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Executive summary
This Report assesses the extent, nature, and effects of financialisation in
Portugal. It also discusses the contribution of financialisation for the crisis that
presently affects the Portuguese economy.
In the second half of the 1970s and in the 1980s high inflation, monetary
financing of the fiscal deficit, and strong regulation of the banking system were
the main characteristics of the macroeconomic environment. From 1984 the
banking sector was gradually liberalised, leading to an increase in competition,
a wave of takeovers, entrance of foreign banks, modernization of the payment
system and channels of contact with customers, and a larger supply of credit.
The strong reduction in the level and volatility of inflation and interest rates, as
well as an easier access to external financing by banks, caused an increase in
credit to the non-financial private sector, giving rise to a period of strong
economic growth. Credit to households to buy houses was the credit segment
that grew the most, but the growth of credit for non-financial corporation was
also remarkable. The rapid growth in credit, together with the dismal
performance of the Portuguese economy since 2000 (and especially after 2008),
implied that in 2011 both Portuguese households and firms were among the
most indebted of the EA, making them particularly vulnerable to an economic
slowdown.
The liberalization of the banking sector, the easier access to international
financial markets, and the growth of credit fostered the development of the
Portuguese financial sector. In 2011, the importance of this sector in terms of
value added was one of the highest in the EA, and between 1995 and 2011 its
growth was one of the fastest. This indicates a process of financialisation of the
economy, which is confirmed by other indicators, namely: the level and
10
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
efficiency of investment declined; the Gross Operational Surplus (GOS) of
financial institutions has grown faster than the GOS of non-financial
corporations; financial assets in proportion of GDP are high and they have
grown rapidly between 1995 and 2010; financial corporations registered the
fastest growth of financial assets amongst the domestic agents; and non-
financial firms became more involved in financial operations.
Another feature of the financialisation of the Portuguese economy is the
increasing role of financial interests in the health sector and in the construction
of public infra-structures.
Banks responded to the new economic environment by building up large
financial groups, increasing concentration, reducing costs, and
internationalising their activities. Banks have made use of market mechanisms,
such as securitisation, to prosper and have increased their dominance in the
financial system.
The growth of the banking sector was accompanied by the emergence of three
main risks: large dependence of foreign market financing, strong decrease in
capital adequacy ratios, and significant vulnerability to house prices fluctuations
(real estate loans represented around 60% of the loans portfolio).
Banks did not treat firms uniformly. On the one hand, compared with large
firms, SME paid larger interest rates and received less credit in periods of
credit tightening. On the other hand, between 1998 and 2011, manufacturing
and construction (after 2004) faced greater difficulties in obtaining credit than
other industries. The slow growth of credit to manufacturing is probably both a
result and a cause of the slow growth of its output. Since 1995, manufacturing
has lost importance in terms of value added, with the fall being larger in
Portugal than in the average of the EA.
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The growth of credit created the economic boom and the conditions for the
bust. The high growth of aggregate demand, fed by credit and helped by a pro-
cyclical expansionary fiscal policy in some occasions, led to one of the highest
average inflation rates of the EA, which implied a reduction in the
competitiveness of Portuguese firms. Around 2002, high inflation, the inevitable
slowdown of credit growth (given the increasing levels of indebtedness), the
liberalization of worldwide trade, and the vulnerability of the Portuguese export
structure to the appreciation of the euro against the US dollar, among other
factors, translated into a long period of slow economic growth, resulting in
increasing pressure on public finance. During the 2000s the Portuguese
economy had one of the worst economic growth performances of the EA, with a
high current account deficit financed abroad by banks and the Government.
Therefore, when the Subprime crisis occurred, the Portuguese economy was
already in a dismal condition. During this crisis, banks had difficulties in
obtaining financing in the international markets. After the Sovereign debt crisis
begun in late 2009, this and other factors – namely, liquidity problems of banks,
increase in uncertainty, rise of regulatory capital requirements, and the
increase in non-performing loans – help to explain the sharp worsening of the
conditions faced by firms non-financial in obtaining credit.
As a result of the Subprime crises and its subsequent developments, the fiscal
position of the Portuguese government deteriorated fast, both as a result of the
‘ automatic stabilizers’ and, to a lesser extent, to the expansionary fiscal policy
followed by the government (according to the guidelines agreed at the EU level).
International investors (the main buyers of Portuguese public debt) started to
raise doubts regarding the capacity of households, corporations and the
government to pay their debts. Interest rates on government’s long term bonds
increased noticeably, forcing the country to resort to international financial
help. Since 2009 the current account deficit has decreased sharply, a result of
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both the international credit rationing, and the substantial drop in internal
consumption and investment (both public and private).
In sum, several indicators suggest that the Portuguese economy has gone
through a process of financialisation since the early 1990s, namely the large
growth of private debt, the growth of the financial sector, the deregulation of
financial markets, and the diffusion of market mechanisms to new areas. This
process has contributed to create the conditions for the emergence of the
Sovereign Debt crisis in Portugal from 2010 onwards.
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Introduction
In most developed countries, the financial sector has been growing in
importance in terms of both employment and GDP. The Portuguese economy is
no exception.
The great importance of finance in the economy nowadays leads us to the
concept of financialisation. Although there is no unique definition of
financialisation, one of the broadest accounts of the term suggests that
“financialisation refers to the increasing importance of financial markets,
financial motives, financial institutions, and financial elites in the operations of
the economy and its governing institutions, both at the national and
international level” (Epstein, 2001, p. 1).
Many transformations in the structure of the economy reflect the process of
financialisation. These include a significant increase in financial transactions,
the rise of real interest rates, higher profitability of financial corporations in
relation to non-financial corporations, among others (Epstein, 2005).
Menkhoff and Tolksdorf (2001) highlight the growing relative importance of
stock markets, capital flows and international financial transactions (visible in
the volume of foreign exchange market transactions) during the last three
decades, particularly in comparison with corporations’ capital stock or the real
national product. These authors add that there has been a change in the role of
the financial sector during the last decades. They advocate that, in the past, the
financial sector supported and stimulated economic growth (“optimistic view”),
through a “supportive relationship”. However, this relation changed
significantly in the last ten to twenty years, as events in the financial sphere
started to follow their own logic and the real economy had to adjust to that
logic. There was a growing “decoupling” between the financial sector and the
real economy.
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Palley (2007) argues that the process of financialisation produces a downward
trend of real economic growth, a transfer of income from the real sector to the
financial sector, and an increase in income inequality and wage stagnation.
Financialisation is, thus, a broad and complex concept. In order to delimit the
analysis done in this report, we adopt the definition of FESSUD project,
according to which financialisation includes eight features: (i) large
development of financial markets, (ii) de-regulation of the financial system and
of the economy in general, (iii) the emergence of new financial institutions and
markets, (iv) a dominance of finance over industry in terms of investment and
production, (v) rising inequality due to the work of market mechanisms and
explicit public policies, (vi) growth of consumption based on credit financing,
(vii) the diffusion of market and financial logic in economic and social areas
previously not affected by these logics, (viii) and the emergence of a culture
oriented to the individual, the market and rationalism.
In the light of mainstream economics, “financialisation” is in general a positive
phenomenon. According to this view, financial markets are efficient in
processing information, which can be used to guide the allocation of resources.
Market mechanisms will improve efficiency in all areas of human activity, as
long as market failures and externalities are correctly addressed.
Especially after the 2008 financial crisis, this wonderland’s view has been
contested by many new and less novel theories, mainly referring to the
following issues:
- Financialisation reduces the level and efficacy of real investment, as
funds are diverted to financial activities.
- Firms aim to maximize their financial value, normally in the short-run,
overlooking their long-run survival and other social values.
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- Economic and social public policies are pushed to accept market
mechanisms in all areas of economic and social life, sometimes with
deleterious consequences in terms of efficiency and equity.
- Growing areas of economic and social life are exposed to volatility and
crises, which often characterise financial markets.
Crotty (2005) adds that the demand of financial markets for more income
pressures non-financial corporations into financial operations, which
contributes for the stagnation of economic growth.
Some authors have argued that the process of financialisation has contributed
to the subprime crisis in the US economy in the end of the last decade (e.g.
Freeman, 2010, and Kedrosky and Stangler, 2011). Palley (2007) concludes that
the process of financialisation makes economies more vulnerable to debt-
inflation episodes and prolonged recessionary environments.
In this regard, a large body of empirical literature has emerged over the last
decades dealing with the causes, patterns and consequences of financialisation
in different parts of the world. Krippner (2005) argues that the US economy
presents signs of financialisation since the early 1970s, which is demonstrated
by the growing importance for non-financial corporations of financial revenues
and the increasing relevance of the financial sector as a source of profits for the
economy. The evidence on financialisation in the US is also confirmed by Palley
(2007), Orhangazi (2008), Stockhammer (2010), among others.
Although the research on this topic has often been focused on the US economy,
financialisation is a common phenomenon across all industrialized economies
(Palley, 2007, Power et al., 2003, Jayadev and Epstein, 2007, Leiva and
Malinowitz, 2007, Orhangazi, 2008), including countries that lie outside the core
of the world economy. Notwithstanding, most of the literature on
financialisation is focused on the more advanced economies, often neglecting
the peculiarities and dynamics of financialisation on the periphery (Becker et
al., 2010).
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However, a few works analyse the specificities of the process of financialisation
in peripheral economies. Leiva and Malinowitz (2007) suggest that the process
of financialisation had a negative impact on economic performance both in the
North and South, due to the decline of productive investments. Other
consequences of that phenomenon include the deregulation of labor-capital
relations, the intensification of mergers and acquisitions to boost shareholder
value, the reduction of the room of manoeuvre of public policies, and rising
income inequality.
Assa (2012) concludes that the process of financialisation has taken place in all
OECD countries and had negative consequences on growth, employment and
equality. Similarly, Kus (2012) confirms that financialisation has raised
inequality for a set of 20 OECD countries between 1995 and 2007.
Other studies focus on specific, non-core countries. Yeldan (2000) concludes
that the process of financialisation has had a negative impact on economic
growth, unemployment and income distribution in Turkey. Becker et al. (2010)
focus their analysis on the financialisation in two countries from Latin America
(Brazil and Chile) and other two from Eastern Europe (Serbia and Slovakia),
finding that this phenomenon has been extremely crisis-prone in all four cases.
They also add that the crisis faced by these countries has fostered the adoption
of further measures towards financialisation (supported by IMF or other
international institutions), namely the privatisation of the pension systems in
Chile and Slovakia.
Orsi and Solari (2010) analysed the changes in the financial systems of Southern
European economies in the last 15 years. According to these authors, these
financial systems are bank-based, with banks controlling all credit, the stock
exchange and investment in shares by acting as advisers, mediators, issuers,
treasurers and investors. Thus, in such countries, universal banks are able to
decide who can invest, where can invest, who makes profits and who loses.
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These authors also consider that the most evident sign of financialisation of
these economies comes from the strong importance of banks, which sustains
the dynamism of the economy granting high levels of credit, especially for
durable goods.
Although affecting many countries around the world, financialisation is not a
homogeneous phenomenon across space and time. According to Peck and
Theodore’s (2007) notion of “variegated capitalism”, capitalism develops across
time and space in heterogeneous way. An important distinction is between
market-based and bank-based financial systems. In the literature on varieties
of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001), bank-based financial systems are
connected to co-ordinated economic systems and market-based are linked to
liberal models. Naturally this distinction is a matter of degree, since all
financial systems have financial markets and banks. Both systems have their
supporters, arguing that one system is better than the other in processing
information, allocating capital and managing risk (Levine, 2002).
However, both the market- and bank-based systems are affected by rationing
and instability. As is well- known, equity rationing is a pervasive phenomenon,
with many firms in developed countries getting a very small fraction of capital
from the stock market (Stiglitz and Greenwald, 2003). Credit rationing by banks
emerges due to asymmetric information that inherently characterizes financial
transactions. As such, an important goal of our work is to discuss whether
credit rationing exists in the Portuguese context, how it works, and who is
affected by it. It is also interesting to understand if banks use equity
participation in firms to better monitor them.
In the bank-based system, instability may come from excessive credit provision,
leading to default of firms and households due to excess leverage in periods of
downturn and fall in house prices. In the market-based system, financial
instability is associated to asset price bubbles, with prices deviating strongly
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from their fundamental values. These bubbles sometimes are supported by the
provision of credit by banks. In other situations, banks are involved in the
creation and investment in new financial products (as CDOs), which create
instability in the markets.
Minsky (1994) argues that financial markets oscillate between regimes of
stability and instability. Periods of prolonged prosperity may create conditions
for the economy to move from a stable system to an unstable system.
Allen and Gale (2001) suggest that the recent past and the present time are
characterized by a trend towards liberal and thus market-based financial
systems. New developments, as the securitization and the involvement of banks
in the trading of financial products, indicate even a change of the character of
banks in direction to more market oriented mechanisms.
Either in bank- or market-based financial systems, the State plays a central
role. Firstly, its role is central in protecting property rights, in creating
regulations, and in liberalizing and developing markets (e.g. the stock market).
Secondly, the State has an important role in bailing out the financial sector in
periods of crisis. The creation of this safety net allows saving the financial
system and the whole economy from collapse, but it creates an incentive for
excessive risk taking by financial agents. Giving the centrality of the State for
the financial sector, we usually observe financial institutions to exert strong
influence over the State, and often having great influence over crucial policy
decisions.
Having in mind the definition of financialisation and its many facets, this Report
aims to assess the extent, nature and effects of financialisation in Portugal. The
interest of studying Portugal is twofold. Firstly, Portugal is currently (in 2013) in
a deep economic crisis, and so it is relevant to ask what was the contribution of
financialisation for this situation. Secondly, as Becker et al. (2010) sustain, the
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economies, particularly, on the US economy, often neglecting the peculiarities
and dynamics of the process in the countries located in the periphery.
The full range of financial institutions and markets will be evaluated taking into
account their interactions with the real economy. The analysis starts in 1980,
the moment usually taken as a reference for the acceleration of the process of
financialisation.
The report is organized as follows. It starts with an overview of the historical,
political and economic development of the Portuguese economy and society.
Part II is dedicated to the evolution of the Portuguese financial sector. First, it
deals with the evolution of the regulatory framework (Section 2), followed by the
growth in finance and its role in the decades of financialisation is described in
Section 3. Taking into account the growth in the financial sector, we study the
change in the structure and forms of organisation (Section 4), the availability
and source of funds (Section 5), the competition between financial institutions
(Section 6), and profitability of financial institutions (Section 7).
Part III discusses the interaction between the financial and other sectors,
namely the behaviour of the real estate sector (Section 8), the source of funds
for business investment (Section 9), the involvement of the financial sector in
restructuring non-financial firms (Section 10), the process of privatization
(Section 11), and cultural and inequality issues (Section 12).
Part IV assesses the importance of the international context in the Portuguese
financial system, with particular attention to the impact of financial
globalization (Section 14), European integration (Section 15), and international
flows of capital (Section 16).
In Part V we discuss the nature and impact of the financial crisis in Portugal.
Finally we draw some general conclusion on the financialisation process in
Portugal.
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PART I – General background
1. Historical, political, economic and international background 1
The history of the Portuguese economy and society since the end of World War
II can be broadly divided into five periods: 1945-1974, 1974-1985, 1986-1999,
2000-2008, and from 2008 onwards. In what follows, we briefly present the main
aspects in the socio-economic history of the country for each of those periods.
1.1. 1945-1974: dictatorship, industrialization, colonial war, and
international economic integration
Like most Western countries, Portugal experienced a period of strong economic
growth in the quarter century that followed the end of World War II. Although
Portugal did not take part in the war (the dictatorial regime, in place since 1926,
adopted a neutral position between the traditional English ally and the
politically closer Nazi regime), the conflict was all but irrelevant for the
evolution of the domestic political economy. Economically, the war fostered the
accumulation of financial and political capital amongst part of the local
industrial bourgeoisie, tilting the balance of power against the rural interests,
which had held great influence within the regime up to then. Politically, the
defeat of the Axis Powers helped to convince the conservative dictatorship to
embrace the economic development of the country, as a means to minimize the
risks of major internal upheavals. Electrification and other major
infrastructural programs, together with the active promotion of selected
industries, were part of the development strategy adopted in that context.
1 Point 1b and 17 of the terms of reference.
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The evolution of the Portuguese economy and society was further influenced by
two major events that took place in the beginning of the 1960s: the participation
of Portugal as a founding member of the European Free Trade Agreement
(EFTA), and the beginning of the colonial war.
The membership of EFTA was seen by the regime as necessary to avoid
international isolation and, at the same time, to take advantage of the opening
of international flows of trade and investment which was developing fast in
Europe during this period. Portugal’s membership of the recently formed EEC
was not feasible due to the Portuguese Government's intention to maintain
privileged relations with the colonies. In contrast, participation in EFTA gave
Portugal greater autonomy in the implementation of its colonial policy. It also
helped to protect national agriculture from external competition, allowing a
gradual tariff disarmament in manufacturing products. Notwithstanding, by
being the single poor country in a club of rich economies (Austria, Denmark,
Norway, the UK, Sweden and Switzerland), Portugal was able to attract
substantial amounts of FDI from other EFTA countries. This was decisive for the
acceleration of industrialization, technological development, productivity
growth, and international economic integration.
In the same vein, the colonial war (1961-1974) had multiple implications for the
evolution of the Portuguese economy and society. On one hand, the war effort
forced the development of several domestic industries. On the other hand, the
young male population was largely mobilized for the military action in the
African colonies, or escaped the country to avoid the war. As a consequence, the
female participation in the workforce increased rapidly, and the scarcity in the
supply of labour translated into faster increases in real wages, favouring the
slow emergency of a middle class. Moreover, the significant increase in
emigration flows led to the increase in remittances, which helped cover the
deficit in the balance of goods and services, leading to a substantial
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accumulation of reserves since the middle 1960s. Finally, by this time, the
colonial war began pressuring public accounts, imposing the need to increase
tax revenue, in spite of the fast pace of economic growth. This gradual
transformation of the tax system contributed to the ulterior development of
social spending.
1.2. 1974-1985: revolutionary upheaval, international crises, and
adjustment
At the international level, the period of strong growth that marked the post-war
period was interrupted by the collapse of the international monetary system
(after the declaration of inconvertibility of the dollar into gold in 1971) and rising
oil prices imposed by OPEC in 1973-4.
It was in the midst of the resulting international economic crisis that the
Carnation Revolution (25th of April, 1974) took place. Putting an end to 48 years
of conservative dictatorship and 13 years of colonial war, the revolutionary
process was thus characterized by great social, economic and political
instability. In addition to the difficulties driven by the international crisis, several
country-specific factors contributed to a sharp disruption in economic activities,
including: the abrupt de-colonization process (leading to the arrival of 700
thousand people in less than one year, in a country with less than 10 million
inhabitants), the social pressure for fast improvements in living conditions
(translating into higher real wages, higher public spending, and inflationary
pressures), the conflict between the emerging regime and prevailing business
and financial groups (ultimately leading to massive nationalizations in several
sectors of activity – electricity, gas, water, rail, sea and air, part of the road
network, banking and insurance), and the inherent uncertainty concerning the
denouement of the revolutionary process.
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Substantial capital flight, significant drops in remittances and foreign
investment, disruptions in production (related to labour unrest), the loss of
colonial markets, real appreciation in the exchange rate (partially associated
with real wage increases), weak external demand, all contributed to increasing
difficulties in the balance of payments and the budget balance, ultimately
leading to Portugal’s recourse to external financial support.
A US-led international loan was granted in 1977 under the condition of an
agreement with the IMF, which was signed the next year. The associated
stabilization program included as key elements: the adoption of a crawling-peg
exchange rate regime (with regular and pre-announced devaluations of the
currency), credit limits aiming to control aggregate demand and the external
deficit, the direct control of credit growth, administrative restraints on interest
rates, and the liberalization of foreign trade. Strong restrictions on the
movement of capital were in place since 1977.
However, the efforts to adjust the external balance were jeopardised by the
advent of the second oil crisis, leading to the need to resort once more to
foreign aid. A second IMF adjustment program was introduced between 1983
and 1985, adding a tighter control on the public enterprises’ debt to the
ingredients already present in the first program. Overall, the decade that
followed the 1974 revolution was marked by slow economic growth and high
unemployment.
The nationalizations that took place after the 1974 revolution and the
agreements with the IMF account for the late liberalization of the Portuguese
economy, in particular the financial sector, in comparison with other European
countries. While in other European countries the private sector dominated the
banking system, public banks were the norm in Portugal in the in the early
1980s. During this period, public banks typically financed the public sector at
interest rates which were below market values, reducing banks’ profits and
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capital. Banks’ management was subject to political influence and competition
was essentially absent from the sector – banks could not compete on price,
quantity, or location. This situation has significantly changed in the following
period.
1.3. 1986-1999: accession to the EEC, growth and liberalization, and
preparing for the EMU
By the end of the period of the second IMF intervention, the international
economic context was becoming more favourable to the Portuguese economy,
due to the appreciation of the US dollar, the substantial drop in oil prices, and
the rate of economic growth of Portugal’s main trading partners. It was in this
favourable context that Portugal joined the EEC (on the 1st of January, 1986),
benefiting in the following years from a substantial transfer of structural funds,
access to loans from the European Investment Bank, as well as from the
significant inflows of FDI (fostered, in particular, by the single market program).
This period was also characterized by the political stabilization of the country
and the liberalization of the Portuguese economy – in particular, the financial
sector (see Table 1).
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Table 1 – Main measures of financial liberalisation and deregulation
adopted in Portugal
Date Measure
February 1984
Start of the removal of barriers to the entry of new banking
institutions and the removal of restrictions on the expansion of
the network of bank branches
June 1984
Liberalisation of deposit rates, excluding the rate on deposits
with a maturity of 180 days up to 1 year
August 1985
Liberalisation of lending rates2, excluding those on operations
with a maturity from 90 to 180 days, 2 years to 5 years and
over 5 years, for which a ceiling was set
1986
Start of the removal of capital controls (allowing for FDI and
portfolio investment)
September
1988
Liberalisation of lending rates, excluding those related to
loans for house purchase
March 1989
Start of the privatisation process and elimination of ceilings on
all lending rates
March 1990 Suspension of the compulsory credit ceiling system
During 1990 New legal framework for Bank of Portugal
October 1990 Crawling peg ends
January 1991
Elimination of compulsory or indicative quantitative credit
limits, replaced by open market operations
April 1992 Escudo joins the European Monetary System
May 1992 Liberalisation of all deposit rates
Dec. 1992
Conclusion of the process international capital movements
liberalisation
Source: Based on Castro (2007)
In the first six years following the accession to the EEC, Portugal’s GDP per
capita (in purchasing power parities) rapidly converged with the EU15 average,
from 54% in 1986 of that average to 68% in 1992. This process of catching-up
was interrupted during the crisis of the European Monetary System (EMS) in
1992-1993. The adverse international context, however, is only part of the
explanation for the falling output and rising unemployment experienced during
this period.
2 Liberalization means that banks become free to set interest rates.
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Since 1990 Portuguese economic policy has been committed to the nominal
convergence strategy that was inherent to the process of monetary integration
in the EU. In the early 1990s, the Portuguese government implemented a
strategy of ‘competitive disinflation’, characterised by restrictive monetary and
fiscal policies aimed at reducing the external deficit and inflation, and seeking
output and employment growth via the reduction in real wages, increased price
competitiveness, exchange rate stability and credibility of policies. The crawling
peg was then abandoned and the escudo was pegged to a basket of European
currencies dominated by the German mark – thereby anticipating, in essence,
the accession to the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary
System planned for 1992. At the end of this year all restrictions on the free
movement of capital were abolished. The conjunction of the disinflationary
strategy and the international recession, as well as the financial instability
within the EMS, led to the first recession of Portugal’s new European age in
1993.
In the remaining years of the 20th century the Portuguese economy benefitted
from the improved performance of the international economy and from the
sharp reduction in real interest rates since the mid-1990s – real long-term
interest rates fell from an average of 4.8% in 1993-1996 to 1.8% in 1997-2000.
Such a drop in interest rates was a result of the aforementioned ‘nominal
convergence’ (in anticipation of the EMU), the liberalization of the banking
sector, and the free movement of capital within the European single market
(improving the domestic banks’ access to international financing, via interbank
lending, debt market, and securitization of credits). Banks have thus ensured
the financing of the economy, borrowing money internationally and lending it
internally. In sum, the participation of the Portuguese economy in the process
leading to the EMU increased significantly the availability of credit.
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Such developments had a decisive impact on public and private decisions, since
economic agents were then able to obtain a substantially higher volume of
credit without increasing significantly their future financial obligations.
Accordingly, public and private (firms and household’) investment increased at
a fast pace during this period, feeding – and being fed by – economic growth.
The increase in domestic investment coincided with a period of low oil prices
and favourable exchange rate developments (with the appreciation of the dollar
against the euro), all of which had a positive impact on economic activity. Thus,
after a dismal performance in 1993-1994, the Portuguese economy regained
momentum, with GDP growing at an annual average of 4.3% (in real terms)
between 1995 and 2000, and the unemployment rate dropping from 7.1% to
3.9%.
Such economic growth was to some extent translated into long-awaited
improvements in social welfare. For example, between 1990 and 2000, the
minimum old age pension increased from 163€ to 202€ per month, while the
minimum unemployment allowances increased from 257€ to 334€ (all values at
2006 prices), while access to health and education services for the population at
large improved substantially. When the decade drew to a close, government
expenditures as a percentage of GDP had grown to 41.1% (from 38.5%) – still
below the EU15 average of 44.9%, but much closer than in 1990. Concurrently,
public investment grew rapidly over the period, reaching 5.3% of GDP in 1997
and remaining over 4% until 2002.
Notwithstanding the increase in social expenditures and public investment,
Government finances seemed at the time to remain in a healthy shape. In fact,
national public debt decreased by more than 10 percentage points of GDP in the
second half of the 1990, from 59.2% in 1995 to 48.5% in 2000; the Government
budget deficit dropped from -5.4% to -3.3%.
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In other words, during the second half of the 1990s, a fairly expansionary fiscal
policy was compatible with a positive evolution of public finances. Four main
reasons account for this: the rapid pace of economic growth, the low levels of
real interest rates, the (re)privatization of large public firms in several
industries (including telecoms, energy, transport, banking and insurance,
among others), and the substantial inflows of European structural funds
(corresponding to more than 2% of GDP each year).
1.4. 2000-2008: dismal growth and loss of competitiveness within the
EMU
By the turn of the millennium, the Portuguese economy and society were in
seemingly promising conditions – and the participation in the founding group of
the euro area was just another expression of this optimistic outlook.
However, the evolution of the Portuguese economy was rather different
afterwards, with GDP growth between 2000 and 2005 dropping to an annual
average of 0.8%. A number of events account for this dramatic change of
course. Soon after the inception of the euro, in reaction to what appeared to be
signs of overheating in the euro zone, the ECB started to tighten its monetary
policy, leading the Euribor 6-month rate to double from its lowest 1999 value of
2.6% to 5.2% in late 2000. Given the high rates of public and private investment
in the preceding years, essentially financed through bank credit, the steep
increase in the interest rates had a significant impact on the levels of available
income and, consequently, in domestic demand. In the meantime, the busting of
the ‘dot.com bubble’ (starting in March 2000 and lasting through 2001) triggered
the first international economic crisis of the new millennium. These two events
are largely accountable for the increase of the Portuguese public deficit to 4.3%
of GDP in 2001, making Portugal the first country in the euro area to break the
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Stability and Growth Pact’s (SGP) 3% limit. In the following couple of years, the
Portuguese authorities were committed to comply with the SGP rules, following
pro-cyclical, contractionary fiscal policies, which led to a 1% drop in GDP in
2003 – starting a decade-long period of divergence in average incomes with the
EU.
While the levels of public and private indebtedness looked relatively sustainable
during the second half of the 1990s (when GDP was growing at an average
annual rate of nearly 5%), a sequence of years of dreary GDP growth translated
into rising debt ratios of firms and households, which increasingly translated
into lower investment and, consequently, even lower growth.
By the early 2000s, the Portuguese economy was facing the consequences of
the aforementioned combination of structural weaknesses and international
developments. In particular, the growing competition from Asian emerging
economies (partly as a result of the agreements reached by the EU in the WTO
and other forums) had a substantial impact on a number of traditional
industries (namely, textiles, wearing apparel, footwear, wood and paper, metal
products and non-metallic minerals), which were responsible for a significant
part of the manufacturing work force. Moreover, anticipating the EU’s Eastern
enlargement in 2004, many multinational firms (especially in the automotive
and related industries) shifted their productive capacity to some of the new
member states (taking advantage of lower wages, higher educational levels,
and the geographical proximity to the main European markets).
In short, steep increases in the interest rates (after a prolonged period of public
and private investment), international crisis, pro-cyclical (restrictive) fiscal
policies, increasingly fierce competition from emerging economies, and a loss
of policy instruments to address such problems was the context in which the
Portuguese economy entered the new millennium. When subsequent external
shocks hit the international economy – namely the successive increases in
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ECB’s interest rates in 2005-2008, the substantial appreciation of the euro
against the dollar in 2007-2008, the peak in oil and commodity prices in 2008
and, finally, the Great Recession – Portugal was still going through an
adjustment process characterized by low economic growth, rising
unemployment rates (from nearly full-employment in 2000 – 3.9% – up to 7.7%
in 2006) and, largely as a consequence, a steady rise in the public debt ratio
(which surpassed the euro zone average for the first time in 2006, reaching
63.9% of GDP).
1.5. Since 2008: crises and adjustment programs with no guarantee of
success
With a record of dismal GDP growth since 2000, a rapid increase in public debt
after 2008 (as a result of the international crisis and the counter-cyclical
measures undertaken in line with the European Economic Recovery Plan), and
high levels of indebtedness of both firms and households, the Portuguese
economy was particularly vulnerable to the speculative attacks against
sovereign bonds in the euro zone, which started in late 2009. Following Greece
in early 2010 and Ireland later that year, Portugal submitted a request for
financial help to the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in April 2011.
The Memorandum of Understanding between the Portuguese Government and
the troika composed of the European Commission, the European Central Bank
and the International Monetary Fund – which established the terms of the
adjustment program that would accompany the EFSF’s loan – fixed as main
objectives the rebalancing of Portuguese public finances (by reducing public
deficit from 9,8% of GDP in 2010 to under 3% in 2013) and the adoption of a
number of measures to strengthen the competitiveness of the Portuguese
economy.
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In general, the adjustment program that is being implemented in Portugal since
May 2011 does not represent a dramatic break with the recent past with regard
to the measures related to public finances. As was partly mentioned before,
several policy initiatives in this field have been adopted in previous years,
including reducing the number of civil servants and their real wages; reducing
the number of public agencies and managers; cutting back social expenditures;
downsizing public investment programs; privatizing state-owned firms;
decreasing tax benefits for household expenditures with education and
healthcare; decreasing tax benefits for higher pensions; increasing the VAT rate
(now at 23%); increasing the maximum marginal rate in personal income tax
(now at 45%); introducing a new tax on stock market capital gains; extending
the base of social security contributions to previously excluded forms of
compensation; among others. Concerning these domains, the Portuguese
adjustment program essentially emphasizes the need to proceed with the
implementation of the measures already in place and, in some cases, to
reinforce some of them (for example, imposing stricter limits to social benefits,
greater cuts in public investment, and a stricter control of the budgetary
process at all levels – central and local administration, quasi-public agencies
and state-owned firms).
As expected, such austerity measures have resulted in a steep decrease in
economic activity and employment. For 2012, the Portuguese government
expects a drop in GDP of 3% (after -1.8% in 2011) and an increase of the
unemployment rate to 15.5% (for 2013, the government’s forecasts for GDP and
unemployment are -1% and 16.4%, respectively). More recent forecasts by the
OECD and the European Commission are even drearier.
The contractionary implications of the adjustment program, in the context of a
decelerating European economy (largely due to the austerity programs being
adopted in other EU countries), have already led to the need to adopt new
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measures in the fiscal area – the most relevant of which was a cut of nearly
12% in civil servants’ wages in 2012 (adding to an average cut of 5% that had
been previously decided) and the announcement of overarching tax increases in
2013. The fact that the government had to introduce an additional, and
substantial, cut of civil servants wages and increase general taxes is not only a
sign that the recessive impact of the austerity measures is greater than initially
expected – it also suggests that the possibility to obtain significant
improvements of the budgetary situation by cutting down superfluous
expenditures, or by increasing revenues from unexplored sources, is entering
into rapid decreasing returns.
In other words, given the measures that were already in place (some of which
for several years), the Portuguese adjustment program seems to be mostly
about forcing the reduction of the public deficit in the short term (in order to
meet the goals set at the EU level) – and an internal devaluation in the medium
term – rather than radically changing fiscal management practices in the
country. The aim to achieve a drastic reduction of the deficit is leading to a deep
recession, which makes it even more difficult to achieve the desired goals in the
fiscal front.
The capacity to achieve the deficit targets seems now to depend on a rapid
return of the Portuguese economy to a growth trajectory. This, however, at the
present juncture appears to be ever more distant. The adjustment program
does not include significant measures to counter the recessionary implications
of expenditure cuts and tax increases. During the adjustment period all sources
of growth are expected to come from net exports. But the deterioration of the
European economy is certainly not a cause for optimism at this level.
For the medium- and long-term, the adjustment program assumes that low
wage growth, a decrease in government’s expenditures, the control of public
debt, together with a number of so-called ‘structural reforms’ in the labour and
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product markets, will help to restore the competitiveness of the Portuguese
economy and put it back on a growth track.
However, returning to a sustainable growth path represents a major challenge
for the Portuguese economy. More important than the imperfections in the
labour and product markets, Portugal presents a number of structural
weaknesses that are particularly hard to overcome. The most relevant
constraints to development in the present context are: (i) the low levels of
education of the labour force, (ii) the profile of economic specialisation (which is 
still dominated by industries with low value-added and highly exposed to
competition from Eastern European and emerging economies), and (iii) the
peripheral position of the Portuguese economy in relation to the main European
and world markets (which entails relevant cost disadvantages). While being part
of a monetary area (the EMU) and a common market (the EU) whose rules and
policies are designed for the whole bloc, and which are short of mechanisms to
address asymmetric developments among the composing economies, Portugal
will probably face a long and painful macroeconomic adjustment in the coming
years.
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PART II – The Portuguese financial sector
2. Regulatory framework3
Since the beginning of the 1980s, there was a worldwide trend to liberalize and
privatize the banking system, and eliminate the restrictions to international
capital flows. At the EU level this was associated with the creation of the
European Single Market.
Even though such a trend reached Portugal with some delay, the liberalization
of the financial system followed a similar path to other EU countries. To
understand the reasons for this delay in Portugal, one has to go back to the
1974 Revolution and the subsequent nationalization of the banking system.
2.1. Nationalization of banks after 1974
Until the 1974’s revolution all banks operating in Portugal were private, with the
exception of Caixa Geral de Depósitos (which remained public to the present
day). The banks that could issue currency (Banco de Portugal, Banco Nacional
Ultramarino, and Banco de Angola) also had a private status.
The provisory Governments in the aftermath of the 1974 Revolution, aiming to
prevent capital flight and to have control in the development of the economy,
nationalized the issuing banks in September 1974. In March of 1975 the other
financial institutions (including non-monetary institutions) were nationalized4,
with the exception of mutual or cooperative institutions (Caixas Económicas,
Crédito Agrícola Mútuo) and foreign banks (Crédit Franco-Portugais from Crédit
3 Point 6 of the terms of reference
4 According to the Decree-Law 132/75 of 14 March.
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Lyonnais, Bank of London & South America from Lloyds Bank, and Banco do
Brasil).
In 1976 the new Portuguese Constitution stipulated the irreversibility of the
nationalizations and the prohibition of the banking activity to private agents.
Concurrently, state owned banks were restructured 5 , increasing the
concentration of the industry.
In the beginning of the 1980s, the largest part of the banking system was state
owned. The system was under the direct control of the Government and there
were restrictive regulations. There were restrictions on the amount of credit
and on interest rates, and commercial and investment banks were legally
separated. The scope of activity of commercial banks was also restricted. There
was no real competition, and innovation and efficiency were limited (Caixa Geral
de Depósitos, 2010). In sum, the financial system was repressed.
2.2. The re-privatization and deregulation of the banking system
After Portugal joined the European Economic Community in 1986, the gradual
integration of the Portuguese economy into the European Common Market
required a gradual dismantling of the constraints on the financial system,
namely the State ownership of banks. This process had already begun in 1983
with the reopening of banking and insurance activities to private enterprise6.
The new regulatory framework allowed the creation of new private credit
institutions thenceforth, clearing the way for national and international
5 Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor absorbed Banco Intercontinental Português, Banco Português do
Atlântico absorbed Banco Fernando Magalhães and Banco do Algarve, Banco Fonsecas &
Burnay integrated Banco do Alentejo, Crédito Predial Português absorbed Banco Agrícola e
Industrial Viseense, and União de Bancos Português was created as a result of the merger
between Banco de Angola, Banco da Agricultura and Banco Pinto de Magalhães.
6 Decree-Law 406/83 dated November 19th and the Decree-Law 51/84 dated February 11th.
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investors to create new private banks (with a minimum of 1.5 million escudos of
capital).
Furthermore, a new set of measures was taken later in the decade, including
the gradual elimination of administrative limits on interest rates, credit growth,
and the number and localization of bank branches. Explicit restrictions on the
composition of bank’s assets were also removed, namely the compulsory
investment in national sovereign debt. Mostly, these measures removed the
restrictions that had been implemented as part of the two agreements with the
IMF (in 1977 and 1983), aiming to contain the growth of money supply.
In this context, a number of foreign banks opened activity in Portugal from 1985
onwards, including Barclays, Banque National de Paris, Chase Manhattan,
Citibank, Manufacturers Hanover Bank. Foreign banks were important to the
modernization of the Portuguese financial sector, being carriers of innovation
and efficiency in baking practices, in particular they brought new methods for
assessing credit risk (credit scoring models), new products and services and
new technology (Honohan, 1999). Simultaneously, a new set of domestic banks
were created, being typically focused in specific market segments (such as
investment activities).
The number of domestic and international banks rose dramatically after then.
Between 1984 and 1994, the number of banks (excluding savings and co-
operative banks) jumped from 14 to 45 (Figure 1). This trend persisted during
the following years, led by the arrival of foreign banks to the Portuguese
market, even though although foreigners continued to account for a relatively
small share of the domestic banking market. Honohan (1999) suggests that the
new foreign banks, many focusing on retail banking, were unsuccessful in the
first years mainly due to high levels of non-performing loans.
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Figure 1 – Number of banks operating in Portugal
Source: Bank of Portugal’s Annual Reports, several years
In 1989 a new Constitution abolished the principle of irreversibility of
nationalizations that had been included in the 1976 Constitution. At the end of
that year, the privatization process began7, and the barriers to the entry of new
financial institutions into the Portuguese financial sector were abolished.
The privatization process represented an important milestone, enhancing
competition and innovation in the banking sector. Since privatizations were
carried out mainly through public offers, they contributed to increases in the
depth of capital markets and led to greater diversification in investors’ portfolio,
particularly in the case of households and corporations. The promotion of
‘popular capitalism’ was by then a moto. Commercial banks facilitated and
profited from this process by giving credit to small investors wishing to buy
stocks.
7 This happened after the publication of the Decree-Law 84/89 of 20 July. Banco Totta & Açores,
Banco Espírito Santo e Comercial and Banco Português do Atlântico were the first institutions
to be privatized in 1991. In 1992, the privatization process continued with Banco Fonsecas &
Burnay, Banco Internacional do Funchal and Crédito Predial Português. In 1994, Banco Pinto
& Sotto Mayor, União de Bancos Portugueses, Banco Fomento do Exterior, Banco Borges &
Irmão and Banco Totta & Açores followed (see Table 1, in Annex).
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As a consequence of the competition from foreign banks and the efforts for
rationalization, several waves of takeovers subsequently took place, especially
after 1994. In many cases, the institutions involved in these operations did not
actually merge, but rather formed banking conglomerates, only a few
disappearing completely as a result. In any case, such reorganization led to the
increase in market concentration (Figure 73).
In order to prevent banks from exerting their market power over clients and to
avoid excess indebtedness in such a liberalized market, some regulations have
been approved to protect consumers. Among the most important, limits to the
commissions charged by banks in the case of anticipated payment of the
mortgage were established, facilitating the mobility of clients across banks and,
therefore, fostering competition among banks. Moreover, banks were forced to
disclose comprehensive pre-contractual information to their clients. In the case
of mortgages, banks were now expected to provide their clients with
simulations of the impact of increases in the interest rate on the monthly
instalment.
Finally, in some countries the liberalization of the banking system has caused
banking crisis. This succession of events has not occurred in Portugal, in spite
of the default of some small banks with no systemic impact.
In sum, and following Honohan (1999), the liberalization of the Portuguese
financial system has gone through three stages. The first stage is associated
with the possibility of the creation of new banks since 1983, after the revision of
the Constitution in the previous year. The second phase starts in 1989 with the
privatization of the banks which had been nationalized in 1975. The third stage
is related to the elimination of interest rate controls (controls on lending
interest rates were removed in 1988, while controls on deposits interest rates
were eliminated only in 1992), the abolishment of credit ceilings (in 1990) and
other State controls on the number of branches and new products and services.
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2.3. European integration and the banking system
The adoption of European regulation has contributed in a decisive way to the
liberalization and deregulation of the Portuguese banking system. An important
step was taken in late 1992, when the Second Banking Coordination Directive8
(which extended the single market to financial services) was transposed to the
Portuguese law9. Thereby, a financial institution allowed to operate in any
member state could establish new branches and provide financial services
across borders throughout the EU, obtaining the so-called “EU-passport”.
Hence, any bank based in the EU obtained automatic access to a much wider
market, broadening the relevant market in geographic terms, reducing national
borders, and removing restrictions on the range of financial activities allowed
(with the exception of insurance activity).
This new regulatory framework also established the principle of universal
banking, eliminating the legal imposition of segmentation of banking activities.
Until the publication of this legal framework, the banking system was
segmented into different activities: commercial banks, savings banks, and
investment banks. After 1992 all banks were able to perform the whole range of
bank activities and the banking system was no longer divided into banks
specialized in certain operations with particular maturities. Banks also started
to offer other specialized products that are not strictly banking products, such
as factoring or leasing. Moreover, banks seized the opportunity to start
internationalizing, by opening branches in other countries.
In order to develop the internal market, one of the main concerns of the EU was
to harmonize the procedures and regulations across member states, including
8 Directive 89/646/EEC of 15 December.
9 Law 298/92 of 31 December.
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the implementation of the European Union Capital Adequacy Directive 10 .
Following the recommendations of the 1988 Basel Committee, such a Directive
aimed to establish uniform capital requirements for both banks and non-bank
securities firms. The Basel I rules for capital adequacy were implemented in
Portugal in 1993. The rules of the common market for insurance and
investment services were also adopted in Portugal.
2.4. Changes in regulation in response to the 2008 financial crisis
The 2008 financial crisis evolved rapidly from a situation of financial turbulence
associated with sub-prime mortgages in the US, to a serious global financial
and economic crisis. In response, the majority of international authorities put in
place coordinated actions, involving the adoption of emergency policy measures
by central banks, supervisory authorities, governments and supranational
entities.
One of the major concerns was to reinforce the future resilience of banks by
increasing their capital. In this line, the new Basel III agreement, starting in
2013 and with full implementation expected in 2019, imposes more demanding
capital ratios (the Tier I ratio goes from 6% to 7%).
The European Commission has adopted a plan recommending member States
to guarantee debt emissions by banks, to soften securities’ accounting rules,
and to recapitalize banks in difficulty through public money (European
Commission, 2008). Measures were taken to improve the regulation of rating
agencies, as for example the prohibition of selling consulting services, the
obligation to publish models and methodologies, the requirement to include
independent members in the administrations. The EU also proposed the
10 Directive 93/6/EEC and the corresponding amendment in Directive 98/31/EEC.
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limitation of bonus to banks’ managers. The UK and France created a special
50% income tax on bonuses for all high earners.
In line with European guidelines, the Portuguese authorities adopted a pro-
active stance, approving measures to support the robustness of the financial
system and to mitigate the negative effects of the crisis on the real economy
(Bank of Portugal, 2007, p. 39).
Thus, in October 2008 the Portuguese government created State guarantees for
issues of securitized debt by banks, to a maximum of 20 000 million € for all
banks. These guarantees were designed for all credit institutions with the head
office registered in Portugal, which were facing temporary liquidity constraints
due to the difficulty in accessing the interbank market and in issuing debt with
medium term maturities. Banks had to pay a commission of 50 basis points
(b.p.) for the guarantee of a debt emission with maturity less than a year (or 50
b.p. plus the premium on the bank’s own credit default swap at 5 years in the
case of a debt emission with maturity larger than a year).
On the 2th of November 2008, the Portuguese government announced a
recapitalization plan for credit institutions, up to a total of 4 000 M€. The main
aim of this recapitalization plan was to guarantee that banks were able to
improve their solvency ratios, in a context of strong difficulties in wholesale
debt markets and according to the Recommendation of the Bank of Portugal11
that the Tier I capital ratio should be above 8% from September 2009.
At the beginning of April 2011, the Bank of Portugal switched from a
recommendation to a requirement that the minimum limit of the Core Tier I
ratio should be 8%. It is worth noticing that the Core Tier I ratio was defined on
the basis of Basel III rules, applicable for the definition of Common Equity I in
2013.
11 Circular 83/2008/DSB.
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In May 2011 Portugal signed the Economic and Financial Assistance Program
(EFAP) with the ECB, European Commission and IMF, as a counterpart of an
international loan amounting 78 000 M€. The EFAP established four main goals
regarding financial stability (Bank of Portugal, 2012: 17): to improve the
solvency of the banking sector, to promote the deleveraging of banks and
ensure their stable funding, to strengthen the supervision of the banking
system, and to improve the regulation of banks.
In order to reinforce the solvency of the banking system, in May 2011 the
minimum for Core Tier I was revised from 8% to 9%, to be complied until the
end of 2011, and to 10% by the end of 201212. In order to prevent situations in
which banks would be unable to meet this required capital levels selling capital
on the markets, part of the international loan (12 000 M€) was allocated to bank
recapitalization (the Bank Solvency Support Facility). Yet, only a restricted
number of banking institutions are expected to use this fund (Bank of Portugal,
2012: 18), probably because they can obtain capital in the market or are not
interested in having the State as a shareholder.
To reduce the leverage of banks the EFAP also included an indicative target for
the credit-to-deposits ratio of the eight main banking groups, which was set at
120% by the end of 2014. In the same vein, a stable funding structure for banks
was based on the reinforcement of the assets that could be used as collateral
for loans from the ECB. This source of finance was still very important for
banks in 2011, when the access to international debt markets was virtually
blocked. The emission of bonds by banks with government guarantee was
important to facilitate the access to ECB’s financing, since those bonds could be
used as collateral in the ECB. Another important line of action was the increase
in banks’ deposits (in order to improve the ratio credit-to-deposits), which has
occurred at a good pace in 2011. The demand for deposits augmented in
12 Notice 3/2011.
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response to the increase of interest rates and due to higher risk aversion. The
competition between banks for deposits was so fierce that the Bank of Portugal
decided to create a rule penalizing banks’ capital if they paid very high deposits
interest rates.
More recently, the Bank of Portugal ruled that 21% of the nominal value of the
exposures to Greek public debt should be deducted from the Core Tier I capital
of the Portuguese financial institutions, due to the strong deterioration of
Greece’s fiscal situation and in line with the decision of the European Summit to
involve the private sector in the bailout. After that, the European Council’s
meeting of 26 October 2011 decided a haircut of 50 per cent of the nominal
amount of Greek debt held by private investors (the terms and conditions of
which have yet to be clarified).
In order to reinforce the confidence of depositors, the Portuguese government
also increased the maximum cover for the deposit guarantee fund, from 25 000
to 100 000 euros per depositor and per institution13.
In addition, there was a substantial reduction in the legally defined period for
redemption of deposits and other measures were taken to reinforce the duties
of financial institutions in terms of information and transparency.
Simultaneously, the Securities Market Commission banned temporarily the
short-selling of shares issued by financial institutions.
Furthermore, the Bank of Portugal put in place amendments to its prudential
supervisory framework. Changes were made to the treatment of unrealized
gains and losses on securities classified as available-for-sale assets, which had
a positive impact on bank’s capital. On the other hand, in order to improve the
supervision of the banking system (in line with the EFAP), the Bank of Portugal
requested more frequent and detailed reports on prudential information
13 Law 211-A/2008.
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(liquidity and solvency). There was also a reinforcement of the methodology to
assess the solvency and deleveraging process of the banking system (including
the realization of stress tests on the eight major banking groups), the
publication of a new non-performing loans ratio, the development of further
indicators to evaluate the level of indebtedness of households and corporations,
and the creation of the Special on-site Inspections Program for banks.
Besides these general measures, the Portuguese authorities had to deal with
the complications which arose in two banks. The problems in the Banco
Português de Negócios (BPN) led to its nationalization in early November 2008
to protect depositors. The other problematic bank was Banco Privado
Português (BPP), where the first move was to set up a private solution through
a loan from six Portuguese banks backed by State guarantees.
Given the fragilities of the Portuguese banking system in 2012, it can be asked if
the supervision of the Bank of Portugal has failed in some aspect. In
accordance with the European Commission (2004) banking regulation has
involved measures to restrict the lending behaviour of banks, namely: higher
capital requirements for mortgage loans with high loan-to-value ratio;
acceleration of provisions for non-performing loans (in 2003); and indications
for banks to increase capital and extend financing maturities. On the negative
side, we can argue that in the BPN and BPP cases there are indications that
more could have been done to detect timely fraudulent management’s acts.
2.5. Concluding remarks
In the aftermath of the 1974 Revolution, most of the Portuguese banking system
was nationalized. Together with the Balance of Payments problems and the
related agreements with the IMF (in 1977 and 1983), this implied that the
process of liberalization of the financial system in Portugal was somewhat
delayed in comparison with other European countries.
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In the second half of the 1970s and for most of the 1980s the Portuguese
banking system was mainly dominated by public banks and it was subjected to
strong regulation, with low levels of competition and innovation. The
liberalization of the banking sector started in 1984, with the authorization of
private banks, followed by the elimination of many restrictions no banks’
activity, privatizations, the free entry of EU banks into the domestic market, and
the adoption of capital requirements. This process resulted in the substantial
increase in the number of banks (especially foreign-owned ones), an increase in
competition, a wave of takeovers, and a larger supply of credit. Despite the
liberalization process, no financial crisis has occurred for two decades. Only in
2008, as a result of the international crisis, the Government and the bank of
Portugal were compelled to take measures to ensure the stability of the
financial system, guaranteeing banks’ debt, recapitalizing banks, and re-
enforcing the regulatory framework. Such concerns have increased in the
context of the adjustment program associated with the international loan
obtained by Portugal in 2011.
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3. The growth in finance and its role in the decades of financialisation 14
As in many countries, the growth of the financial sector and of debt has been a
distinctive feature in the recent evolution of the Portuguese economy. In this
section we start by assessing the importance of the financial sector in terms of
output, employment and financial assets in Portugal, as well as the evolution of
securities’ markets, including the stock and debt markets. Then, we discuss the
evolution in the allocation of households’ wealth across securities, the saving
rate, the volume and composition of deposits, the volume of loans, the level of
debt of households and corporations, the level of non-performing loans, and
Government‘s contribution to the increase in debt. We conclude with the
analysis of the contribution of households, firms and Government for the
external debt.
3.1. Output and employment in the financial sector
In the recent decades, the sectorial structure of the Portuguese economy has
experienced a deep transformation, with the importance of service sector
increasing in terms of production and employment (see Figure 4). In the 1990s
the weight of agriculture and industry in the total value added of the economy
started declining and the weight of services started to increase significantly. In
1990 the shares of agriculture, industry and services in total value added was
10%, 31% and 52%, respectively, whereas in 2010, the corresponding values
were 2%, 17%, and 74%. This phenomenon of tertiarisation of the economy was
common to other developed economies, although the decrease of primary and
secondary sectors’ activities over this period was particularly pronounced in
Portugal. Since productivity tends to grow at a slower rate in services than in
14 Point 2 of the Terms of Reference.
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manufacturing, the growth of services may have contributed to a reduction in
overall productivity growth.
Figure 2 – Sectorial structure of the Portuguese economy, 1980-2010
Gross value added Employment
Source: Bank of Portugal (historical series) and INE
Since 1995 non-tradable goods sectors have grown faster than the average
economy (see Section 10.2 for more details). Several factors account for the
increasing weight of non-tradable sectors in the Portuguese economy,
including the following:
x the growth in public expenditure (mostly in physical infrastructure and in
education and training);
x the easier access to credit (fostering the expansion of construction, real
estate activities, and financial services);
x the appreciation of the real effective exchange rate (before and after the
inception of the euro), the trade agreements between EU and emerging
economies, and the EU’s Easter enlargement – all of which undermined
the competitiveness of Portuguese exports and discourage investment in
activities exposed to international competition;
x EU’s agriculture and fisheries policies, which favoured the destruction of
productive capacity and disinvestment in these sectors (both of which are
producers of tradable goods with significant weight in the Portuguese
economy until the early 1990s);
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x the privatization of large companies in sectors producing mainly for the
domestic market (energy, telecommunications, transport, financial
services, etc.), in conjunction with regulatory privileges granted to
privatized companies (diverting both financial and human resources from
the rest of the economy, including the tradable sectors);
x the bargaining power the largest Portuguese business groups – most of
which base their activity on non-tradable sectors, such as financial
services and retailing – in relation to much of the remaining economic
actors (in particular SMEs). These groups used their power to influence
political decisions in favour of non-tradable sectors.
Financial services (defined in a broad sense: including financial services and
real estate) were among the sectors which benefited the most from these
trends: between 1986 and 2010, their weight in terms of total value added grew
from 10% to 15% (see Figure 3). It is worth noting that the larger increase in the
importance of the financial sector occurred in the five years after the reopening
of this sector to private actors. The proportional growth in importance of
financial sector in terms of value added was rather similar to the growth of the
overall service sector: over the same period, the weight of the whole service
sector in the total value added of the economy also increased by a half, from
51% to 74%.
In contrast, financial activities registered a marginal decrease in importance in
terms of employment, from 3.1% in 1995 to 3% in 2011. Since its share in terms
of value added has increased, while its share in employment has remained
constant, the financial sector’s apparent productivity of labour has grown faster
than the average.
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Figure 3 – The importance of the financial sector (% of gross value added
and employment)
Source: Eurostat
Comparing the importance of financial activities in terms of total value added
with the euro area partners, we conclude that in 1995 the Portuguese financial
sector was one of the smallest (Figure 4). However, from 1995 to 2011 the
relevance of the financial sector in the overall GDP has grown faster in Portugal
than in the Euro area, with its pace of growth being only supplanted by
Ireland’s. By 2011 the weight of the financial sector in the Portuguese economy
in terms of value added had converged to the Euro area’s average, although
remaining below the latter.
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Figure 4 – The importance of the financial sector in broad sense in the EA
(% of gross value added)
Source: Eurostat
Similarly, in terms of employment, the financial sector was less important in
Portugal than in the Euro area in 2010. As in many other Euro Area countries
(with the noticeable exception of Ireland), the weight of the financial sector in
total employment in Portugal has remained relatively stable in the period under
analysis.
Figure 5 – The importance of the financial sector in broad sense in the EA
(% of employment)
Source: Eurostat
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However, a very different picture is obtained when we adopt a more restrictive
definition of financial activities (i.e., considering only financial activities, i.e., the
activities classified under the category K according to Eurostat’s NACE
classification). In this case the weight of financial activities in total value added
in Portugal was among the highest in the Euro Area in 2011 (Figure 6), and its
growth between 1995 and 2011 was outstanding (Figure 6). Still, the importance
of financial activities in terms of employment in 2011 was below the EA average,
and followed a downward trend since 1995 (Figure 7).
Figure 6 – The importance of the financial sector in strict sense in the EA
(% of gross value added)
Source: Eurostat
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Figure 7 – The importance of the financial sector in strict sense in the EA
(% of employment)
Source: Eurostat
3.2. Other measures of financialisation
Financialisation has two implications for firms’ profitability and activity
(Krippner, 2005). On one hand, a growing fraction of profits of the economy
comes from financial firms. On the other hand, non-financial firms become
increasingly involved in financial activities, and thus financial profits grow in
relevance in comparison with revenues from productive activities.
In order to measure those implications of financialisation we can use two
indicators. For the first consequence we can use as a proxy the gross operating
surplus (GOS) of financial corporations in comparison to GOS of non-financial
corporations. The GOS synthetises the remuneration of capital (rents, interests
and profits)15. This indicator tells us from which sector capital is taking its
remuneration. Regarding the second effect of financialisation, we look at the
15 “At the level of national accounts, gross operating surplus can be defined as a balancing item
in the generation of income account representing the excess amount of money generated by
incorporated enterprises' operating activities after paying labour input costs. In other words,
gross operating surplus is the capital available to financial and non-financial corporations
which allows them to repay their creditors, to pay taxes and eventually to finance all or part of
their investment.” (Eurostat)
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weight of financial revenues from sales or net profit for non-financial firms,
obtained from a representative sample of firms 16. As a complement, we look at
the data from National Accounts on property income (interest, rents, and
dividends)17 of non-financial corporations in comparison to production.
Regarding the first indicator, from 1995 to 2008, the proportion of GOS of
financial corporations to non-financial corporations grew by 10 p.p., from 15%
to 25%, a sign of the on-going process of financialisation in the period (Figure
8). From 2009 to 2011, in the context of the financial crisis, that indicator
decreased approximately 6 p.p.
Figure 8 – Gross operating surplus of financial corporations (% of gross
operating surplus of non-financial corporations)
Note: The values for 2010 and 2011 are forecasts.
Source: INE (National Institutional Accounts)
Concerning the second indicator, since 1997 there was a rise in financial
revenues (interests, dividends, and capital gains on financial investments) of
non-financial corporations in percentage of total sales (or total net profit), with
a particularly strong increase in the period 2003 and 2007 (Figure 9). A
16 Source: Sistemas de Contas Integradas de Empresas em Portugal, INE.
17 It excludes capital gains in financial transactions.
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complementary indicator, the ratio property income to production also
increased, but only since 2003. 18
Figure 9 – Financial revenues of non-financial corporations (% of sales and
net profit)
Note: The sample comprises the non-financial corporations with over 20
employees until 2003 and the total of non-financial corporations thereafter.
Source: INE (Sistemas de Contas Integradas de Empresas em Portugal)
Figure 10 – Property income of non-financial corporations(% of production)
Note: The values for 2010 and 2011 are forecasts.
Source: INE (National Institutional Accounts)
18 See the definition of property income above.
0,0%
0,5%
1,0%
1,5%
2,0%
2,5%
3,0%
3,5%
4,0%
4,5%
5,0%
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
55
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
Financial assets
Another way of looking at financialisation is by analysing financial assets,
namely how they are distributed across institutional sectors (financial firms,
non-financial firms, households and the Government). In Portugal, financial
assets accounted for around 720% of the GDP in 2010, which is smaller than the
EA17 average of 767%19. In this indicator Portugal is close to Germany (722%)
and has a larger value than countries of larger GDP per capita, as Austria
(633%), Finland (684%), Italy (560%), and Spain (586%).
In Portugal, as well as in most European countries, financial assets have been
increasing as a percentage of GDP (see Figure 11 and Table 2). In the period
1995-2010 the ratio of financial assets to GDP increased 274 p.p. in Portugal,
which is the third largest increase in the EA920, only supplanted by Finland
(369%) and France (320%).
19 Financial assets include currency and deposits, securities and other shares, loans, shares
and other equity, insurance technical reserves and other accounts receivable/payable
(Eurostat). The values for Ireland and Netherlands are not shown in the graph because they
were very high and would distort the graph.
20 We exclude Ireland, Luxembourg, and Netherlands because they are outliers in this indicator.
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Figure 11 – Financial assets of the total economy (% of GDP)
Note: Consolidated Figures. Source: Eurostat (Annual Sector Accounts)
Table 2 – Change in financial assets of the economy (in p.p.)
Note: Consolidated Figures. The change for Ireland corresponds to the period
between 2001 and 2010.
Source: Eurostat (Annual Sector Accounts)
Euro Area 17 n.a 603% 767% n.a . 164
Belgium 639% 797% 877% 238 80
Germany 474% 670% 722% 249 52
Ireland n.a . 1148% 2542% n.a . 1394
Greece 294% 387% 410% 116 23
Spain 353% 467% 586% 232 119
France 435% 598% 754% 320 156
Italy 383% 510% 560% 177 50
Netherlands 847% 1091% 1447% 600 357
Austria 384% 469% 633% 249 165
Portugal 445% 579% 719% 274 140
Finland 316% 402% 684% 369 282
Country 1995 2000 2010
Change 1995-2010
(p.p.)
Change 2000-2010
(p.p.)
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This upward trend in financial assets could be interpreted as an indicator of
financial development. It gives us also an indication of the relative speed at
which financial stocks and productive revenues have developed over time and,
therefore, measuring indirectly “financial rents” accumulated (Cingolani, 2012).
According to Aglietta (1998) and Toporowski (2010), the growing importance of
financial assets as a percentage of GDP in most European countries could be a
symptom of asset price inflation. Indeed, even if one discount future gains, it is
relatively unlikely that the value of accumulated financial assets should grow
much faster than GDP.
Looking at which sectors own financial assets, in 2011 most of the financial
assets (337% of GDP) were owned by financial corporations (the central bank,
banks and other non-monetary financial institutions), which is similar to the
EA17 (
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Figure 12). However from 1995 to 2011, there was a structural change in
Portugal, with the very fast growth of financial assets owned by financial
corporations. In order to illustrate this change we compare financial
corporations with households. In 1995, financial assets owned by households
and financial corporations both represented each around 175% of GDP. In 2011,
financial corporations basically doubled their assets holdings to 337% of GDP
and households increased their assets only to 224% of GDP. In reality, the
growth of financial corporations’ assets represented a convergence of Portugal
with the EA in terms of distribution of assets by institutional sectors.
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Figure 12 – Financial assets by institutional sector (% of GDP)
a) Portugal b) Euro Area 17 (2000-10)
Note: Consolidated Figures. The total of the economy is the sum of the four
institutional sectors. Households includes Non-Profit Institutions
Source: Eurostat (Annual Sector Accounts)
Other way of looking at the rise of the importance of financial corporations is by
looking at the weight of financial corporations’ assets on the sum of the total
assets of non-financial corporations, government and households (Table 3).
Even though in 2010 Portugal had a position below average on that indicator
(100% for Portugal and 127% for the EA17), the country had one of the largest
increases of the EA11 in terms of financial corporations assets relative to other
institutional sectors: it increased from 63% in 1995 to 100% in 2010. Only
Ireland and the Netherlands had a larger growth of that indicator.
The rapid growth of financial assets held by financial corporations may reflect a
transfer of real wealth from productive sectors (Non-Financial Corporations,
Households and Non-Profit Institutions) to the financial sector (Cingolani, 2012).
In principle, financial assets should have a residual importance for non-
financial firms. If a large increase in the financial assets owned by non-financial
firms is observed, this is an indication that firms are diverting resources from
productive applications to financial accumulation, distorting their main goal.
Financial assets owned by non-financial corporations also denoted an upward
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rise of 42.4 p.p. in Portugal from 55% in 1995 to 93% of the GDP in 2011. This
increase was not very large when compared with other EA countries and the
ratio in 2010 was marginally smaller in Portugal than in the EA17 (Table 4).
Table 3 – Ratio between the financial assets of Financial Institutions and
the sum of Non-financial Corporations, Government and Households (%)
Note: Consolidated Figures. The data for Ireland relates to 2001.
Source: Eurostat (Annual Sector Accounts)
Table 4 – Change in financial assets of non-financial corporations (in p.p.)
Note: Consolidated Figures. The change for Ireland is for 2001 to 2010
Source: Eurostat (Annual Sector Accounts)
Country 1995 2000 2010
Change 1995-2010
(p.p.)
Euro Area 17 90.6 127.0
Belgium 88.9 72.8 78.1 -10.8
Germany 99.8 113.2 126.4 26.5
Ireland 0.0 0.0 394.0
Greece 89.6 70.7 120.2 30.5
Spain 76.4 82.2 101.4 25.0
France 84.3 83.0 109.7 25.5
Italy 59.1 56.4 79.2 20.1
Netherlands 126.8 132.1 169.5 42.7
Austria 94.3 104.4 100.8 6.5
Portugal 63.3 72.6 99.7 36.4
Finland 63.3 53.5 88.4 25.1
Euro Area 17 n.a 95% 104% n.a . 9%
Belgium 69% 125% 219% 151% 95%
Germany 72% 116% 97% 25% -19%
Ireland n.a n.a 274% n.a . 147%
Greece 19% 31% 33% 14% 2%
Spain 40% 67% 95% 54% 27%
France 63% 117% 115% 52% -2%
Italy 40% 57% 59% 19% 1%
Netherlands 97% 138% 199% 103% 61%
Austria 33% 48% 105% 72% 57%
Portugal 55% 83% 97% 42% 14%
Finland 45% 69% 104% 59% 36%
Change 1995-2010 Change 2000-2010Country 1995 2000 2010
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Regarding the distribution of financial instruments owned by non-financial
corporations, in 2010 they owned essentially shares and other equity (29% of
GDP), currency and deposits (28% of GDP), other accounts receivable (19% of
GDP) and loans (17% of GDP). 21 The more speculative category (securities other
than shares) had a minor importance (2% of GDP). Loans was the item that
grew the most in 1995-2011, but growth was also significant in shares, and
currency and deposits. The growth of loans was also very large when compared
with the EA17. In 2010, it is worth mentioning that shares and other equity had a
smaller importance in Portugal than in the EA17 (48% of GDP and 25% of GDP
for the EA17 and Portugal, respectively). This probably is an indication of the
lower importance of inter-firm equity participations, reflecting the lower
presence of large business groups in the Portuguese economy.
Figure 13 – Financial assets owned by non-financial corporations (% of
GDP)
a) Portugal b) Euro Area 17
Note: Consolidated Figures. Households includes Non-Profit Institutions
Source: Eurostat (Annual Sector Accounts)
21 Shares refer basically to participations in other firms; currency and deposits is liquidity for
conducting transactions; other accounts and receivable is the financing of the activity by the
suppliers; and loans typically refer to loans between non-financial firms belonging to the same
business group.
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3.3. Financialisation and real investment
One negative consequence of financialisation is that financial activities crowd-
out real investment, reducing its level and efficacy.
Portugal has had since 1980 and up to 2008 high levels of investment to GDP
(private and public investment). These levels were above the EA12 average and
were also quite high even among the cohesion countries (Greece, Ireland,
Spain, and Portugal) – see Figure 14. The reasons for the high investment in
Portugal can be found in the fact that initially, between 1980 and 2000, Portugal
was a country with high needs of private and public investment, due to poor
public infrastructures and the need to modernize firms’ technology. Investment
was also fostered by the reduction in nominal and real interest rates during the
convergence process to the EA, and also by the EU structural funds. The rapid
growth of credit to firms was also a factor supporting levels of investment
above the EA average.
From 2001 up to 2008 the share of investment in GDP declined in Portugal,
whereas in the EA it remained essentially constant. This reflected the
conjunction of factors such as: low growth prospects (associated with the
dismal performance of the domestic economy and the increasing competition
from outside the EU – see Section 1), growing levels of indebtedness, increases
in interest rates, and also the satisfaction of investment needs in earlier periods
(specially, with regard to public infrastructure). After 2008, the importance of
investment in GDP also declined in the EA, but at a smaller rate than in
Portugal. In 2011, the importance of investment in GDP has become smaller in
Portugal than in the EA. The rapid decline in investment after 2008 in Portugal
can be attributed to the international crisis of 2008 and 2009 and, later, the
Sovereign debt crisis starting in 2010, which implied a strong reduction in credit
and even drearier prospects of economic growth.
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Figure 14 – Gross fixed capital formation at 2005 prices (% of GDP)
Source: AMECO
Despite the high level of investment, there are some doubts about its quality
and real efficiency. In Portugal, the marginal efficiency of capital since 1986 was
followed a strong downward tendency (Figure 15). 22 Nevertheless, this
downward trend worsened after the creation of the single currency, when the
Portuguese marginal efficiency of capital slipped below the level in the EA.
Figure 15 – Marginal efficiency of capital
Note: The values for 2012 and 2013 are forecasts.
Source: Ameco
22 The marginal efficiency of capital is calculated as the change in GDP at constant market
prices of year T per unit of gross fixed capital formation at constant prices of year T-5 (source:
AMECO).
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
Euro area (12
countries)
Ireland
Greece
Spain
Portugal
-30%
-20%
-10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
3
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
9
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
7
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
3
Portugal
Euro Area 12
64
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
Between 1992 and 1998 the Portuguese marginal efficiency of capital was
larger than in the EA: 0.117 and 0.091 respectively. After the creation of the
euro, the picture changed dramatically, with the efficiency of investment in
Portugal becoming one of the lowest in the EA (Table 5).
3.4. Securities markets
In Portugal, the stock market capitalisation as a proportion of GDP increased 11
p.p. from 1989 to 2011 (from 16% to 27%). This indicator includes not only the
number of shares outstanding, but also their prices. That upward tendency
hides some large oscillations in line with the evolution of the world’s stock
markets (Figure 16). From 1989 to 1999 there was a large increase in the
capitalisation of the Portuguese stock market, due to the privatisation process,
the entrance of foreign investors via the development of the Portuguese
market, and the boom of the dot.com firms after 1995. After 1999 there was a
decline in market capitalisation due to the bursting of the dot.com bubble. After
2002, market capitalisation recovered until 2007, and then fell again afterwards
as a result of the Subprime crisis. Since 2010 the Sovereign debt crisis caused a
further and strong decline in the stock market, an evolution which was also
observed in Greece and Spain.
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Table 5 - Marginal efficiency of capital (periods’ averages)
Note: The value for 2012 is a forecast.
Source: Ameco.
In 2011, Portugal had a stock market capitalisation corresponding to 21% of the
GDP, which was much lower than the Euro area average of 41%. The
underdevelopment of the stock market in Portugal is a structural
characteristic, being also reflected in the reduced number of firms listed in the
market, the strong concentration of the stock market in the top 10 firms (IMF,
2006:24) and the decisive importance that banks have on the financing of firms.
The corporate sector in Portugal is largely dominated by SMEs, which mostly
rely on banks for financing.
Furthermore, between 1993 and 2011, the increase in the Portuguese stock
market capitalisation was well below the Euro area average: 11 p.p. and 41 p.p.,
respectively. During this period Portuguese firms have privileged debt over
equity, which largely accounts for such divergence. The large prevalence of
SME in Portugal also creates obstacles to the development of the stock market.
Regarding the weight of financial firms’ capitalisation (monetary and non-
monetary firms) in stock market capitalisation, from 1989 to 2003, this was
larger in Portugal than in the EA (Figure 17). That was especially true in the
period 1990-1996, because the first privatisations were done on the financial
Austria 0.09 0.09
Belgium 0.10 0.08
Germany 0.07 0.07
Spain 0.10 0.07
Finland 0.14 0.11
France 0.10 0.08
Greece 0.10 0.04
Ireland 0.33 0.12
Italy 0.07 0.03
Netherlands 0.15 0.08
Portugal 0.12 0.02
Euro Area 12 0.09 0.07
UK 0.18 0.11
Country Mean 1992-1998 Mean 1999-2012
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sector. However, after 2004 Portuguese financial companies had a
representation in the stock market smaller than in the EA. Since 2010, this
results from the fact that Portuguese financial firms have been more affected
by the Euro Sovereign debt crisis than EA’s firms.
Figure 16 – Stock market capitalization of quoted shares (proportion of
GDP)
Source: AMECO and ECB
Figure 17 –Market capitalization by institutional sector
a) Portugal b) Euro Area
Source: ECB (Payments and Settlement Systems Statistics)
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Looking inside the financial sector, the other financial intermediaries have a
much lower importance in Portugal than in the euro area in terms of stock
capitalisation, and since 1989 they have been losing importance, reaching an
almost null representation in 2011. This is related with the fact that the other
financial intermediaries are integrated into financial groups.
In terms of debt securities (bonds and commercial paper, for example) issued
by non-financial firms the situation is quite different. In Portugal the total
outstanding amounts were 5% of GDP in 1993, a value similar to the euro area
average (Figure 18). From 1989 to 2011 debt has increased substantially and
achieved 24% of GDP, the highest value among the euro area countries and
quite close to the UK. In this comparison, we use nominal values and include
also securities not traded in markets, such as commercial paper, which is an
important source of financing for Portuguese firms. The large increase in the
amount of debt represented by securities resulted from the process of
leveraging of Portuguese firms. Particularly, since 2005 bank loans have
become less important in the financing of firms in favour of debt securities (See
Section 9.1).
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Figure 18 –Market capitalisation of securities other than shares issued by
non-financial corporations (proportion of GDP)
Source: AMECO and ECB
Regarding the issue of debt securities by the General Government, these
represented 76% of GDP in 2011, much more than the value of debt securities of
non-financial firms (Figure 19). Since 1989, there was an increasing trend in the
value of Government securities, mirroring the evolution of Public Debt (see
Section 3.10). Such evolution implied that the weight of Government securities
on GDP risen above the Euro average since 2006.
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Figure 19 –Market capitalisation of securities other than shares issued by
the general government (proportion of GDP)
Source: AMECO and ECB
3.5. The assets side of households
In this section we study the composition of households’ wealth to understand
the propensity of households to fund banks and other firms through the
acquisition of shares, other securities and deposits.
In 1980 the importance of dwelling in households’ wealth was 72.1% 23 – see
Figure 20. From 1980 to 1996 this value decreased substantially, reaching
55.3% in 1996. From 1997 to 2011 the proportion of wealth (already including
loans) invested in dwelling remained around 50%. One reason for such a large
proportion of wealth being invested in dwellings is the large proportion of
houses occupied by the owner. Due to the malfunctioning of the rental market,
households tend to buy the house in which they live. This issue is further
discussed in Section 3.7 below.
23 Here, we measure the importance of the value of houses in total wealth (financial plus
houses). From 1980 to 1996 the data on wealth excludes loans, which are included after 1996.
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Figure 20 – The importance of houses in households’ wealth (% of total)
Source: Bank of Portugal (Economic Bulletin)
In 2008 the value of dwellings to disposable income was smaller in Portugal
than in other European countries (Spain, France, Italy, Finland and UK), being
comparable to German (Bank of Portugal, 2009). One reason for this is the weak
growth of house prices in Portugal in recent years (Figure 164).
In contrast, financial wealth’s importance on total wealth has grown and its
composition has exhibited substantial changes (Figure 21). 24 Currency and
deposits were the main financial investment of families over the period 1980-
2011. This is in accordance with the liquidity preference theory, which argues
that households prefer to invest in more liquid assets in order to be able to
consume promptly. However, their importance has declined remarkably:
currency and deposits represented 71% of total financial wealth in 1980,
decreasing to 50% in 1996. From 1997 to 2010 their weight remained around
39% despite some fluctuations. One major reason why deposits became less
attractive for households up to 2010 is related with the decrease in their return,
leading investors to seek higher returns in more risky assets. The supply of
such assets has increased with the growth of mutual funds during the 90s and
24 Financial wealth includes currency and deposits, securities (including shares), loans, mutual
funds and insurance products.
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insurance companies (especially in the life segment) during the 80s and 90s,
and with the development of the stock market fed by the privatisation process.
In 2011 there was an increase in 4 p.p. in the investment in deposits and
currency, explained by the increase in deposits’ interest rates, due to the
increasing competition for deposits among banks. Another factor contributing
to the increase of deposits was the crisis in stock and bond markets associated
with the Euro sovereign debt crisis, leading people to seek refuge in more safe
assets.
Figure 21 – Structure of households’ financial wealth (%)
Note: before 1997 there is no information on loans.
Source: Bank of Portugal (Economic Bulletin)
In fact, mutual funds’ importance in households’ wealth25 increased especially
in the first years after 1989. From 2000 to 2006 there was again a slight
increase in the investment in mutual funds. After that the decline was quite
strong reflecting the reduction in prices but mainly the disinvestment in this
asset (Antão et al, 2009: 487).
25 The stock of mutual funds and quoted shares depends both on the market price and on the
outstanding amount.
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In turn, the importance of insurance products, mainly life and pension funds,
has grown steadily from 1% of the financial wealth in 1989 to 16% in 2011. On
the one hand, retirement savings plans were fostered through tax benefits, as
well as by fears that the public pension system would not be able to meet its
responsibilities in the future. On the other hand, closed pension funds were
created for workers of the financial sector, as well as of large public and private
companies. Ultimately, almost all these pension funds have been integrated in
the public pension system (See Section 5.1).
The importance of shares and other participations (hereafter shares) as a
proportion of households’ wealth has increased substantially from 24% in 1980
to 38% in 1996, largely as a result of the privatization process (see Section 11).
After 1996 the importance of shares ceased to increase and has fluctuated with
the evolution of the stock market, with a strong decline in 2001 and 2008. The
tendency for decline in the preference of households for shares after 1999
meant a larger difficulty for firms in issuing shares.
The evolution of the importance of securities excluding shares (hereafter debt
securities) was opposite to the evolution of the importance of shares,
translating a probable substitution between the two classes of assets in
accordance with markets fluctuations. Comparing 1980 and 1996, we conclude
that debt securities have basically maintained a residual importance in
households’ wealth, around 1-2%. But in the period 1986-1991 their importance
increased to around 4%-5% and decreased afterwards. From 1998, the
importance of debt securities has increased steadily up to 6% of financial
wealth in 2011. This increase has created a demand for the large amount of
debt securities issued by firms in that period.
When we compare the structure of the financial wealth of Portuguese and
European households in 2010, it stands out that in Portugal there was a smaller
proportion of wealth invested in quoted shares, mutual funds and insurance
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(Figure 22). But the proportion of wealth invested in equity (quoted and
unquoted shares and other equity) was larger in Portugal (23.4%) than in the
euro area (16.6%) in 2010. The larger importance of equity in households’
wealth in Portugal compared with the euro area is explained by the components
unquoted shares and other equity, which in 2010 represented 21.2% in the
former and 12.3% in the latter. This indicates that in Portugal firms have a
considerable demand for their equity from households. However, the
component shares and other equity in proportion of GDP had a downward
tendency since 1995 (Figure 23), meaning that the demand for equity by
households has not accompanied the growth of corporations’ assets, which
constitutes a factor explaining the increase in the debt-to-equity ratio of
corporations during that period.
Another conclusion that we can draw is that the development of the stock
market could be improved with the right education of households for the
advantages of quoted shares, since household already have a large interest in
unquoted shares and other equity.
Figure 22 – The structure of households’ financial wealth (% of total)
a) 2000 b) 2010
Note: Shares includes quoted shares, unquoted shares and other equity
Source: Eurostat, Sectorial Accounts
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Furthermore, in 2010 the share of wealth invested in deposits was similar in
Portugal and in the Euro area, while in 2000 Portuguese households invested
more in deposits than their euro area counterparts. Between 2000 and 2010,
Euro area households have increased the proportion of wealth invested in
deposits in response to the financial crisis.
Figure 23 –Households’ financial wealth (% of GDP)
Source: Eurostat, Sectorial Accounts
Savings
During the 1980s Portugal was one of the Euro area countries with highest
gross national saving rate 26 (Figure 26). In the run-up to the euro, the national
saving rate decreased and in 1998 Portugal was among the euro area countries
with the lowest saving rates, with a saving rate near 20% of GDP. After joining
the euro, the saving rate decreased rapidly and reached values around 9% of
GDP in the period 2009-2010, which was a value significantly smaller than the
euro area average.
26 Includes savings of households, corporations and government.
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Figure 24 –Gross national savings (% of GDP)
Source: IMF (World Economic Outlook Database)
Households saving rate followed a similar pattern to the overall saving rate (see
Figure 25). In the period 1989-1998 households’ savings as a proportion of
disposable income felt more than 10 p.p., from 19.7% in 1989 to 9.2% in 1998.
The decline in the saving rate was explained by the reduction in interest rates
and the increase in private consumption in a favourable macroeconomic
environment, where precautionary saving made less sense. The development of
the banking sector, which offered large amounts of cheap credit, together with
the development of the social state, where also important factors explaining the
decline in households saving rate (Alexandre el at., 2011). In 2004-2007 there
was a further decline in the saving rate, but after the Subprime crisis there was
a recovery.
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Figure 25 – The Portuguese saving rate (% of disposable income)
Source: Bank of Portugal (Economic Bulletin)
That evolution put Portuguese households among the ones with the lowest
saving rate in the period 1995-2010, only above Finland, the UK and Greece
(after 1999) (see Figure 26).
Figure 26 – Households saving rate (% of disposable income)
Source: AMECO
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The strong growth in bank credit after 1995 was not matched by a growth in
deposits of households and firms. In fact, the importance of deposits decreased
from 93% of GDP in 1994 to 77% of GDP in 2007 (Figure 27). This resulted not
only from a decline in the saving rate of households, but also from the
emergence of other financial instruments that competed with deposits. As a
result the ratio loans to deposits went from 60% in 1994 to 175% in 2007 (Figure
28).
Figure 27 – Volume of deposits and loans (% of GDP)
Source: Bank of Portugal and INE
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Figure 28 – Ratio of loans to deposits (%)
Source: Bank of Portugal
From 2007 to 2011, the share of deposits in GDP has increased from 77% to
96%, reflecting the increase in deposits’ interest rates, a slight increase in
households’ saving rate, and an increase in risk aversion as a result of the
crisis. This has occurred in a context in which banks had more difficulty in
getting finance in the financial markets, and thus have been competing more for
deposits. This allowed banks to reduce the ratio loans to deposits to 155% in
2011.
Deposits of firms
Regarding firms, deposits were in the 2000s still the main component of non-
financial corporations’ portfolios, despite the growing importance of shares and
other securities (Antão et al, 2009)
In Portugal and in the euro area, deposits from non-financial firms have
accounted for about 20 per cent of total deposits (households plus firms) in the
last decade (see Figure 29). In both cases, there was a slight increase in the
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share of non-financial corporations’ deposits. Such an increase indicates that
firms, more than households, have increased their preference for liquidity.
Figure 29 – Volume of Deposits from non-financial corporations (% of
total).
Source: Bank of Portugal and European Central Bank
3.6. Volume of loans from banks 27
During the 1980s, the real growth of credit (nominal growth minus CPI inflation
rate) was very low and in many years negative (Figure 30).28 This is explained by
the low economic growth, nominal instability and the IMF intervention in
Portugal. From 1991 up to 1993 there was a short cycle of high credit growth,
which was interrupted by the economic slowdown. In 1995 a cycle of very strong
growth of credit started, reaching more than 25%/year in 1999. Afterwards,
credit growth declined reaching negative values en 2011. Explanations for these
cycles will be done below.
27 Excludes financial non-monetary institutions.
28 Excludes securitised credit.
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Figure 30 – Total loans (annual real growth rate)
Source: Bank of Portugal
Another way of looking at the evolution of credit is to analyse the ratio of credit-
to-nominal GDP (Figure 27). 29 From 1980 to 1995, that ratio declined from 71%
to 53%, showing a decline in financial development in the period. From 1995 to
2009, there was a notable increase of 100 p.p. in that indicator, from 53% to
152%. In 2010 and 2011, there was a slight decrease in the ratio to 148% in
2011. The strong growth of credit in the period 1995-2009 was undoubtedly
associated with the Portugal joining the euro, which affected both the demand
and supply of credit.
On the demand side, the participation in the EMU increased current and
expected output growth and led to a sharp decline in nominal and real interest
rates. As a result, the unemployment rate decreased considerably during the
nineties. Initially these changes were seen as permanent by most economic
agents, favouring a substantial increase in credit demand.
On the supply side, the greater competition between banks also increased the
availability, sophistication and diversification of financial products and services,
particularly in the credit segment. This process was clearly facilitated by the
29 It includes bank credit to non-financial firms and households.
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use of international financial markets, which occurred even before the arrival of
the euro, with the elimination of capital controls and an expressive reduction in
the exchange risk of the escudo. After Portugal joined the euro, the exchange
risk disappeared completely and the access to the European financial markets
was opened up. Portuguese banks began to access to those markets,
diversifying their funding sources, selling government bonds from their
portfolios and borrowing on the euro interbank and bond markets, or directly to
the ECB, making them less dependent on customers deposits.
Securitization also allowed banks to gradually change the structure of their
balance sheets, adjusting risk, cost and liquidity. Since 1997, Portuguese banks
have been undertaking securitization operations, mainly in the segment of
credit to households. The first operations were done on international markets
more familiar with these kind of operations, but in 1999 a new legal framework
was approved authorizing the creation in Portugal of institutions specialized in
the acquisition or transformation of credits. The amounts involved in
securitization operations have been increasing during the last years,
representing an important additional funding source (See Section 4.3).
The easier financing allowed banks to satisfy the demand for credit, feeding the
expenditure of households and the investment of firms. Consequently, the
indebtedness of most Portuguese economic agents increased substantially,
which led after some time to a natural reduction of credit growth. In fact, from
1999 to 2002 there was a decline in the real growth of credit to values slightly
above 5%/year. The decline in the loans’ growth was also associated with the
perception that the potential growth of the Portuguese economy had decreased
substantially, which was made clear by an actual recession in 2003. After this
year, credit growth increased again, but never above 10%/year. In 2008, the
financial and economic crisis caused the beginning of a new downward
tendency, culminating in 2011 with a negative real growth of loans.
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Regarding the credit to households and non-financial corporations (NFC),
between 1980 and 2007 the former grew systematically at higher rates than the
latter (Table 6), and in 2007-11 both types of credit grew at approximately the
same rate. Between 1980 and 1998, loans to households increased from 14% to
53% of total loans (households and NFC) (Figure 31). After 1998, the share of
loans to households has essentially stabilized.
Table 6 – Credit to households and to non-financial corporations
(annualized growth rates)
Note: Securitized credit not included. Source: Bank of Portugal
Figure 31 – Volume of loans to NFC and households (% of total)
Source: Bank of Portugal
Looking at the three types of household credit (housing, consumption and other
purposes) 30, it is clear that, between 1993 and 2011 the loans for housing
30 Credit to other purposes is a residual category, including for example credit to students and
to small entrepreneurs.
1980-1993 17,2% 28,0% 14,4%
1994-2002 17,4% 21,9% 14,0%
2003-2007 7,3% 8,9% 5,4%
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purchase grew at a much faster rate than loans for consumption and other
purposes (Table 7). Housing credit represented in 2011 around 80% of total
credit to households, and this proportion has grown in the last 20 years from a
value of 64% in 1980 (Figure 32).
Table 7 – Loans to households by purpose (annualized growth rate)
Note: From 1979 to 1998 credit for other purposes included credit to
consumption.
Source: Bank of Portugal
Figure 32 – Volume of loans to households by purpose (% of total)
Source: Bank of Portugal
In terms of loans to NFC, an important element is their maturity structure. Long
maturities are riskier for banks, but are essential for firms to finance medium
and long term investments. From 1980 to 1987 loans with maturity larger than
one year increased from 33% to 55% of total loans (Figure 33). From 1987 to
1993 that tendency was inverted, and in 1993 the medium/long term loans
1979-1992 27,9% 29,1% n.a. 25,3%
1993-1998 26,5% 26,5% n.a. 12,5%
1999-2007 12,4% 13,4% 9,3% 9,2%
2008-2011 2,3% 3,0% 2,1% -2,6%
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returned to around 30% of loans to NFC. From 1994 up to 2011 the
medium/long term loans gained importance and in 2011 they represented 72%
of total loans. This evolution in the Portuguese banking system was quite
notable, showing that banks were able to take more risk (naturally with a larger
return) in order to finance medium and long term investments. Even though
they were assuming larger risks by lending with larger maturities, banks may
have reduced risk by using collateral or because the financial situation of firms
and the business cycle had a better outlook.
Figure 33 – Volume of loans to non-financial corporations by maturity (% of
total)
Source: Bank of Portugal
3.7. Households’ debt
In Portugal, the indebtedness of households grew quickly from 1993 up to 2009,
and declined slightly afterwards (Figure 34). In 1995, Portugal had one of the
lowest levels of households’ debts of the EA, at 26.1% of GDP. By then, only Italy
and Greece presented lower levels of households’ debt. After a period of fast
growth, in 2009 households’ debt in Portugal represented 95.4% of GDP, which
compares with 63.2% for the EA16. The level of debt in Portugal was one of the
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highest of the EA, being supplanted only by the Netherlands (127.7%) and
Ireland (123.2%). Portuguese households’ debt level was close to the UK.
Figure 34 – Household’s debt (% of GDP)
Source: Eurostat
Both demand and supply factors contributed to the increase in households debt
levels as we have seen in the previous section. Since the beginnings of the
1990s, liquidity constraints have been attenuated for a large number of families
(mainly due to the reduction of nominal interest rates) facilitating the access to
credit, mostly for house purchase. In the previous section it became clear that
the most important component of households’ credit is the credit for house
purchase.
It was precisely on mortgage credit that financial liberalization led to more
intense competition, with a significant reduction of interest rates, increase in
credit supply and emergence of new products. As a result, the spread in
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housing credit has been smaller in Portugal than in the EA, whereas for other
credit’s types the opposite occurs (See Section 9.2). 31
The high growth and importance of housing credit in Portugal was related with
households buying houses, with around 3/4 of households living in houses of
their own in 2010. Notice that in the period 1980-2002 the growth of owners
occupancy rate in Portugal was one of the largest in Europe (Figure 35).
Additionally, the percentage of households that own a second house has
increased substantially since 1995.
One of the main reasons for the high proportion of households owning a house
is related to the malfunctioning of the rental market. Legislation from the late
forties limited the increase of rents for the oldest contracts. This implied that
many tenants still in 2011 paid rents below the market value. This regulatory
framework has been responsible for a low supply of houses to rent, as well as
for the high value of rents in recent contracts. Although rents of new contracts
can be set freely, the supply of new houses for renting has been small. One
explanation for that is the slowness of courts on the resolution of rental
contracts’ disputes.
31 The spread is the difference between the credit interest rate and the interbank interest rate.
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Figure 35 – Home Owners (owners occupancy rate, %)
Source: OECD,
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/archivestory.php/aid/1996/Owning_up.html
The demand for houses was also stimulated by several policy measures,
namely through tax benefits to loans by the Portuguese government that lasted
until September 2002.
Similarly, since the early nineties there was a rapid increase in credit for
consumption, which was used to satisfy the demand for durable goods, like
cars, appliances, and furniture. As a consequence, the growth rate of private
consumption has been relatively higher than the growth rate of GDP.
A negative consequence of the increase in families’ indebtedness is that they
become more vulnerable to shocks. Obviously, they are more susceptible to any
increase in the interest rate, especially in Portugal where flexible interest rates
are dominant. Additionally, since a large share of their monthly income is
devoted to the payment of the debt service, any decrease in disposable income,
especially caused by unemployment, cannot be easily accommodated.
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The boom in credit to households, with credit growing at more than 10% per
year, lasted until 2002 (the same for firms). Afterwards, credit and indebtedness
continued to grow but at a slower rate (the percentage change in debt ratio can
be seen in Figure 36), which was not enough to sustain economic growth at high
levels.
Figure 36 – Percentage change in households debt ratio
Note: % change in debt ratio equals the % change in households debt minus the
% change in nominal GDP. Source: Eurostat
The debt that we referred to above includes loans from banks and non-
monetary institutions, as credit-purchase financing firms. In terms of credit to
households for consumption and other purposes, non-monetary financial
institutions were responsible for 13.4% of total credit in 2011. 32 Regarding the
evolution since June 2009, it is worth noting the credit from banks has grown at
a higher rate than the credit from other financial institutions (Figure 37). In
32 The credit from banks was obtained from the Monetary and Financial Statistics of Bank of
Portugal (does not include securitized credit). The total credit to households, including
monetary and non-monetary credit, was obtained from the Central de Responsabilidades de
Crédito of Bank of Portugal (includes securitized credit). Notice that the fact that one source of
data does not include securitized credit while the other source includes it, does not constitute a
major problem, because we are interested in credit to consumption and other purposes, which
very rarely has been securitized by banks.
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June 2009, credit from non-monetary financial institutions represented 16.5%
of the total credit to households for consumption and other purposes, and in
June 2012 represented only 12.8%. This is an indicator that banks did not adopt
a more restrictive attitude on credit to households than other non-monetary
institutions.
Figure 37 – Quarterly growth rate of loans to households for consumption
and other purposes (from all financial institutions and banks) - %
Source: Bank of Portugal
3.8. Corporations’ debt
Between 1995 and 2000, the robustness of the Portuguese economy stimulated
investment by the corporate sector, which stimulated further economic growth.
In a context of declining interest rates and increasing bank competition,
corporations financed investment mainly through bank credit, but used also
debt securities. This evolution implied a strong increase in firms’ total debt
(loans, debt securities and trade credit) – Figure 38. In 1995 this debt
represented 58% of GDP, a value which was not a high value in the EA context.
As a term of reference, the unweighted average of that indicator for Germany,
France, Spain and Italy was 57.7% in 1995. Between 1995 and 2010, non-
financial corporations’ debt increased rapidly in Portugal, and in 2010 it
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represented 137.2% of GDP, a value that is much higher than the EA average of
85.3%. The Portuguese indicator was even larger than the UK’s indicator.
Figure 38 – Corporations’ debt (% of GDP)
Note: debt includes loans, securities other than shares, and trade credit.
Source: Eurostat
The level of debt has been considerably higher for private corporations than for
households: 183% of GDP and 101% of GDP in June 2012, respectively (Figure
39). Since 2007, households’ debt as a percentage of GDP had a small growth of
3 p.p., while firms’ debt in percentage of GDP grew 22 p.p. This suggests that
during the crisis firms have been probably using credit to support their financial
obligations.
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Figure 39 – Debt of non-financial private sector (% of GDP)
0
Source: Bank of Portugal (Debt of Non-Financial
Sector)
When we study which firms were increasing their debt between 2007 and June
2012, we realise that micro and small firms had a much smaller increase (2
p.p.) than medium (5 p.p.) and large firms (7 p.p.) - Figure 40. Even though we
cannot be conclusive, this may be a symptom of credit rationing in relation to
micro and small firms. It can also be argued that micro and small firms were
more affected by the recession than medium and large firms.
Figure 40 – Debt of non-financial private corporations by firm size (% of
GDP)
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Note: Non-Financial Holdings are not included
Source: Bank of Portugal (Debt of Non-Financial Sector)
Non-financial private corporations have been financed mainly by the financial
sector (Figure 41). Still, the importance of the financial sector has decreased
slightly in the last two years (-4.9 p.p.), in favour of the Rest of the World (+4.3
p.p.), probably reflecting reduced credit supply by domestic banks.
Figure 41 – Private corporations by financing sector (% of total)
0
Source: Bank of Portugal (Debt of Non-Financial Sector)
3.9. Non-Performing Loans
We observed that households’ and corporations’ banking debt increased
remarkably since 1995. One interesting question is whether that increase was
sustainable. If that was the case, we should not observe a large increase in non-
performing loans.
Between 1997 and mid-2001, there was a notable decline in non-performing
loans (NPL) ratio both for households and non-financial corporations (see
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Figure 42) 33. Even though at a slower rate, the decline in the ratio of loans in
default for non-financial corporations continued up to 2007. In contrast, for
households that ratio has remained relatively stable between 2001 and 2007.
After 2007, the increase in NPL ratios was very fast for households and
especially for firms, surpassing in 2011 the values that the ratios had in 1997.
This increase was explained by the strong deterioration in Portuguese
economic activity after 2007, with an increase in unemployment, the reduction
in firms’ profitability, and increase in the bankruptcy of non-financial
corporations. In addition, Antão et al (2009) highlights that the rise of non-
performing loans has been common to firms of all sizes (small, medium and
large).
Figure 42 – The evolution of non-performing loans of households and non-
financial corporations
Source: Bank of Portugal
Nonetheless, in 2011 the level of non-performing loans was differentiated
across sectors (see Table 8): the sectors with a rate of default above the
average were manufacturing, construction, real estate, and trade. From 2007 to
33 It includes credit and interest overdue for more than 90 days and other uncertain loans. This
ratio incorporates a more restrictive understanding of NPL than the NPL ratio calculated by
the Bank of Portugal.
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2011 the sectors with an increase of non-performing loans larger than average
were trade, construction and real estate, which shows the difficulties existing in
these sectors.
Table 8 – Non-performing loans of non-financial firms by sector
Source: Bank of Portugal
In terms of segments, the non-performing loans of households have increased
very rapidly in the loans to consumption and other purposes (see Figure 43),
with the ratio of loans in default reaching a value of around 10% in 2011. This
increase was not particularly worrying for banks because many credits in this
segment had collaterals, such as cars. In contrast, the increase in non-
performing loans in the housing segment has been very mild, and the ratio was
less than 2% in 2011. The small rate of default in the housing segment can be
explained by the low level of Euribor, especially from mid-2009 (Figure 122), the
existence of real and parental collateral, the practice of long maturities for this
type of loans (which allows low instalments), and the low values of debt service
to income ratio (Figure 44).
Agriculture,
Forestry and
Fishering
Mining
and
Quarrying
Manufacturing
Electricity,
Gas, Water,
Sewerage,
Remediation
Construction
Trade and
Repair of
Vehicles
Transportation
and Storage
Accommodation
and Food Service
Activities
Information and
Communication
Real
Estate
Professional,
Techonological
Services,
Support
Services
Education,
Health and
Social Work
Activities
Total Non-
Financial
Corporations
1997 11,9% 5,9% 10,7% 0,2% 6,4% 5,4% 2,5% 7,3% 3,7% 6,4% 2,3% 4,5% 6,4%
2003 6,3% 2,3% 4,0% 0,2% 2,2% 3,4% 0,6% 2,0% 1,5% 1,0% 1,0% 1,8% 2,1%
2007 1,2% 1,3% 2,5% 0,2% 1,8% 2,2% 0,6% 1,2% 2,4% 1,0% 0,7% 1,0% 1,5%
2011 3,5% 4,6% 6,2% 0,3% 11,0% 7,7% 1,8% 5,3% 2,4% 7,2% 3,3% 2,5% 6,0%
Change
2007-11
2,3% 3,3% 3,7% 0,1% 9,2% 5,5% 1,1% 4,1% 0,0% 6,2% 2,6% 1,4% 4,6%
95
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
Figure 43 – The evolution of non-performing loans of households by
purpose
Source: Bank of Portugal
Figure 44 – Debt service to income for households (median values of the
ratios)
Source: Household surveys from ECB (2009), Housing finance, Occasional
paper 101.
Despite the increase in non-performing loans for households and firms, the
scale of the problem is still below the euro average. In other words, the credit
risk in the Portuguese banking system was in 2011 at a low level.
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Figure 45 – Nonperforming loans to total gross loans (households and
firms)
Source: World Bank.
Note: The loan amount recorded as nonperforming is the gross value of the
loan as recorded on the balance sheet, not just the amount that is overdue.
3.10. Government Debt
The favourable business cycle evolution, the sharp decline in interest rates, and
the privatization process caused a reduction of the government deficit and
public debt between 1995 and 1999, in accordance with the Maastricht criteria
(Figure 46 and Figure 47). The government deficit decreased during the second
half of the 1990s from 5% of GDP, in 1995, to 3%, in 2000. This effort allowed the
participation of Portugal in Stage Three of the EMU.
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Figure 46 – The Portuguese public deficit (% of GDP)
Source: Bank of Portugal
Figure 47 – The Portuguese gross general government’s debt (% of GDP)
Source: World Bank New Database
Financial integration, the reduction of exchange rate risk, and the development
of pan-European negotiation platforms led to an increase of the proportion of
public debt owned by foreigners: in 2000 it was 54% and in 2008 increased to
78% (Figure 48). This process was already under way since 1993, with the
General government issuing almost exclusively fixed rate bonds with long
maturities.
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Figure 48 – Percentage of total public debt owned by non-residents
Source: Bank of Portugal, Annual Report 2011
As foreigners bought more public debt, domestic banks withdraw slowly from
that market, allowing them to concentrate on the provision of credit to
households and firms, which was more profitable. Credit granted the State in
proportion of the total credit to the private sector decreased remarkably from
60% in 1987 to around 5% in 2001 (Figure 49). This decrease was possible
because at the end of the second half of the 1980s the compulsory obligation to
buy public debt was withdrawn. When in the second half of the 1990s the private
credit grew at high rates, banks even sold Government bonds as a way of
financing. Only in 2010 and 2011 the credit granted to the State in proportion of
total private credit increased to a level near 10%, because national banks
bought public debt as the yields increased and foreign investors took flight from
domestic public debt.
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Figure 49 – Credit granted to the State (% total internal credit without the
State)
Source: Bank of Portugal
Since 2007, there is information on all the financers of the General
Government.34 We observe a growing importance of the financial sector in the
last two years, due to the purchase of public debt on large scale by banks
(Figure 50).
Figure 50 – Financer sector of the General Government (% of total)
0
Source: Bank of Portugal (Debt of Non-Financial Sector)
34 Financers are banks granting credit to the State and essentially buyers of public debt.
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After 2000, Portugal started to struggle to maintain the budget deficit under 3%
of GDP. Portugal was one of the first countries to violate the Stability and
Growth Pact in 2001. One reason for that was the decline in economic growth
after Portugal joined the Euro. As a result, the Public debt started to increase
steadily, and after 2004 was already above the 60% limit of the Growth and
Stability Pact.
Some authors argue that in the years around 2000, when the economy was near
full employment, the budget deficit should have been smaller, in order to allow
more room for a counter-cyclical policy in periods of economic slowdown (see
for example Abreu, 2006). Between 1996 and 2000 the fiscal policy was
expansionary and pro-cyclical - Figure 51. This meant that the output gap
increased while the fiscal balance (structural primary balance) increased. In the
years 1998 and 2000 the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy was particularly
accentuated. Later on, in 2002 in a period of economic slowdown, the
constraints of the SGP forced the government to follow a pro-cyclical tightening
of the fiscal policy.
The situation of the public finances became much worse in 2009 and 2010 with
the impact of the economic crisis. The deficit reached in 2009 and 2010 values
close to 10% of GDP. This proved to be dreary signs for foreigner public debt
investors, eventually leading to a sovereign debt crisis and the need to resort on
international institutions for Government financing.
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Figure 51 – Fiscal policy and the business cycle
Source: From Bank of Portugal, Annual Report 2011, pp. 96
The total public debt includes the debt of the general government and the debt
of public firms not included in the general government. In June 2012, the debt of
those public corporations represented 11% of GDP (Figure 52). In order to have
an idea of the total debt of public firms we have to look at the ones included and
at the ones excluded from the perimeter of General Government. In total, public
corporations’ debt was in June 2012 26% of GDP, which represented 17.5% of
total public debt. Between 2007 and June 2012, the increase of public sector
debt was also explained by the rise in the debt of public corporations (+9 p.p.),
but the major increase was in the debt of the General Government excluding
public firms (52 p.p.) (Figure 53).
102
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
Figure 52 – Debt of both the General Government and public corporations
not included in the General Government (% of GDP)
Source: Bank of Portugal
Figure 53 – Total debt of public corporation (% of GDP)
Source: Bank of Portugal
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To place public and private debt in perspective, in June 2011, the overall debt of
the non-financial sector of the Portuguese economy was 432%, with around a
third being the responsibility of the Public Sector (Figure 54). Since 2007, the
debt of the public sector has increased more than the debt of the private sector,
mainly due to the adoption of countercyclical policy measures after the 2008
crisis and the increase in interest rates of the public debt due to the Euro
sovereign debt crisis.
Figure 54 – Total debt of the economy (% of GDP)
Source: Bank of Portugal
3.11. Net lending/borrowing
The net lending/borrowing of each institutional sector corresponds to the
difference between current savings (plus capital transfers) and investment of
each sector. Current savings are obtained by the difference between income
and consumption. Net lending/borrowing corresponds to the financial saving of
the sector, which is the difference between financial investments made and
financial liabilities acquired in the period.
From 1993 to 2000, the private sector went from a lending position 8% to a
borrowing position of 6.5% (Figure 55). The improving of the borrowing position
of the Government during that period was not enough to avoid a deterioration of
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the borrowing position of the economy vis-à-vis the rest of the World. The
evolution of the positions of the private sector and of the government was
conditioned by the integration in the euro, which caused a reduction in interest
rates and was associated with the increase in credit and the improvement in the
budget deficit. In this period, both families and corporations suffered a decline
in their net lending/borrowing position (Figure 56).
Figure 55 – Net lending/borrowing position by sector (% of GDP)
Source: Bank of Portugal, Several Annual Reports and Financial Stability
Reports
Figure 56 – Net lending/borrowing position of households, Corporations,
General Government and Rest of World (% of GDP)
Note: Total corporations includes financial and non-financial corporations
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Source: Bank of Portugal, Several Annual Reports and Financial Stability
Reports
From 2001 to 2008, the borrowing positions of the Government and the private
sector remained high, causing high borrowing from the Rest of the World. On
the private sector side, corporations had the highest increase in the borrowing
position, while households maintained their lending position at an almost
constant level.
After 2008, the tendency was for a reduction of the borrowing from the Rest of
the World, due to a strong reduction in the borrowing position of the Private
sector, which was accompanied by the public sector only in 2011. The recovery
in the private sector was accomplished by an improvement of net
lending/borrowing position of both families and corporations.
3.12. Concluding remarks
In this section we reviewed the growth of finance and several dimensions of the
financialisation process. In 2011, the importance in terms of production of the
financial sector (using a strict definition) in Portugal was one of the highest in
the EA, and the growth between 1995 and 2011 was one of the fastest.
From 1995 to 2010, the financial sector has financed a high level of real
investment in Portugal. Nevertheless, since 2001 there was a decline on the
level and efficiency of investment. The Gross Operational Surplus (GOS) of
financial institutions has grown faster than the GOS of non-financial
corporations.
In Portugal, financial assets as a proportion of GDP are high and they have
grown fast between 1995 and 2010, indicating an accumulation of financial rents
during the period. The institutional sector with the fastest growth of financial
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assets was financial corporations, probably translating a transfer of wealth to
the financial sector.
Non-financial firms were also more involved in financial operations, which were
increasingly more important in terms of revenues. Accordingly, financial assets
owned by non-financial corporations have grown since 1995 slightly more than
in the EA, but they are not very large in terms of GDP. The growth was
especially large in the item loans.
One financial area where Portugal is underdeveloped is the stock market, and
the tendency since 1993 has been for a divergence with the EA in terms of stock
market capitalization. In contrast, Portuguese firms are among the ones of the
EA that most issue debt securities, which had a fast growth since 1993.
The growth of the financial sector has been accompanied by a less conservative
attitude of households in terms of investment, with a decrease in the
investment in deposits and an increase in the investment in shares, debt
securities and above all insurance products. Portuguese households have less
preference than EA’s households for quoted shares, but on the overall they
have more preference for shares (quoted and unquoted). This means that the
large preference of Portuguese firms for debt is not explained by a low demand
for equity from households.
Households’ saving rate decreased considerably before Portugal joined the
euro, with the decline starting in the 1980s. In 1995-2010, Portugal was one of
the euro area countries with one of the lowest households’ saving rate.
As a result the growth of deposits did not accompany the growth of credit,
leading banks to search for other sources of financing.
Borrowing from abroad and using credit securitization, banks were able to
finance a strong cycle of credit growth, initiated in 1995 and ended in 2001/02,
and induced by both demand and supply conditions. Credit to households grew
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much faster than credit to firms, especially in 1994-2002, despite the fact that
the latter is more important for economic growth than the former. The segment
of credit to households that grew most was credit for housing, and in 2011, 80%
of the credit to households was for that purpose. The credit for firms with
medium/long term maturities increased considerably, allowing firms to do
more long term investments. Finally, there are indications that SME were less
favoured than large firms in in the recent period of credit tightening.
The rapid growth in credit from 1995 to 2002 contributed to the high growth of
GDP in the period. Since the economy in 2001 was already near full
employment, the inflationary pressures were also considerable. After 2002,
credit continued to growth but at slower rates, which was not enough to sustain
high levels of economic growth, especially because other forces were pushing it
down: nominal exchange rate appreciation and high inflation implied a loss of
external competitiveness, the efficiency of the investment has been decreasing,
and the competition from Asian and Eastern European countries accentuated.
The growth in credit implied that in 2011 both Portuguese households and firms
were among the most indebted of the EA, making them vulnerable to an
economic slowdown. Indeed, since 2008 non-performing loans have increased
considerably, especially for some sectors of activity and households’ credit
segments. This constitutes an indication of the difficulties brought by the
growth of indebtedness, but on the overall the problem is still controlled.
Government finances had a good performance from 1995 to 1999 and a worse
performance since 1999, mainly due to the slow economic growth of the
Portuguese economy. Between 1996 and 2000 the Government followed a pro-
cyclical expansionary policy, which, with the benefit of hindsight, can be pointed
as imprudent. In 2002 the constraints of the Stability and Growth Pact obliged
the Government to adopt a pro-cyclical tightening of the fiscal policy. In 2009
and 2010 the fiscal deficit reached almost 10% of GDP. This moved foreign
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investors away from Portuguese public debt, in a context marked by high
uncertainty in the euro area. Since they were the main buyers of public debt,
this ultimately led to Sovereign debt crisis.
One reason for the crisis was the high level of foreign borrowing of the economy
as whole to finance current account deficit, with the Government representing a
third of the debt of the non-financial sector. From 1993 to 2000, the increase in
borrowing from the rest of the world was due to the private sector, while
Government reduced borrowing. From 2001, the increase in borrowing from the
Rest of the World was due to an increase in borrowing of corporations and the
Government, with households not contributing for this increase.
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4. Structure of financial sector by forms of organization 35
In this chapter we analyse the structure of the financial sector. The importance
of the different financial institutions is assessed (Section 4.1), including a
description of the importance of foreign and public banks (Section 4.2). Next, we
study how banks have used the securitization of credits to spur their growth
(Section 4.3). The use of derivatives and off-balance sheet items is also taken
into consideration (Section 4.4). The way other financial institutions have
evolved is studied in Section 4.5. Finally, the role of venture capital in financing
innovative investment is the topic of Section 4.6.
4.1. Structure of the financial system
In Portugal, financial liberalization and economic growth caused an increase in
the importance of the financial system: the assets of the CB (namely foreign
reserves, credit to banks, and securities), other monetary institutions,
insurance corporations and pension funds, and other financial intermediaries
as a proportion of GDP increased 240 p.p. from 1995 to 2010 (see Table 9 and
Figure 57).36 This phenomenon was observed in other OECD countries as well.
Between 1995 and 2011, the importance of banks and of CB’s assets in terms of
GDP basically doubled, while the importance of insurance corporations and
pension funds increased 2.5 times. Finally, the weight of other financial
intermediaries has almost trebled (Table 9 and Figure 57).
35 Point 3 of the Terms of Reference.
36 In this section the total of financial corporations is non-consolidated.
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Table 9 – Financial assets (% of GDP)
Source: Eurostat
Figure 57 – The structure of the Portuguese financial system (% of GDP)
Source: Eurostat
Regarding the relative importance of each financial institution, between 1995
and 2011, the weight of banks (including the CB) in the financial system
decreased: it was around 80% of total financial assets of the financial system in
1995 and decreased to 75% in 2011 (see Table 10 and Figure 58). The decline
was not larger because the importance of the CB has increased between 2008
and 2011, due to the massive financing of banks by the CB. In contrast, other
financial institutions, insurance companies and pension funds increased their
importance in the financial system. Investment funds increased their role in
system until 1998, but after that there was a reduction of their importance
(Antão et al, 2009).
Central Bank 24,1% 49,1% 25,0
Other Monetary Financial Institutions 140,4% 287,2% 146,8
Other Financial Intermediaries (except Insurance Corporations and Pension Funds) 23,0% 67,1% 44,1
Insurance Corporations and Pension Funds 17,5% 42,4% 24,9
Total 205,0% 445,8% 240,8
Financial Auxiliaries 0,3% 2,3% 2,0
Financial Assets 1995 2011
Change 1995-2011
(p.p.)
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The reported tendency for the loosing of importance of banks among financial
intermediaries was observed in other European countries. The size of the
disintermediation in Portugal was very similar to Spain and Finland, and much
less than in Belgium, France and Austria (see Table 11).
Table 10 – Financial assets of financial institutions (% of Total)
Source: Eurostat
Figure 58 – The structure of the Portuguese financial system (in proportion
of the total)
Source: Eurostat
Central Bank 11,8% 11,0% -0,8
Other Monetary Financial Institutions 68,5% 64,4% -4,1
Other Financial Intermediaries (except Insurance Corporations and Pension Funds) 11,2% 15,1% 3,9
Insurance Corporations and Pension Funds 8,5% 9,5% 1,0
Financial Assets 1995 2011
Change 1995-2011
(p.p.)
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Table 11 – Financial assets of other monetary financial institutions (% of
Total)
Source: Eurostat
Despite their declining share of total financial assets, other monetary financial
institutions continue to be the main financial institutions in Portugal, similar to
other Continental European countries. In 2010, the importance of banks in the
Portuguese financial system was above the EA17 average, but was still below
the largest values of Finland, Greece and Spain (Table 11). The characterization
of the Portuguese financial system as a bank-based system is perfectly valid in
2010.
More generally, other authors talk about the rise of the importance of financial
markets over financial intermediaries, which they call disintermediation. In
Portugal, we only observe such a tendency in the securities debt market, but
not in the stock market (Table 12). But in 2011 the difference between the
assets of financial intermediaries and debt securities market capitalisation is
still huge. Anyway, this tendency has to be interpreted with caution, since a
large part of the debt market of non-financial firms is “controlled” by banks, in
the sense that they buy directly the debt or sell it through their branches.
Euro Area 17 n.a. 44,8% 42,9% n.a. -1,9
Belgium 79,0% 65,1% 61,2% -17,7 -3,8
Germany n.a. n.a . n.a . n.a . n.a
Ireland n.a. n.a . n.a . n.a . n.a .
Greece 68,9% 81,9% 73,5% 4,7 -8,3
Spain 74,0% 67,3% 68,8% -5,2 1,5
France 68,5% 59,8% 59,4% -9,1 -0,4
Italy n.a. n.a . n.a . n.a . n.a .
Netherlands 32,0% 36,2% 33,4% 1,4 -2,8
Austria 75,1% 65,1% 64,2% -10,9 -0,9
Portugal 68,5% 65,6% 63,8% -4,7 -1,8
Slovenia n.a. 62,5% 66,7% n.a. 4,1
Finland 75,2% 67,0% 72,4% -2,8 5,3
Country Change 1995-2010 (p.p.)20071995 2010 Change 2007-2010 (p.p.)
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Table 12 – Financial intermediaries versus financial markets
Source: Eurostat and ECB
Accompanying the development of the financial system between 1995 and 2010,
the assets of financial auxiliaries have also increased from 0.3% of the PIB to
2.3% (see Table 9). 37
Compared to other European countries, the growth of the financial sector on
the economy between 1995 and 2010 was high (see Table 13). In 2010 the
importance of the financial system was below the Euro area average, but was a
high value among the countries of similar development.
A rather interesting issue is that if instead of using consolidated data for the
financial system we use unconsolidated data, the Portuguese financial system
appears as the second largest of euro area, with a dimension very similar to the
French system. 38 This indicates that there are many financial operations
between the major sub-sectors (central bank, OMFI, other financial
intermediaries, and insurance companies and pension funds) that compose the
financial system.
37 Financial auxiliaries are institutions that serve financial intermediaries and clients but do not
finance the economy. This category includes for example dealers, stock market exchanges,
exchange rate agencies, and rating agencies.
38 The unconsolidated data corresponds to the sum of the financial assets of the diverse sectors
composing the financial system.
Stock market
capitalisation
(% GDP)
Debt market
capitalisation
(% GDP)
Financial assets
of financial
intermediaries
(% GDP)
1995 20 7 205
2011 27 24 446
% change 1995-2011 35% 269% 117%
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Table 13 – Financial assets of the financial system (% of GDP)
Note: the financial system includes the Central Bank, other monetary financial
institutions, other financial intermediaries, and insurance corporations, pension
funds, and financial auxiliaries. In this table the financial system is on
consolidated terms. Source: Eurostat (Annual Sector Accounts)
Table 14 – Financial assets of the financial system – unconsolidated data
(% of GDP)
Note: the financial system includes the Central Bank, other monetary financial
institutions, other financial intermediaries, and insurance corporations, pension
funds, and financial auxiliaries.
Source: Eurostat (Annual Sector Accounts)
Euro area (16 countries) n.a 403,2% 429,6% n.a.
Belgium 300,6% 459,6% 384,6% 84
Germany 236,7% 388,7% 403,2% 167
Ireland n.a 1493,2% 2027,7% n.a.
Greece 139,0% 178,9% 223,6% 85
Spain 153,1% 284,4% 294,9% 142
France 198,7% 380,3% 394,6% 196
Italy 141,9% 227,3% 248,9% 107
Netherlands 473,6% 870,1% 910,3% 437
Austria 186,4% 318,5% 317,8% 131
Portugal 172,5% 318,7% 359,0% 187
Finland 122,3% 207,9% 320,9% 199
Country 1995 2007 2010
Change 1995-2010
(p.p.)
Euro Area 17 n.a . 349,7% 378,7% n.a .
Belgium 313,1% 547,9% 452,7% 139,6
Germany n.a . n.a . n.a . n.a .
Ireland n.a . n.a . n.a . n.a .
Greece 149,6% 197,0% 281,5% 131,9
Spain 179,7% 379,4% 414,5% 234,8
France 222,2% 445,1% 460,9% 238,7
Italy n.a . n.a . n.a . n.a .
Netherlands 523,8% 1017,3% 1116,0% 592,2
Austria 215,4% 395,0% 398,8% 183,4
Portugal 205,0% 367,9% 460,0% 255,0
Slovenia n.a . 191,0% 200,6% n.a .
Finland 142,7% 230,2% 347.4% n.a .
Country 1995 2007 2010 Change 1995-2010 (p.p.)
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4.2. Importance of foreign, public and non-for-profit banks
In the first years of the 1990s there was a radical change in the Portuguese
banking system, with the transformation of a mainly public system into a
system were the public bank has a minority role. In 1991, the system was
dominated by State-owned banks with around 74% of the assets (Figure 59). In
1996, after the privatization of banks, only one State-owned bank (Caixa Geral
de Depósitos - CGD) was left with 22% of banks’ assets. Ever since, the state
bank has been among the five largest banks operating in Portugal, and in 2012
was still state-owned and maintained basically the same market share of
assets.
The existence of CGD as a public bank has been subject of discussion in
Portugal. The same type of polemic exists in other countries and in the
economic literature. There are several arguments favouring the existence of
public banks, namely the stabilizing role in credit supply, the role in solving
problems of insolvent banks, and the correction of asymmetric information.
Moreover, public banks have a special role in supporting small and medium
enterprises, providing services to residents of isolated areas, and funding
socially desirable projects but financially unprofitable.
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Figure 59 – Weight of public banks in the banking system
Source: Bank of Portugal (Banking System Statistics), Associação Portuguesa
de Bancos and Antão et al (2009)
In contrast, other authors advocate that public banks may have undesirable
effects, due to their inefficiency, the political influence on management, the
distortion of competition, and the limited effect on economic growth.
In Portugal, CGD has been crucial in mitigating the recession after the
Subprime crisis. Mortágua (2011) highlights that CGD had a counter-cyclical
lending behaviour raising credit in the period 2009-11, contrary to most of the
Portuguese private banks. CGD was also used by the Portuguese Government to
bailout the private bank BPN after the crisis.
Barros and Modesto (1997) developed a model using panel data of seventeen
commercial Portuguese banks over the period between 1990 and 1995, in order
to evaluate the existence of a regulatory intervention in the Portuguese banking
sector by public banks (at that time there were several public banks). They
constructed a simple oligopoly model, where a public bank competes (through
the level of interest rates) with several private banks. All private banks aim to
maximize their profits, although the public bank is instructed by public
authorities to maximize an objective function (in order to promote the welfare
state) that depends on its profits and its revenues from deposits and loans. They
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find evidence of regulatory intervention of public banks in the loans market,
which aimed at decreasing the equilibrium interest rates paid for loans.
Nevertheless, their empirical results do not support the hypothesis of the
existence of internal regulatory devices in the deposits market.
Against this backdrop, the possibility of creating a new development bank
owned by the Portuguese state is currently under discussion. The goal of the
new bank would be to finance investment projects with very low interest rates,
countering the strong recessionary effects arising from the current effort
towards fiscal consolidation. The new bank may or may not be inserted in the
group CGD.
Other banks similar to the public bank in the non-profit orientation are co-
operative or mutual banks. There are two of such banks operating in Portugal:
Crédito Agrícola and Montepio Geral. Even though these two banks have a
small proportion of the total banking activity, they have distinctive
characteristics because their prime goal in not to maximize profits with the aim
of distributing them to their owners (Barradas et al, 2011). These authors
emphasize that both banks have modernized in the last years, offering a set of
financial products and services similar to any standard bank. Nevertheless,
they find important differences between the co-operative and mutual banks and
commercial banks, namely in the way funds are raised (both banks are not
listed in the stock market, so they only raise capital through the injection of
funds by new or existing members and by retaining profits), governance criteria
(they are customer owned entities with a democratic control by their members),
tax regime (Caixa Económica Montepio Geral has benefited from an exemption
of Income Tax39), application of profits (they use profits essentially to increase
39 According to the Article 8 of the Decree-Law 119/83, dated February 25th; Article 1 of the Law
151/99, dated September 14th; and Article 10 of the Corporate Income Tax Code. Crédito
Agrícola has already lost most of the fiscal benefits and tax exemptions.
118
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
their capital base and promote social activities), and behavior towards profits
and social development (they maximize members/customer value and not
exclusively profits and contribute to the social and economic development of
regions where they operate).
On the other hand, Crédito Agrícola is mainly designed to support primary
sector and SME and is local in nature, whilst the mutual institution is more
focused in households and, particularly, in credit concession for housing
purposes. Thus, both banks are slightly more specialized than the other
commercial banks in domestic retail banking.
According to the European Association of Co-operative Banks, at a European
level the specific business model of co-operative banks has proved to be more
resilient to the crisis, since they had a better performance than standard
commercial banks during the financial crisis started in 2008. Besides, co-
operative banks have not been included in any nationalization program or
declared bankruptcy.
Regarding foreign banks, they were already operating in Portugal in 1991,
although with a residual importance (around 3% of the assets). They were
mainly branches and subsidiaries of large foreign banks operating in other
European markets. Since then, the market share of foreign banks has
increased and in 1999 they represented 12.7% of banking assets (Bank of
Portugal, 2000). These banks are subsidiaries or branches of large European
banks. In 2000, the importance of foreign banks experienced a large increase to
around 22% of assets, when Santander bought the Banco Totta e Açores and
became one of the largest banking groups operating in Portugal. The increase
in the importance of foreign banks was a tendency that occurred also in the
Euro area (Figure 60), and has contributed to the increase in diversity and
competition in the market. After that large takeover, the importance of foreign
banks stabilized and started to decline slightly after 2005 (Table 15).
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Table 15 – Subsidiaries and branches of foreign banks in proportion of
banking system’s assets
Source: Annual Reports of BP (before 2000), Bank of Portugal (Banking System
Statistics) and ECB (Structural Financial Indicators)
The presence of foreign subsidiaries in Portugal was larger than in the euro
area: in 2008 it was 16.9% and 13.7%, respectively (Figure 60). But the
importance of foreign subsidiaries was smaller in Portugal than in other
medium size countries, such as Austria, Belgium, Finland and Ireland. This may
indicate the ability of Portuguese banks to withstand foreign competitors.
Figure 60 – Assets of subsidiaries in percentage of the assets of credit
institutions
Note: EA12 between 1997 and 2002, EA13 from 2003 to 2007 and EA16 after
2008
Source: ECB (EU Banking Structures)
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4.3. Securitisation of credit
The beginning of the Subprime crisis in the American subprime housing market
was strongly linked to the securitization of credit. The system of incentives of
banks led them to grant excess credit to households with dubious
creditworthiness. Commercial banks granted credit that afterwards was
securitized in the form of CDOs, obtaining more financing for continuing to
supply credit. In this way they removed credit risk from their balance sheets,
creating an incentive for generating more credit independently of its quality.
In Portugal, securitization was used to finance the rapid growth of credit.
Securitization allows banks to sell loans and obtain liquidity at a low cost (Bank
of Portugal, 2008). Banks used two types of operations: the ones where loans
stayed in the balance sheet and the ones where loans went off-balance sheet.
In Portugal and in the Euro area accounting standards hamper the elimination
of bank’s responsibilities through securitization operations (Antão et al 2009:
503). Besides that, banks are forced to maintain the commercial relationship
with the client after the securitization of its credit, charging the amounts in debt
and providing other services related with the loan (Antão et al, 2009: 456). Both
previous comments indicate that unlike in the US, apparently, the legal
framework of securitization operations in Portugal does not incentive banks to
take too many risks in credit operations.
In the Portuguese market, securitization operations began in 1997. Before that
there was only the issue of mortgage bonds, which had a residual importance.
These bonds are instruments that have mortgage credit as collateral. During
the first years of the securitization process, the absence of specific legislation
implied that securitization operations were made with non-resident special-
purpose vehicles. In 2000, specific legislation for securitization operations was
created, leading to the rapid development of these operations. Especially after
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2002, securitization grew quickly with the use of special-purpose vehicle
companies to issue securities. In 2011 securitisation operations represented
20.5% of the total stock of credit to the non-financial private sector (Figure 61).
Notice that after 2005 there was a rapid increase in on-balance sheet
securitization operations at the expense of off-balance sheet operations (Figure
62).
Reflecting the development of securitization operations, securitisation societies
and funds had an exponential growth since 2001 and represented 62% of Other
Financial Institutions’ assets in 2011 (See Section 4.5).
Figure 61 – Loans securitized by OFMI (% of the total credit to the private
non-financial sector)
Source: Bank of Portugal (Monetary and Financial Statistics)
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Figure 62 – Securitized credit recognized on the balance sheet (% of total
securitized credit)
Source: Bank of Portugal (Monetary and Financial Statistics)
The majority of securitization operations was of mortgage loans (Bank of
Portugal, 2008: 9), but it also included consumer loans and SME loans (ECB,
2011: 35). When we look at securitised assets by securitization companies and
funds, we conclude that in 2001 there was only securitization of loans to
households. Afterwards, the importance of the securitisation of loans to non-
financial firms increased and in 2011 it represented 26.8% of the total, while
households’ loans declined to 71.4% (Figure 63).
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Figure 63 – Original debtor of securitized assets by securitization
companies and funds (% of total assets securitized)
Source: Bank of Portugal
Besides being used for liquidity purposes, securitised products can serve as
collateral in the ECB credit operations. Since 2007, Portuguese banks have self-
retained new issues for that purpose (ECB, 2011: 35). Banks acquire the
securities issued by the special purpose vehicles to use them as collateral in
ECB monetary operations. In 2011, there was a slowdown of securitisation due
to unfavourable market conditions and to the tightening of the criteria for asset
backed securities (ABS) to be accepted as collateral by the ECB. Indeed, in 2011
the central bank started to demand AAA rating at the time of the issue of the
ABS, conditions that were loosened in 2012 (Bank of Portugal, 2012: 54).
Notice that, the reduction of capital requirements is not significant in
securitisation operations, because normally banks retain on the balance sheet
the securities with greater subordination (equity tranche), which have high
capital requirements (Bank of Portugal, 2008: 9). The regulatory goal is that
securitisation operations should be neutral in terms of capital adequacy
requirements (Bank of Portugal, 2001: 206). This means that, if after the
operation a bank maintains the same level of risk, the capital requirement
should also be maintained.
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4.4. Derivatives and off-balance sheet operations
Banks may invest in financial markets to increase profits. A particularly risky
way of doing that is using derivatives. In the history of banking and recent
financial crises there are some examples of banks loosing large amounts with
these instruments. Probably the best known case is Bearings bank that went
bankrupted due to derivatives trading. To assess the exposure of banks to
derivatives, we look at the ratios between gross asset and liability positions at
market value in financial derivatives to total capital. In 2008, these ratios for
Portuguese banks were much lower than the ratios of France, Germany, Ireland
and Netherlands. In 2008, on average for France, Germany, Ireland and
Netherlands the ratio of asset position to capital was 669.1% and for Portugal it
was 39.8%, while for liabilities the numbers were 682.4% and 71.1%,
respectively (Figure 64). This clearly indicates that Portuguese banks engage
much less in derivatives trading than their European counterparts.
Figure 64 – Asset/Liability position in financial derivatives to capital (2008)
Note: The data for Germany refers to 2007
Source: IMF (Financial Soundness Indicators)
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Banks also hold off-balance sheet items such as guarantees and loan
commitments. By performing services to firms associated with those accounts,
banks charge fees, but they are acquiring future responsibilities that may
compromise capital. Looking at the importance of those two off-balance sheet
items in proportion to total assets across 8 euro area countries in 2010, we
observe that Portugal was the country with the largest indicator, with a value
two times larger than the average of the other countries (48.6% and 19.6%,
respectively) – Figure 65. Notice that in 2010 in Portugal there was a 10 p.p.
increase in the off-balance sheet ratio, while in the group of euro area countries
there was a 5 p.p. decline.
Figure 65 – Off-balance sheet commitments (% of total assets)
Source: ECB
4.5. Other Financial Institutions
Besides monetary institutions, there are other financial institutions (OFI), and
some of them are able to finance the economy without creating money. The best
known ones are factoring firms, leasing firms, brokers, and credit-purchase
financing firms. There are also credit financial institutions, securitisation
societies and funds, and financial holding companies. In particular, credit
financial institutions are allowed to realize all the banking operations except
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receiving deposits. In reality they include many other types of institutions, such
as factoring firms, leasing firms, credit-purchase financing firms, consumer
credit firms, which prefer to have this legal category. Securitisation societies
and funds manage funds of credit titularisation.
On the aggregate, these institutions have grown faster than the monetary
sector (central bank and OFMI). In 1994, their assets represented 6.9% of total
assets of the CB and OFMI and in 2011 they represented 30.5% (see Figure 66).
Figure 66 – Total assets of OFI (% of monetary assets)
Note: monetary assets are the total of assets of the monetary survey.
Source: Eurostat
Besides the quantitative growth there was a qualitative change in the group of
OFI (Figure 67). In 1994, the most important institutions were leasing firms and
financial holding companies, followed by credit-purchase financing firms and
factoring firms. The two latter types of firms together with leasing firms
registered an absolute decrease in their assets after 2001. Notice that this may
result from the fact that these types of institutions started to register
themselves as credit financial institutions, a category that emerged in 2003 and
grew substantially thereafter.
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Figure 67 – Total assets of other financial institutions excluding Investment
Funds (millions of euro)
Source: Bank of Portugal
Another structural transformation in the sector was the continuous growth in
importance of financial holding companies, reflecting the growing importance
of financial groups.
Finally, the major event in the sector was the emergence of securitisation
societies and funds in 2001, which registered an exponential growth, and in
2011 represented 62% of the assets of all OFI. This was associated with the
growth of securitisation of credit by banks (see Section 4.3).
In addition to granting credit to the non-financial sector, banks also give credit
to OFI. From 1980 to 1989 the credit to non-monetary financial institutions
(NMFI) as a proportion of credit to non-financial corporations (NFC) was
relatively stable and below 5% (Figure 68). After 1989 that indicator registered a
remarkable increase, reaching 34% in 1996. From thereon there was a decline
in the importance of credit to NMFI, which reached 20% of the credit to NFC in
2003 and remained around that number until 2008. But with the beginning of
the sovereign debt crisis the credit to NMFI increased again, and in 2011 it
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represented 39.5% of the credit to NFC. Overall, the evolution since 1980
indicates that banks have being devoting a large proportion of their credit
capacity to finance other financial institutions.
Figure 68 – Credit to non-monetary financial institutions in proportion of
the credit to non-financial firms
Source: Bank of Portugal
4.6. Venture capital
An important source of financing for innovative firms is Venture Capital (VC),
especially in an early stage (seed and start-up). In the period 1997-2007, the
importance of this type of financing was smaller in Portugal than in the euro
area: 0.019% of GDP and 0.039% of GDP, respectively (see Figure 69). This is an
indication that the innovative entrepreneurs obtained less finance of their
activities in Portugal. However, in 2008-2011, Portugal has made an effort to
increase seed VC, increasing the importance of VC above the Euro area
average: 0.027%/GDP and 0.018%/GDP respectively. A significant part of that
effort was supported by public funds. Overall either in the euro area or in
Portugal, the venture capital represents a very small proportion of GDP.
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Figure 69 – Venture capital investment by type of investment stage (early
stage, seed and start up) (% of GDP)
Source: Eurostat
The stock market is another important source of financing for innovative firms.
As an example one can think of the many dot.com US firms that have already
made their IPOs. However, on this regard Portugal presents a less developed
stock market than the EA average, implying less financing for innovative firms
(See Section 3.4).
Another important activity of VC firms is to finance buyouts. In this case
outsiders in conjunction with VC firms take the control of a firm. Through this
activity VC facilitate firms’ acquisitions. In Portugal, transactions in this
segment of VC as a percentage of GDP are clearly below the European average
(see Table 16).
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Table 16 – Buyouts and venture capital investments (% of GDP)
Source: Eurostat
4.7. Concluding remarks
The growth of the Portuguese financial sector between 1995 and 2010 was high
when compared with the EA, but in 2010 its importance in the economy was still
below the average of the monetary area, but it was high among countries of
similar development. Accompanying this growth there was also a rapid change
in terms of the importance of public and foreign banks. In the first half of the
1990s, the financial system went from a system dominated by state-owned
banks to a system where only one public bank remained, with around 20% of
the market. Since 1991, foreign banks increased their importance in the
national banking system, but their penetration was smaller than in other EA
countries of similar dimension. This shows the good competitive capacity of
domestic banks.
Total VC (% of GDP)
2007 2008 2009 2010 Mean 2007-2010 Mean 2007-2010
European Union 15 0,49% 0,32% 0,11% 0,25% 0,29% 0,40%
Belgium 0,16% 0,09% 0,14% 0,06% 0,11% 0,24%
Bulgaria 0,13% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,03% 0,05%
Czech Republic 0,03% 0,01% 0,04% 0,01% 0,02% 0,04%
Denmark 0,43% 0,13% 0,12% 0,05% 0,18% 0,29%
Germany 0,29% 0,22% 0,06% 0,13% 0,17% 0,23%
Ireland 0,10% 0,01% 0,01% 0,01% 0,03% 0,07%
Greece 0,03% 0,09% 0,01% 0,00% 0,03% 0,04%
Spain 0,15% 0,05% 0,03% 0,18% 0,10% 0,18%
France 0,55% 0,31% 0,07% 0,20% 0,29% 0,39%
Italy 0,08% 0,16% 0,05% 0,04% 0,08% 0,12%
Luxembourg 0,01% 0,11% 0,00% 0,09% 0,05% 0,37%
Hungary 0,04% 0,00% 0,20% 0,02% 0,07% 0,08%
Netherlands 0,51% 0,16% 0,04% 0,12% 0,21% 0,31%
Austria 0,10% 0,05% 0,02% 0,02% 0,05% 0,08%
Poland 0,22% 0,14% 0,13% 0,10% 0,15% 0,19%
Portugal 0,04% 0,16% 0,07% 0,07% 0,09% 0,16%
Romania 0,07% 0,05% 0,02% 0,03% 0,04% 0,09%
Finland 0,34% 0,14% 0,06% 0,11% 0,16% 0,29%
Sweden 0,53% 0,72% 0,23% 0,66% 0,54% 0,77%
United Kingdom 1,41% 0,94% 0,37% 0,86% 0,89% 1,16%
Norway 0,08% 0,12% 0,14% 0,21% 0,14% 0,26%
Switzerland 0,11% 0,17% 0,07% 0,30% 0,16% 0,30%
Country
VC Buyouts (% of GDP)
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To finance their growth, banks have securitisation, which became an
importance source of financing for banks. In this way a bank-based system has
used market mechanisms to strength its position. Apparently, credit
securitization did not create incentives for banks to take excessive risks in
credit granting.
In other areas of risk, Portuguese banks trade much less than euro area banks
in derivatives, but they have a much higher level of off-balance sheet items.
Other financial institutions grew faster than banks, especially securitisation
societies and funds, which registered an exponential growth. Financial holding
companies also grew considerably fast, reflecting the growing importance of
financial groups. Banks have been devoting a large proportion of their credit
capacity to finance non-monetary financial institutions.
We observe a tendency for disintermediation as the securities debt market grew
much faster than financial intermediaries.
Regarding the non-bank financing of innovation, venture capital financing of
early stage projects was smaller in Portugal than in the EU from 1997-2007, but
from 2008-2011 it was larger in consequence of an important effort of public
policy. Additionally, the financing of innovative firms in the stock market is also
more limited in Portugal, due to the small dimension of this market.
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5. Availability and source of funds 40
This section studies the growth of the several types of institutional investors
and their role in the financing of firms (Section 5.1). Some of these financial
firms are part of banking groups, which are described in Section 5.2.
5.1. Institutional investors
Institutional investors are financial companies that cannot create money
directly, but due to their functions in the economy manage large sums of funds,
and therefore are important in the financing of the economy. There are three
major institutional investors: insurance companies, pension funds and
investment funds. In the period 1995-2010, the institutional investor that grew
fastest was insurance companies. In 1995, their assets represented only 9.7% of
GDP and in 2010 represented 38.1% of GDP (Figure 70).
Figure 70 – Financial assets of Institutional investors (% of GDP)
Source: OCDE
The fast growth of insurance companies can also be noted by looking at another
indicator of insurance: the ratio of direct gross premiums to GDP (Table 17).
40 Corresponds to point 9 of the terms of reference.
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Between 1983 and 2010, the Portuguese insurance market grew significantly. In
1983 the premiums represented 1.8% of GDP, one of the lowest values among
Euro area countries.41 In 1998, before joining the Euro, the importance of
insurance premiums to GDP had grown to 4.98%, still below the EU-15 average
of 7.4%. The growth of insurance companies continued in the following years
and in 2008 the premiums represented 8.69% of GDP, slightly above the EU-15
average and above the majority of euro area countries.
Table 17 – The direct gross premiums (% of GDP)
Source: OCDE
In the non-life insurance sector, foreign firms have contributed significantly to
the growth of the market (see Table 18). In 1983, foreign companies controlled
18.1% of this market segment, which was a reasonably high value in the Euro
area context. In 1998, foreign companies already controlled 26.4% of the non-
life insurance segment. In the next years, the market share of foreign
companies increased slightly and in 2010 they represented 28.3% of the non-life
insurance segment.
41 There is no information for Netherlands and Greece.
Austria n.a. 5,3% 5,8%
Belgium 3,7% 6,4% 8,0%
Finland 4,3% 3,9% 4,8%
France 3,5% 7,9% 10,6%
Germany 2,8% 6,4% n.a .
Greece n.a. 1,7% 2,3%
Ireland 6,9% 11,6% 21,7%
Italy 1,7% 4,7% 8,1%
Netherlands n.a. 9,3% 6,2%
Portugal 1,8% 5,0% 9,0%
Spain 1,6% 4,8% 5,3%
United Kingdom n.a. 12,6% n.a .
European Union (15) 2,1% 7,4% 5,0%
Country 1983 1998 2010
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Interestingly, in the life insurance segment there has been a decline in the
market share of foreign companies. In 1983 they controlled 47.7% of the
market, 15.2% in 1998 and 5.8% in 2010 (see Table 18).
Table 18 – Market share of foreign undertakers (% of total business)
Source: OCDE
Pension funds had a smaller growth than insurance companies from 7.4% of
GDP in 1995 to 14.6% of GDP in 2005. After that their importance declined to
10.8% of GDP in 2010. One reason for this decline is the transference of private
pension funds to public social security.
In Portugal, as in many continental European countries, most pensions are
provided by public funds. There are some private pension funds for large
companies and banks that have gradually been dismantled. Nevertheless, in
2010 the assets controlled by autonomous pension funds as a percentage of
GDP represented 11.4%, which is a relatively high value for the euro area if we
exclude Finland, Ireland, and Netherlands (Table 19). In the latter three
countries private pension funds are disproportionally very important.
Notice that between 2001 and 2010, the tendency in Portugal was for a
stabilization of the share of autonomous pensions funds’ assets in GDP, while in
the other Euro area countries the tendency was for an increase.
Life Non-Life Life Non-Life Life Non-Life
Austria n.a . n.a . 32,5% 50,8% n.a . n.a .
Belgium 24,3% 39,1% 3,1% 2,6% n.a . n.a .
Finland 0,0% 0,6% 0,0% 0,1% n.a . n.a .
France 7,7% 12,1% 1,0% 1,2% n.a . 0,1%
Germany 3,4% 4,0% 7,7% 12,2% 27,0% 17,1%
Greece 17,0% 20,0% 9,7% 9,8% 57,2% 33,8%
Ireland 47,4% 45,1% 17,2% 16,7% 8,2% 8,9%
Italy 1,2% 4,6% 2,3% 4,8% 30,2% 27,3%
Netherlands 16,6% 26,6% 34,3% 36,7% 25,2% 17,0%
Portugal 47,7% 18,2% 15,2% 26,4% 5,8% 28,3%
Spain 23,5% 21,7% 28,7% 26,7% 10,3% 18,6%
United Kingdom n.a . n.a . 26,3% 39,9% n.a . n.a .
2010
Country
1983 1998
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As already mentioned, one reason why pension funds have not grown was the
transference of some pension funds to Social Security since 1997. The main
transferences happened in 1997 (BNU and Territory of Macau, 0.4% of GDP), in
2003 (CTT, 0.9% of GDP), in 2004 (CGD, ANA, Navegação Aérea de Portugal e
Imprensa Nacional, 2% of GDP), in 2010 (PT Comunicações, 1.6% of GDP) and in
2011 (various banks, 3.5% of GDP) – Bank of Portugal, 2011).
Table 19 – Assets (including non-financial) of autonomous pension funds (%
of GDP)
Source: OCDE
Those transferences allowed the temporary reduction of the fiscal deficit, which
was very convenient for Governments, because it allowed them to comply with
the Growth and Stability Pact. But in the long-run such operations may
undermine the fiscal balance if the discounted value of the liabilities assumed
by Social Security is inferior to the value of assets transferred. Naturally, this
calculus is subject to substantial uncertainty arising from the evolution of
wages, financial markets and mortality rates. The EU has highlighted that
transfers of pension funds to Social Security have a particularly negative impact
on the structural fiscal balance (Banco de Portugal, 2011).
Austria 2,9% 4,8% 5,3%
Belgium 5,5% 4,4% 3,8%
Finland 49,5% 68,6% 82,1%
France n.a. 0,0% 0,2%
Germany 3,4% 4,0% 5,2%
Greece n.a. n.a. 0,0%
Ireland 43,7% 48,3% 49,0%
Italy 2,2% 2,8% 5,6%
Netherlands 102,6% 121,7% 128,6%
Portugal 11,5% 12,7% 11,4%
Spain 5,8% 7,2% 7,9%
United Kingdom 72,0% 78,6% 88,7%
Country 2001 2005 2010
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Financial assets of investment funds have lost importance in terms of GDP:
from 19.3% of GDP in 1998 they declined to 9.2% in 2010. In contrast, the non-
financial assets of investment funds have grown quickly, and in 2010 they
represented 8.3% of GDP, almost the same as the financial assets (see Figure
71).
The growth of non-financial assets in investment funds is related to the growth
in real estate investment funds. In 1998 they represented 1.9% of GDP and in
2010 they had grown to 5.1% of GDP. Naturally, the growth of these specialised
funds has contributed to the increase in investment in real state.
Figure 71 – Assets of investment funds (IF) (proportion of GDP)
Source: OCDE
The main buyers of securities (debt and shares) are institutional investors
(mutual funds, insurance companies and pension funds). In Portugal, financial
integration implied a diversification of institutional investors’ portfolio towards
securities issued by non-residents (Figure 72). The reduction of exchange rate
risk was one of the main explanations for the increase in the international
diversification of portfolios. In a sense, this implied less demand for the
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securities issued by Portuguese firms, probably creating difficulty in the
financing of firms.
Figure 72 – Assets issued by residents and owned by institutional investors
(in proportion of the total assets owned by each institutional investor in
each category)
Source: OCDE
5.2. Financial groups
The process of deregulation and privatization of Portuguese financial system
boosted the formation of large financial groups, which typically have a
commercial bank as a dominant shareholder.
According to Pinto (1995), this type of strategy has had essentially two goals.
Firstly, it has allowed the proliferation and distribution of diverse financial
services in a more efficient way, through cross-selling or bundling. This type of
strategy favours the attraction of customers to other financial products less
common in commercial banking. Banks can use their clients’ base to sell not
only deposits and credit, but also mutual funds, insurances, factoring, leasing,
among other products. Besides this marketing advantage, there are also
synergies in terms of information and production technologies. Secondly, it
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
Securities other than
Shares of Insurance
Corporations and
Pension Funds
Shares of Insurance
Corporations and
Pension Funds
Securities other than
Shares of Investment
Funds
Shares of Investment
Funds
138
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
prevents a hostile takeover by other financial institutions, due to the large
dimension of the financial institution.
The creation of a banking group by diversifying operations to related markets
allows for the stabilization of revenues and for taking advantage of growing
markets. An example of this is the insurance market in Portugal, which had a
rapid growth and where banking groups were present. Another advantage of
banking groups is that they facilitate the financing of activities. The commercial
bank that can receive deposits and access to the central bank and the interbank
market can finance other financial firms lacking such access, as investment
banks and other non-monetary credit institutions. Naturally, there are some
risks. For example, if an investment bank makes risky investments, it can drag
the whole group into a difficult situation. But in Portugal such a scenario was
not realized.
Banking groups dominate the Portuguese financial system, offering a wide
variety of products and services, in a context of universal banking. Those groups
have been created essentially by mergers and acquisitions, but also by internal
growth. They have chosen to control specialised firms dedicated to a segment
of business. They control and own most of financial companies linked to the
provision of other financial activities, like insurance services, factoring, leasing,
renting, asset management, investment banking, among others. All companies
in the group are overseen by a holding company.
Mainly since the last decade, these financial groups have been following an
international expansion’s strategy, in an attempt to avoid the deceleration of the
Portuguese economy and the maturity of the Portuguese banking market. In
most cases, this international strategy has been used to facilitate and to
promote exports and direct investment by Portuguese companies.
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The continuous growth of financial groups was also detected in Section 4.5, as
we noticed that the control of assets by holding companies grew substantially
since 1994.
Notice that, together, the five largest banking groups account for around 75% of
the Portuguese banking market, either in terms of assets, credit or resources
from customers. In Portugal there are 5 large groups: CGD, BCP, BES,
Santander and BPI. Only Santander is foreign owned, and the rest are
domestically controlled. The largest group is CGD, controlled by the state, and
the smallest are Santander and BPI. In terms of market share, Santander has
had a very fast growth since 2003, while BCP has lost market share (Table 20).
In Annex 0 we describe in more detail the composition of each group.
Table 20 – The importance of banking groups on the Portuguese banking
system
Source: Based on data from Bank of Portugal and APB
Banking System Total Assets 100.0% 100.0%
CGD Total Assets 23.4% 24.6%
BCP Tota l Assets 21.4% 18.1%
BES Tota l Assets 13.7% 15.5%
Santander Totta Total Assets 1.5% 7.8%
BPI Tota l Assets (individua l ) 8.3% 8.3%
C5 68.3% 74.2%
Banking System Credit to Clients 100.0% 100.0%
CGD Credit to Cl ients 22.5% 25.9%
BCP Credit to Cl ients 24.9% 21.6%
BES Credit to Cl ients 13.0% 15.6%
Santander Totta Credit to Cl ients 1.7% 9.0%
BPI Credi t to Cl ients 8.9% 9.0%
C5 70.9% 81.1%
Banking System Resources from Clients 100.0% 100.0%
CGD Resources from Cl ients 28.2% 28.5%
BCP Resources from Cl ients 19.3% 19.2%
BES Resources from Cl ients 12.7% 13.8%
Santander Totta Resources from Cl ients 1.2% 8.0%
BPI Resources from Cl ients 7.8% 10.0%
C5 69.2% 79.6%
2003 2011
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5.3. Concluding remarks
Institutional investors are important in financing the economy. In Portugal,
insurance companies were the institutional investor that grew most since 1995.
On the other two groups of institutional investors – pension funds and
investment funds – there was no progress. Financialisation has stabilized or
retreated in terms of pension funds, with many private pension funds
transferred to the public domain. This movement had a positive effect on the
fiscal deficit in the short run, but in the long run may have had negative effects.
The importance of investment funds decreased substantially, but the
importance of real estate investment funds increased.
The monetary integration led Portuguese institutional investors to invest more
in foreign assets. This may have created difficulties for Portuguese firms to
obtain finance in markets.
In the banking sector there was the construction of banking groups through
M&A and internal growth. This tendency brought many advantages for banks
namely the possibility of cross-selling, easy of financing, costs reductions,
technology and information advantages, and creation of barriers to entry. The
creation of groups allowed banks to have a universal approach to the business,
offering a variety of products and services, many times through their own
specialized financial firms. Currently, the 5 largest banking groups control
around 75% of the banking system.
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6. The nature and degree of competition between financial institutions42
This section describes the evolution of concentration in the Portuguese banking
sector, giving particular attention to the impact of Mergers and Acquisitions
(Section 6.1). The impact of competition on innovations in the payment system
and channels of contacts with clients is the focus of Section 6.2.
6.1. Concentration and mergers and acquisitions
Since 1990, the degree of concentration in the Portuguese banking market has
increased significantly in line with global and European tendencies. From 1991
to 1996, the deregulation of the banking market and privatisation of banks
originated a consolidation in the sector. The share of assets of the five major
banking groups (C5) increased from 67.7% in 1993 to 83% in 1996 (Figure 73).
Figure 73 – Bank concentration (C5)
Note: Non-consolidated data from 1993 to 1998 and consolidated data from
2000.
Source: From 1993 to 2003 data from Bank of Portugal’s Annual Reports and
from 2004 calculations based on APB and Bank of Portugal.
42 Corresponds to point 4 of the terms of reference.
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The privatization process consolidated the dominance of the five largest
banking groups: Caixa Geral de Depósitos, Banco Comercial Português, Banco
Espírito Santo, Banco Pinto e Sotto Mayor (latter Santander Totta) and Banco
Português de Investimento. These groups are organized to offer a wide variety
of products and services, in a context of universal banking. Since the end of
banking privatizations, those banking groups have clearly led the Portuguese
banking system, in terms of assets, income, credit and deposits. In 1996, they
accounted for 83% of the assets, 79.6% of credit, 84.9% of deposits and 93.1% of
net income. The fact that their share of net income was larger than their share
of assets shows that they were more profitable than the remaining banks in the
system. This may result from larger efficiency and/or larger market power.
After the end of the privatization process and up to 2002 there was some
significant M&A, with the peak in the year 2000 (Table 21). In that year there
were several M&A involving the major banking groups. Two events were of
paramount importance. The first was the dismantling of the group Banco Pinto
e Sotto Mayor (BPSM), which included Banco Totta e Sotto Mayor Inv (BTSM inv),
Banco Totta e Açores (BTA) and Crédito Predial Português (CPP). The BPSM
was acquired by Banco Comercial Português, BTSM Inv was acquired by Caixa
Geral de Depositos and CPP was acquired by BTA. The second major event
occurred in the 2000, when BTA was acquired by the Spanish group Santander,
creating the major foreign bank in Portugal. The impact of these M&A
movements can be seen in the increase in 2000 of the share of assets owned by
the five major groups (Figure 73).
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Table 21 – Number of domestic M&A involving credit institutions
Note: EU 12 (1997-2000) and EU 25 (from 2001)
Source: ECB (EU Banking Structures 2004 and 2005)
After 2001 the M&A activity reduced significantly to one or zero operations a
year. Also, after 2000 the tendency was for a decrease in the concentration of
the banking market.
Between 1998 and 2010 the number of credit institutions in Portugal decreased
by 32% (73 institutions), which compares with a reduction of 26% in the Euro
area (Figure 74). Despite large, the decrease in the number of institutions in
Portugal corresponds mainly to some minor adjustments in the banking system
(Table A , in Annex). A large number of institutions leaving the market are local
Agricultural Caixas that have merged with other Caixas. Moreover, small
foreign banks leaving the market, M&A and internal adjustments in banking
groups led also to the reduction of the number of banks. The joiners are small
foreign banks and internet-based banks. Other banks join the market due to
internal re-organizations of large banking groups.
Belgium 1 6 1 0 1 1 2 1
Germany 15 12 22 10 9 8 14 11
Greece 1 8 3 4 2 2 3 1
Spain 7 12 9 7 5 3 4 1
France 17 9 7 10 12 12 8 11
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Italy 17 16 24 31 24 23 22 13
Netherlands 3 1 1 0 2 2 2 2
Austria 5 2 4 4 1 3 0 1
Portugal 2 3 1 5 2 0 1 0
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
United Kingdom 4 0 0 1 13 12 10 13
EA 12 68 69 72 71 58 56 57 41
EU 73 69 75 73 93 75 73 60
2002 2003 2004Country 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
144
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
Figure 74 – Number of credit institutions
Source: ECB
Regarding concentration, a slightly different picture is obtained by looking at
the Credit Institutions43 on a non-consolidated basis, i.e., excluding other firms
of the banking group apart from Credit Institutions. Comparing with the share
based with consolidated data, the share of total assets of the five major
institutions decreases (Figure 75). But the most important is the analysis of the
tendency of the indicator C5, being much clearer the increase in concentration
in the credit market after Portugal has joined the Euro. Although in a smaller
scale, this tendency also occurred in the Euro area (Figure 75), and also at a
global scale (Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009).
43 According to the Portuguese law, credit institutions are companies whose business is to
receive deposits or other repayable funds in order to apply them by granting credit. It is also
considered as credit institutions companies which have as their object issuing means of
payment in the form of electronic money. Thus, credit institutions include: banks, savings
banks, mutual agricultural credit banks, credit companies, investment companies, leasing
companies, factoring companies, mutual guarantee societies, and electronic money institutions.
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Figure 75 – Share of the five largest Credit Institutions in total assets (non-
consolidated basis)
Source: ECB and for the EA average the Report on EU Banking Structures
(ECB), several years.
The degree of concentration of assets in the Portuguese banking market is
larger than for the majority of Euro area countries (Figure 75). But these data
has to be interpreted with caution, since banks grow in size to exploit scale and
scope economies and, therefore, it is expected that smaller national markets
would be more concentrated. Thus, compared with EU countries of similar
dimension as Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands, the level of concentration
does not seem large.
The increase in concentration did not mean a decrease of competition. Since
1990, competition between banks increased considerably due to: 1) the
privatization of public banks, 2) the authorization of universal banks, 3) the end
of credit limits in 1991 and 4) the reduction of the reserve rate from 17% to 2%
in 1994 (Alexandre et al, 2011: 34).
As described by the Bank of Portugal (1997), one of the consequences of the
rise on banking competition between 1986 and 1997 was the increase of
deposits interest rates and a decrease of credit interest rates for low risk
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clients. In this way, the financial margin felt considerably after 1991, in
detriment of an increase of commissions and other services.
Effectively, Pinho (1999), using a panel data model, concludes that the period of
deregulation of the banking activity between 1986 and 1992 implied an increase
of price and non-price competition between banks. Additionally, he founds that
the smallest banks paid higher interest rates and supported higher levels of
advertising and branch expenditures, in order to increase their market share.
Boucinha and Ribeiro (2009) conclude that the Portuguese banking market is
close to monopolistic competition in the long-run. Competition was more
intense after 1996 and especially after 2000, indicating that the privatization of
banks, the liberalization of the market and the euro participation has increased
competition, namely in the credit segment.
In general, the effect of M&A has two contradictory effects on the conditions
offered to clients. On the one hand, those operations may contribute to an
improvement in firms’ efficiency, which can be transmitted into lower interest
rates and more credit to the non-financial private sector. On the other hand,
M&A reinforce the market power of banking groups, leading to worse
conditions for clients. Bonfim et al (2011) conclude for Portugal that M&A have
contributed to a reduction of interest rates and to an increase of credit to non-
financial firms, but has implied a smaller growth of credit to households.
If a merger increases the efficiency of both the acquiring and the acquired
institutions, it is expected that the sum of the market value of both institutions
increases. In this direction, Silva and Diz (2005) analyse the value creation
effects of mergers and acquisitions in the Portuguese banking industry between
January of 1995 and September of 2003, using an approach based on event
studies. They study the market performance of twenty acquired or absorbed
financial institutions (called “targets”) and of twenty-two acquiring financial
institutions (called bidders).
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They note the existence of some gains for the targets, but no gains for the
bidders. Nevertheless, if analysed as a combined entity (target plus bidder),
they conclude that mergers and acquisitions in the Portuguese banking industry
during that period did not create net wealth for shareholders.
6.2. Innovation: payment systems and channels of contact with
customers
It was just saw that, despite the increase in concentration, the level of
competition between Portuguese banks has increased. Some authors argue
that competition is associated with innovation. In this section we study how
banks innovated in terms of payment systems and ways of contact with
customers.
Between 2000 and 2011, there was a strong increase in the number of ATMs
and Point of Sales (POS) in Portugal (Figure 76a). In 2011, Portugal had the
highest number of ATMs per million inhabitants, as well as the largest set of
functionalities since the Portuguese ATM system is one of the most
sophisticated in Europe (Antão et al , 2009). At the same time, the number of
POS per million inhabitants has also risen, and in 2011 this indicator was larger
in Portugal than in the EA, being only smaller than Finland, Ireland, Greece and
Spain in 2011 (see Figure 76b).
In Portugal, the ATM system has functioned in a cooperative basis between
banks, through the creation of a firm (Sociedade Interbancária de Serviços –
SIBS) in 1993, in which each bank with a retail network owns an equity position.
Clients from any bank can use the ATM system, with all services free of charge,
with the system being mostly funded by advertising.
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Figure 76 – Payment terminals per million inhabitants
a) ATMs b) POS
Source: ECB (Payments and Settlement Systems Statistics)
In Portugal, the development of payment terminals during the last decade was
also associated with the increasing use of debit and credit cards. In fact, in the
2000s, the use of cards as a payment instrument in proportion of GDP had in
Portugal the highest jump among EA countries (see Figure 77). In 2011,
Portugal had the second highest utilization of cards, only lower than the UK.
Figure 77 – Utilization of cards issued in the reporting country except e-
money function (transaction in % of GDP)
Source: ECB (Payments and Settlement Systems Statistics)
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In contrast, the use of chequebooks decreased substantially in the last decade
in Portugal, a trend also visible in other European countries. Nevertheless,
cheques continued to be used more in Portugal than in other EA countries, with
the exception of Ireland and Greece (see Figure 78).
Figure 78 – Utilization of cheques (% GDP)
Source: ECB (Payments and Settlement Systems Statistics)
The Portuguese situation is quite different when we analyse direct debts and
credit transfers. Despite some convergence since 2000, especially on credit
transfers, those payment systems in 2011 were still less used in Portugal than
in the EA (Figure 79 and Figure 80). This means that on direct debts and credit
transfers, which are the most representative payment methods in other EA
countries, Portugal still presents some underdevelopment, implying more
transaction costs and less productivity. For example, the lower use of direct
debits implies more use of labour input to make recurrent payments.
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Figure 79 – Utilization of direct debts (% GDP)
Source: ECB (Payments and Settlement Systems Statistics)
Figure 80 – Utilization of credit transfers (% GDP)
Source: ECB (Payments and Settlement Systems Statistics)
As we saw, the accessibility to banks’ services through ATMs has increased
notably since 2000. Similarly, the number of branches also rose quite
substantially since 1997 (Figure 81), reflecting the abolition of the barriers to
the location and opening of new branches in 1993. This process has been
accompanied by a geographical dispersion of branches through the territory, in
an effort to increase the contact with customers to raise market share.
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Figure 81 – The number of bank branches in Portugal
Source: ECB (Structural Financial Indicators)
However, the upward trend in the number of branches reversed between 2001
and 2004, due to the development of new business channels, like homebanking
(by fax, phone and especially internet). There was also a reduction in the
number of employees per branch (Activity Report of APB, several years), mainly
in the last few years, in a context where branches are increasingly smaller,
more disperse and decentralized. Between 2005 and 2008 there was again an
increase in the number of branches, and in 2009 and 2010 the crisis caused the
stabilization in the size of the branches’ network.
The number of branches per million inhabitants increased in Portugal in the
period between 2000 and 2010. This increase went in the opposite direction to
the evolution that occurred in the EA. Moreover, in 2010 Portugal had the
second highest number of branches per million inhabitants among the
European partners (Figure 82).
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Figure 82 – The number of bank branches per million inhabitants
Source: ECB (Structural Financial Indicators) and Eurostat
6.3. Concluding remarks
Since 1999 the deregulation of the banking market, the privatisation of banks,
and M&A increased considerably concentration in the banking sector. This
increase was one of the largest in the euro area. In 2010, the degree of
concentration was above the EA average, but it was not very different from
other small European countries.
Despite the increase in concentration, competition has increased especially
after 2000, causing a reduction of lending interest rates and an increase in
credit supply to firms.
Financial integration and the increase in competition led to a modernization of
the payment systems and channels of contact with customers. The two areas
where more progress was made were ATMs and bank branches. Portugal has
one of the largest networks of ATMs, which has also more functionalities than
in other countries. The size of the network of bank branches also increased, and
in 2010 Portugal had one of the largest networks per million of inhabitant of the
EA. Simultaneously, homebanking has also grown substantially.
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In other areas the progress was slower. The use of direct debits and credit
transfers is quite small in Portugal, while cheques are still very much used,
showing evidence of the underdevelopment of parts of the payment system.
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7. Profitability of the financial system44
In this section we assess the profitability of the financial system. Section 7.1
looks at financial margin, commissions and other non-interest income. As a
complement, we describe the evolution of the intermediation margin in Section
7.2. The ratio cost-to-income and a review of studies on banking efficiency are
the objects of Sections 7.3 and 7.4, respectively. The overall profitability of the
banking system as assessed by the ROA and ROE is reviewed in Section 7.5,
which includes also a comparison with the return of non-financial firms. The
payment of taxes by banks is seen in Section 7.6. Finally the evolution of capital
ratios is studied in Section 7.7. In all these sections we face a significant
challenge in terms of the comparison of indicators across time, due to the
widening of the group of banking institutions under analysis in the statistics of
Bank of Portugal (in 2004 and 2007).
7.1. Financial margin, commissions and other non-interest income
From 1992 to 2010 there was a strong downward tendency the financial margin
(the difference between interests received and paid), especially in the period
1992 to 1998 (Figure 83) as a result of an increase in competition, the reduction
in interest rates and the improvement in operational efficiency. One of the
drivers of the improvement of operational efficiency was technological progress
(Antão et al, 2009: 463).
The decline of the financial margin implied an approximation to the European
values. In 2010, the Portuguese financial margin was not as high as in Austria,
Spain, Greece and Italy, but was close to these high values (Figure 84). Notice
44 Corresponds to point 5 of the terms of reference.
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that the comparison between countries should be interpreted with caution, due
to differences in balance sheet structures (Antão et al, 2009: 466).
Figure 83 – Financial margin (% of average assets)
Source: Calculations based on data from Bank of Portugal
Figure 84 – Net interest income in several EA’s countries (% of total
assets)
Source: ECB (Statistics on Consolidated Banking Data)
In order to compensate the decrease in the financial margin, the income from
services and commissions as percentage of average assets had a tendency to
increase between 1997 and 2005 (Figure 85). That occurred because in the
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beginning of the 1990s banks’ services to clients were not directly charged, with
banks being remunerated by high financial margins. As financial margins
decreased, banks started to charge explicitly for the services provided. After
2005, there was a small downward tendency in the income from services and
commissions.
Figure 85 – Income from services and commissions (% of average assets)
Source: Calculations based on data from Bank of Portugal
Besides credit and other services provided to clients, banks can invest directly
in financial markets. In Portugal, since many banking groups include
investment and commercial banks, we may wonder if banks have been
dedicating more resources to investment and trading activities. From 1992 to
2011, the income from securities and financial operations did not show any
overall trend, fluctuating in accordance with the evolution of the stock market45
(Figure 86).
However, the investment in securities in proportion of total assets had a clear
downward tendency up to 2008, which was particularly strong from 1992 to 2002
(Figure 87). During that period banks dedicated increasing resources to satisfy
45 Even though there was a certain degree of anticipation of banks’ income in relation to the
stock market evolution.
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the growth of credit’s demand. But after 2008, the investment in securities
increased, probably because profit’s opportunities in the credit market
declined. Also, during that period domestic banks invested in the Portuguese
government debt as foreign investors moved away from this market.
Figure 86 – Income from securities and financial operations (% of average
assets)
Source: Calculations based on data from Bank of Portugal
Figure 87 –Investment in securities (% of total assets)
Source: Calculations based on data from Bank of Portugal
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The proportion of assets associated with securities and financial operations in
total assets was in 2010 smaller in Portugal than in the other Euro area
countries, with the exception of Greece (Figure 88). Nevertheless, between 2008
and 2010, in Portugal that proportion suffered the largest increase in the Euro
area (7 p.p.), due to the reasons indicated above.
Figure 88 – Trading and investment securities (% of total assets)
Note: Trading and investment in securities includes financial assets held for
trading, financial assets designated at fair value through profit or loss,
available-for-sale assets, held-to-maturity investments, and derivatives-hedge
accounting.
Source: ECB (Statistics on Consolidated Banking Data)
7.2. Intermediation Margin
The intermediation margin, which assesses the gross margin captured by
banks, is measured as the difference between active (credit) and passive
(deposits) interest rates. The smaller that margin the more efficient banks are
in performing financial intermediation. The intermediation margin can be
calculated separately for non-financial firms and for households.
Since 2003, the intermediation margin for non-financial corporations was on
average 1 p.p. larger in Portugal than in the EA (Figure 89). The difference
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between the two margins increased from the end of 2011 to June 2012.
Similarly, between January 2003 and June 2012, the average interest rate
margin for credit to households for consumption was also 2 p.p. larger in
Portugal than in the EA (Figure 90a), but the margin for credit to households for
housing was 0.35 p.p. smaller in Portugal than in the EA (Figure 90b).
Figure 89 – The intermediation margin for non-financial corporations
Source: Bank of Portugal
Figure 90 – The intermediation margin for households
a) Credit to consumption b) Credit for housing
Source: Bank of Portugal
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7.3. Cost-to-income
In the beginning of the 1990s the cost-to-income ratio increased, probably due
to the reorganization of the main banks after the privatization process (Figure
91). 46 From 1995 to 2006 the cost-to-income ratio followed a downward trend.
After 2006, with the beginning of financial turbulence in the markets, the ratio
of cost-to-income started to increase at a quick rate, as the crisis reduced
banks’ income.
Figure 91 – Evolution of the cost-to-income ratio (% of banking product) in
Portugal
Source: Calculations based on data from Bank of Portugal
Comparing with other Euro area countries, in 2010 the cost-to-income ratio of
Portuguese banks was low, with only Spain, Finland and Ireland presenting a
lower ratio (Figure 92).
46 The cost-to-income ratio is the sum of administrative costs, personnel costs and
amortizations divided by banking production.
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Figure 92 – Cost-to-income ratio (%) in the euro area
Source: ECB (Statistics on Consolidated banking Data)
7.4. Studies on banking efficiency
There are several studies on banking efficiency in Portugal. One of the most
recent and complete is Boucinha, Ribeiro and Weyman-Jones (2009), which
covers the period 1992-2004 using a stochastic cost function. The study
assumes that banks attribute loans using debt and equity to finance them.
Banks take into account a comprehensive set of costs in minimising costs:
these include labour costs, financial costs, capital costs and external services.
All these cost affect the marginal cost. The estimations done show that the
reduction in interest rates decreased financial costs and thus the marginal
costs of loans. There was also a decrease in marginal costs due to the
reduction of the other costs (labour, capital and external services).
The level of cost-inefficiency was only 9% (above the efficient level), which
means that on average banks had a cost 9% above the efficient level. This
inefficiency may be due to allocative or technical inefficiency. Technical
efficiency is the firm's ability to minimize cost for a given level of inputs. In turn,
allocative efficiency reflects the ability to use inputs for the optimization of
production, given the respective prices and technology. It is interesting to notice
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that there is no evidence of an improvement in cost-efficiency over time. But
naturally the efficiency varies across banks, from a minimum of 84% to a
maximum of 99%. In contrast, there evidence of technological progress that
reduces costs at a rate of 2.2% a year, which intensifies at the end of the
sample.
The authors also find evidence of scale and scope economies. This may justify
the merger and acquisitions that occurred in the Portuguese banking system,
where the goal was to create larger and more diversified institutions.
The positive evolution of total factor productivity was mainly determined by
scale efficiency and technological progress, with no contribution from technical
efficiency. The growth of productivity accelerated after 1999, and was quite slow
in the first part of the 1990s, when the liberalization of the banking system was
still incipient.
There are other studies on cost efficiency, ones using stochastic cost functions
(Mendes e Rebelo, 1999; Pinho, 2001; Ribeiro, 2006; Lima and Pinho, 2008) and
another using Data Envelopment Analysis that is a non-parametric approach
(Canhoto and Dermine, 2003). Mendes and Rebelo (2000) use both methods.
These studies have several theoretical and empirical methodological
differences, besides covering different time periods, making it difficult to
compare their results. Anyway, all studies except Mendes and Rebelo (1999)
find productivity gains in Portuguese banks (Antão et al, 2009: 471).
Studies also find systematic differences in cost efficiency across different types
of banks: public banks are less efficient (Pinho, 2001; Mendes and Rebelo,
2000), banks created after 1984 tend to be more efficient than the ones created
before (Canhoto and Dermine, 2003), and foreign banks are more efficient than
domestic banks (Canhoto and Dermine, 2003). The results of Canhoto and
Dermine (2003) indicate that deregulation of the banking system which allowed
the entrance of new banks may have contributed to an improvement of average
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efficiency. Using a simulation exercise, Mendes and Rebelo (2000) found that
the mergers and acquisitions may improve banks’ efficiency. Ribeiro (2006)
found the opposite result. In this direction, Lima and Pinho (2008) indicate that
periods of high market concentration are associated with lower cost efficiency.
Barros and Borges (2011), not using a frontier approach, conclude that banks
which have constructed stronger capital structures benefit from a larger return
on assets.
7.5. Return-on-Assets and Return-on-Equity
Even though the data is not completely comparable across time, the ROE
(before taxes and minority interests) of the Portuguese banks has shown a
tendency to increase between 1992 and 2006 (Figure 93). After that there was a
steep decline in the ROE, which in 2011 became negative. This reduction is
explained by the Subprime crisis and the Sovereign debt crisis.
Figure 93 –ROE (before taxes and minority interests) of the Portuguese
banks
Source: Calculations based on data from Bank of Portugal
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The evolution in terms of ROA (before taxes and minority interests) was slightly
different, since between 1992 and 2006 the upward tendency is not so clear,
being more visible in 1996-99 and 2003-06 (Figure 94). The difference in the
evolution of ROE and ROA reflect an increase in the leverage of the banking
system, as we will see in Section 7.7. But the strong decline in ROA after 2007
was similar to the one that occurred in ROE.
Figure 94 –ROA (before taxes and minority interests) of the Portuguese
banks
Source: Calculations based on data from Bank of Portugal
Compared with the EA, the average ROA of Portuguese banks was in 2006 one
of the largest (Figure 95). The average ROA of banks was also very large in
Greece and Spain, two countries affected latter by the sovereign debt crisis. In
2010, the ROA in Portugal declined to an intermediate position in the EA. In
terms of ROE, Portuguese banks had an intermediate position in 2006 and 2010
(Figure 96).
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Figure 95 – Banks’ ROA of euro area countries (%)
Source: ECB (2007), European Banking Sector Stability, Nov; and ECB (Statistics
on Consolidated Banking Data)
Figure 96 – Bank’s ROE of euro area countries (%)
Source: ECB (2007), European Banking Sector Stability, Nov; and ECB (Statistics
on Consolidated Banking Data)
If the financialisation hypothesis was valid, banks would increase their profits
and non-financial firms would suffer a reduction of profits. In Portugal, the ROE
(after taxes) of banks in 2001-07 was around 5 p.p. larger than the ROE of non-
financial firms: 11.79% and 6.6% respectively. The data for non-financial firms
was obtained from the Central de Balanços that includes firms of all sizes. It
would be more correct to compare banks with large firms. When we compare
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only with the mean of large firms (including financial) for the period 1999-2007,
we observe that banks have a slightly higher ROE than the average of large
firms: 11.63% and 10.37% respectively (Figure 97). After 2007, due to the larger
effect of the financial crisis on banks, the situation inverted and the ROE of
banks has become smaller than the one of non-financial firms.
Figure 97 – Comparing the ROE (after taxes) of banks and large firms
Note: Large firms have a turnover higher than 50 million euros
Source: European Sectorial Reference Database for large firms and Bank of
Portugal for banks
7.6. Taxes
One contribution of banks to society is through the payment of taxes.
Accompanying the fall in the statutory tax rate, taxes on banks’ profits as a
proportion of income before taxes has decreased from 1992 to 2004 (Figure 98).
From 2005 to 2008 that tendency reverted. In 2009 and 2010 tax rate decreased
again, probably due to the use for tax purposes of the losses caused by the
financial crisis. 47
47 Banks can use losses to decrease the tax rate on profits.
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Figure 98 – Firms’ statutory tax rate and taxes on banks’ profits (% of
income before taxes)
Source: OECD and calculations based on data from Bank of Portugal
If we look to a more precise measure, the effective tax rate computed by the Tax
Authority for 2007-2010, it can be noticed that financial and insurance activities
pay more tax than the national average (
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Figure 99). However the national average tax rate is pushed down by social
activities and by activities characterised by a high degree of informality.
Therefore, comparing financial and insurance activities with manufacturing
industry, real estate activities, or health activities, it stands out that the financial
sector has a tax rate 3 to 4 p.p. lower.
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Figure 99 – The effective tax rate on profits by activity (% average 2007-
2010)
:
Source: INE
In part, the low average profit tax rate of banks is related with the use of the
Madeira’s Off-shore (valid up to 2011), which allowed to obtain tax exemption
for the profits of banks’ subsidiaries located there (up to 15% of the total profit
of the credit institution (APB, 2010: 109)). 48 In general, this opportunity was not
available for other firms.
7.7. Capital adequacy and funding structure
Between 1992 and 2002, the fact that the ROE increased more than the ROA was
due to the decrease of the capital to liabilities ratio (Figure 100). After 2002, that
ratio increased slowly, and then decreased again in 2011.
48 Profits generated by banks on the Madeira’s Off-shore are tax exempt. Also, profits obtained
elsewhere and transferred to that Off-shore are not subject to taxes.
170
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
Figure 100 – The capital to liabilities ratio (%)
Source: Calculations based on data from Bank of Portugal
In 2008-10, Portugal was among the Euro area countries with higher equity-to-
assets ratio (Figure 101). This explains why the relative profitability of
Portuguese banks decreases when assessed in terms of ROE rather than in
terms of ROA. But the capital-to-assets ratio does not take into account the risk
of assets. For that we have to look at the overall capital adequacy ratio.
Figure 101 – Capital in percentage of total assets
Note: capital includes all the equity on the balance sheet. Source: ECB
(Statistics on Consolidated Banking Data)
From 1997 to 2000 the overall capital adequacy ratio has decreased due to the
increase in credit (Figure 102). This tendency was already evident since 1994
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(Antão et al, 2009: 551). In 2000, the overall capital adequacy ratio was slightly
higher than 9%, which is close to the regulatory minimum of 8%. From 2001 to
2005 there was an attempt to prevent the further decline in the capital ratio,
which was followed by a new decline after 2005.
Figure 102 – Capital adequacy ratios (%)
Note: The overall capital adequacy ratio is the regulatory capital ratio. Source:
Bank of Portugal’s Annual Reports and Financial Stability Reports, several
years
Comparing with other EA’s countries, in 2008 and 2010 Portugal was the
country with the lowest overall solvency ratio (Figure 103). In 2000 and 2004 the
picture was essentially the same (Bank of Portugal, 2004: 100).
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Figure 103 – Overall capital adequacy ratio (%)
Source: ECB (Statistics on Consolidated Banking Data)
As we just saw in Figure 102, banks have used increasingly liabilities to finance
activities. The funding structure of the Portuguese banks has changed
significantly since 1992 (Figure 104), with resources from customers loosing
importance. In fact, during the nineties the main funding component was
related to the resources from customers. In 1992, deposits represented 70% of
total liabilities. Higher households saving rate, high interest rates and the
absence of other saving products explain the strong importance of deposits
during that period. However, since 1992 the tendency has been for a decline of
deposits, which in 2009 represented only 47% of liabilities. This is undoubtedly
related to the decline of households saving rate.
Up to 1998, deposits were replaced by loans from other European banks. After
1998 and up to 2007, the emission of securities became an increasingly
important source of financing. This tendency was interrupted by the Subprime
crisis that led banks to gain financing from the ECB and from depositors.
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Figure 104 – Funding structure of the Portuguese banks (% liabilities)
Source: Bank of Portugal
7.8. Concluding remarks
The several transformations in the Portuguese banking system (including the
increase in competition) have led to a reduction in the financial margin, which
however remained above the EA average. In compensation banks have
increased income from services and commissions.
Another interesting aspect is that despite universal banking being the rule in
Portugal, banks decreased the amount of resources devoted to securities and
financial operations, and their level of engagement in these operations is low.
Confirming the results on the financial margin calculated from banks’ balance
sheets, the intermediation margin obtained directly from interest rates shows
that the spread in credit to consumption and to firms is larger in Portugal than
in the EA. However, the intermediation margin for credit to households is
smaller in Portugal than in the EA.
Banks made a substantial reduction in costs that was interrupted by the
financial crisis. In European terms Portuguese banks are relatively efficient.
The observed gains in banks’ productivity were due to scale efficiency and
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technological progress. The effect of M&A on cost efficiency seems to have
been negative.
Combining revenues and costs, from 1996 to 2006 the tendency was for an
increase in the ROE and ROA of the banking system. Naturally, the financial
crisis turned the upward tendency into a steep decline. Before the decline, the
ROA of Portuguese banks was among the largest of the EA, but comparing with
large firms in Portugal banks do not seem to have had excess profitability.
Financial and insurance activities paid slightly less taxes than other industries,
as manufacturing, real estate and health.
From 1997 to 2010, banks have suffered a degradation of capital adequacy
ratios. Initially, the decline is explained by the rapid growth of credit, and later
by losses due to the crisis and by difficulties in raising capital. Consequently, in
2008 and 2010, Portuguese banks had one of the lowest levels of regulatory
capital of the euro area.
With less capital, banks used more liabilities to finance their activity. The
structure of funding changed considerably since 1992, with deposits losing
importance and loans from European banks and securities gaining importance.
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PART III – The interaction between the financial and other sectors
8. Real Estate sector 49
The real estate sector has an important role in the economy, not only because a
large fraction of households’ wealth is invested in houses, but also because it
represents a significant proportion of GDP. The real estate sector is
heterogeneous, with two large divisions being present: residential and
commercial real estate. The latter includes buildings related to leisure, retail,
office, industry and healthcare. Commercial real estate for the IMF includes
loans collateralized by commercial real estate, loans to construction
companies, and loans to firms developing real estate.
Given the importance of the real estate sector, the emergence of bubbles in this
sector is especially dangerous for macroeconomic stability. Sometimes they
occur for reasons not related to fundamentals, while in other circumstances
rational elements play an important role, as in the case of low interest rates
and large capital availability.
In the boom phase, growing house prices stimulate an unsustainable growth in
credit. This stimulus is larger than in the case of stock prices increases. As the
price of houses rises, the value of collaterals also increases, leading to a
growth in credit. This together with growing house prices incentivizes the
expansion of investment in the construction and real estate sectors. The
increase in house prices also affect households’ consumption, due to the
positive effect of wealth on consumption.
49 Point 7b of the terms of reference.
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In the bust phase, decreasing house prices lead some construction firms to
default. Banks start accumulating non-performing loans. The default of
households may also increase has they do not have means to pay a credit larger
than the value of the home (this is especially true in the UK and the US). In an
attempt to recover its money, banks start selling houses that were given as
collateral, leading to further decline in house prices. As banks accumulate
losses, they start decreasing the supply of loans to the economy.
Simultaneously, as collaterals’ value decreases, households and construction
firms have less access to credit. This and the negative effect of declining house
prices on consumption imply a fall in aggregate demand, which makes the
situation even worse.
The decline in both house prices and aggregate demand may lead to deflation,
which increases the real value of debt, initiating a debt-deflation spiral. With
decreasing prices, households also postpone consumption, leading to a further
fall in aggregate demand.
The distortion in the financial sector can last for decades, as the 1990’s
Japanese crisis shows.
In this section we start by examining the growth of real estate loans, including
loans to households and firms in the industry (Section 8.1). Then, one goes to
the analysis of the weight of real estate in investment and production (Section
8.2). After, we study the contractual characteristics of the housing credit market
(Sections 8.3 to 8.6). Finally, we review some studies on the impact of wealth on
consumption (Section 8.7).
8.1. Real estate loans
In Portugal in the beginnings of the 1980s credit was subject to ceilings, and
only some banks could give credit for housing, due to the segmentation of the
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banking industry. As a result, credit grew slowly in real terms. With the
financial deregulation, the supply of credit for the real estate sector increased
at a fast rate. However, there was not a boom-bust cycle in house prices (See
Section 17.1).
In the periods 1980-88 (before the full liberalization of banking) and 1992-2006
after the liberalization) real estate loans (loans to households for house
purchase, and loans to construction and real estate firms) increased faster than
the overall credit to the private sector (Table 22).
Table 22– Annual average growth rate of real estate loans and total loans
to the non-financial private sector
Source: Bank of Portugal
If real estate is very important in the loans’ portfolio, it implies that the banking
system has a large vulnerability to fluctuations in house prices. A cycle of boom
and bust in the real estate sector may reduce credit quality and the value of
collaterals, with negative consequences for the financial sector stability.
Therefore, we assess next the importance of real estate sector loans.
In Portugal, since 1980, the evolution of real estate loans in the private non-
financial sector has had five distinct periods (Figure 105). From 1980 to 1988,
there was a rapid growth of the importance of real estate loans, from 16.8% in
1980 to 33.1% in 1988. From 1988 until 1992 there was a slight decrease of real
estate loans’ share. From 1993 to 1998 the share of real estate grows again
quickly from 32.6% to 47.4%. The perspective of joining the euro decreased
1980-88 1988-92 1992-98 1998-2006 2006-2011
1. Households housing 33.4% 14.2% 26.5% 13.9% 4.3%
2. Construction 18.6% 12.5% 24.1% 16.6% 1.3%
3. Real estate activities 18.6% 12.5% 24.1% 19.2% 3.1%
4. Total of real estate loans (includes 1, 2 and 3) 27.9% 13.8% 25.9% 14.8% 3.7%
5. Non-financial firms 14.5% 15.2% 8.9% 11.3% 4.4%
6. Households 29.4% 17.3% 26.5% 12.6% 4.0%
7. Private non-financial sector (includes 5 and 6) 17.5% 15.8% 16.0% 12.0% 4.1%
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interest rates and increased expectations of future GDP growth. These together
with the growth of house prices and the small number of households owning a
house boosted the demand for houses. The next period, from 1999 until 2006,
was a period of slower growth, with the weight of housing loans reaching the
maximum of 61.1% of total loans to the private sector. During this period, the
slower growth occurred because a large number of households were already
owners of a house, house prices’ growth started to slowdown, and economic
grow was smaller. After 2006, the further reduction in GDP growth and the
worsening of the conditions offered by banks (availability of credit and interest
rates) implied a period of stabilization of the importance of real state credit
around 60%.
Figure 105 –Real estate loans in % of loans to the private non-financial
sector
Source: Bank of Portugal
The growth of each segment of real estate loans was not uniform. The increase
in the importance of credit to construction and real estate companies in total
credit occurred relatively late in comparison with the increase in credit to
households for house purchase (Figure 106). Indeed, such an increase
happened only after 1996 and lasted until 2005 for construction firms, and until
2008 for real estate firms. After these periods of expansion, both sectors start
losing importance in total credit.
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Figure 106 –The weight of the total loans to the private non-financial sector
by purpose
Source: Bank of Portugal
When we look at the importance of residential real estate loans in total real
estate loans, we observe a sharp increase in the period 1979 to 1996, with an
jump from 45.6% to 84.0% (Figure 107). From 1996, the importance of loans for
housing decreased to a value slightly above 70%, where it basically remained
until 2011, with a small increase to the end of the period.
Figure 107 –The importance of residential real estate loans (% of the total
real estate loans)
Source: Bank of Portugal
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Comparing with Austria, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, the importance of
residential real estate loans in total loans (including to government and non-
residents) was larger in Portugal (Table 23). That was already clear in 1999-
2001, when the proportion of households’ credit directed to house purchase was
75.4% in Portugal and 63.7% in the euro area (Banco de Espanha, 2002). The
same picture exists when we compare the weight of commercial real estate
loans on total loans in Portugal with Germany and Italy.
Table 23 – The importance of the residential and the commercial real
estate loans
Source: IMF (Financial Soundness Indicators)
8.2. Weight of housing in investment and production
The investment done by all agents in the economy may be divided into
investment in dwellings, other buildings and structures, transport equipment,
other machinery and equipment, cultivated assets and intangible fixed assets.
Now, we are interested particularly in the investment in dwellings. From 1995
to 2007, in the EA the gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) on dwellings has
increased moderately, but after 2007 up to 2011 declined, reaching in 2011 the
1995’s level. But this average trend hides different national trajectories. In
Spain and Ireland, there was a strong growth until 2007 and to levels probably
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2011
Austria Residential Real Estate Loans (% ofTotal Gross Loans) n.a. 13% 12% 11% 12% n.a.
Residential Real Estate Loans (% ofTotal Gross Loans) 18% 18% 17% n.a. n.a. n.a.
Commercial Real Estate Loans (% of Total Gross Loans) 6% 6% 5% n.a. n.a. n.a.
Residential and Commercial Real Estate Loans (% ofTotal Gross Loans) 24% 24% 22% n.a. n.a. n.a.
Commercial Real Estate Loans (% ofResidential Real Estate Loans) 26% 25% 25% n.a. n.a. n.a.
Residential Real Estate Loans (% ofTotal Gross Loans) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 19%
Commercial Real Estate Loans (% of Total Gross Loans) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 9%
Residential and Commercial Real Estate Loans (% ofTotal Gross Loans) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 27%
Commercial Real Estate Loans (% ofResidential Real Estate Loans) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 47%
Netherlands Residential Real Estate Loans (% ofTotal Gross Loans) n.a. n.a. n.a. 25% n.a. n.a.
Residential Real Estate Loans (% ofTotal Gross Loans) 32% 32% 32% 32% n.a. n.a.
Commercial Real Estate Loans (% of Total Gross Loans) 11% 11% 11% 12% n.a. n.a.
Residential and Commercial Real Estate Loans (% ofTotal Gross Loans) 43% 43% 43% 44% n.a. n.a.
Commercial Real Estate Loans (% ofResidential Real Estate Loans) 34% 34% 35% 37% n.a. n.a.
Portugal
Country
Germany
Italy
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compatible with the formation of a bubble on the housing market. After 2007, in
these two countries there was a movement of strong correction and the GFCF
on dwellings slipped, mainly in Ireland where investment returned to levels
lower than the 1995’s level (see Figure 108).
Figure 108 – The evolution of the gross fixed capital formation on
dwellings.
a) 1995=100 b) % of Total
Source: Eurostat
In Portugal, the GFCF on dwellings rose until 2000 at a faster rate than the EA
average and after 2000 decreased considerably, in what was one of the largest
declines in the EA. In 2011 the investment was 50% of the 1995’s level.
The investment in dwellings is related with the investment of real estate and
construction sectors, but is not identical to it. Then, it is interesting to analyse
the investment of those two sectors in comparison with the investment of all
sectors. From Figure 111 we observe a continuous decline in almost all EA’s
countries, with this trend been more pronounced in Portugal with a fall from
39% in 1996 to 24% in 2011.
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Figure 109 – Gross fixed capital formation of construction and real estate
sectors (% of total)
Source: Eurostat
It may be interesting to make a separate analysis of construction and real
estate. The importance of investment done by the construction sector in 1996-
2011 was very high in the Portuguese economy when compared with other EA
countries (Figure 110). After 2000, it experienced a significant decline, but the
level of investment continued to be considerably high, situated above 3.5% of
total investment.
Figure 110 –Investment by the construction industry (% of total investment)
Source: Eurostat
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In turn, the investment in real estate was between 1996-2011 lower in Portugal
than in the EA and the negative trend has also been more pronounced (Figure
111).
Figure 111 –Investment by the real estate industry (% of total investment)
Source: Eurostat
In the EA the weight of the real estate and the construction activities on the
gross value added decreased slightly between 2000 and 2011 (Figure 112). In
Portugal the descendent trend was much stronger than in the EA. In 2000 the
importance of real estate and construction in Portuguese GDP was around
17.3%, very close to the EA average, but in 2011 those activities only
represented 13.4% in Portugal, a value significantly below the EA (16.2%).
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Figure 112 – The importance of real estate and construction activities (% of
gross value added)
Source: Eurostat
Similarly to production, from 2000 to 2011, in the EA the weight of the real
estate and construction on total employment also declined, especially after
2007 (Figure 113). However, the importance of those sectors on employment
has increased in Belgium, Finland, France and Italy. Once more, in Portugal the
downward trend was stronger than in the EA: in 2000 the real estate and
construction represented 12.7% and 8.7% of total employment in Portugal and
the EA, respectively, and in 2011 they represented 10% and 7.4%. From these
numbers also stands out that in the EA real estate and construction sectors
have a larger labour productivity relative to the other sectors of the economy
than in Portugal, since they employed a larger proportion of people in Portugal
than in the EA, but represent a smaller proportion of the value added than in the
EA.
Notice that the strong increase in employment in the real estate and
construction sectors in Portugal between 1995 and 2000 was clearly at odds
with what happen in the EA, probably with the exception of Spain and Ireland for
which we do not have data for that years. And most notably that increase of
importance in terms of employment did not translate in an increase in terms of
value added.
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
22%
1
9
9
5
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
Germany
Spain
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Portugal
Euro Area
185
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
Figure 113 – The importance of the real estate and the construction
activities (% of total employment)
Source: Eurostat
8.3. Characteristics of housing loans
According to the ECB (2009), the interest rate characteristics of housing loans
vary considerably from country to country. In most euro area countries, housing
loans are granted at variable interest rates (Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy,
Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia and Finland). In these
countries, interest rates are adjusted to the Euribor on a monthly, quarterly,
half-yearly or yearly basis. In some countries other reference interest rates are
used, like the Treasury Bills in Belgium or the ECB main refinancing rate in
Ireland, Greece, Malta and Luxembourg. In a minority of countries (Belgium,
Germany, France and the Netherlands) housing loans are granted using fixed
interest rates normally for a period over five or ten years.
In Portugal, the share of variable rate loans in new loans for house purchase
reached ninety nine per cent in 2007, with the six-month EURIBOR as the main
index for variable interest rates. Indexed real estate credits make the real
estate sector and families’ income more dependent of interest rate’s changes.
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Besides, in Portugal housing loans are granted on average with a maturity
between thirty and forty years, which represents a maturity quite large when
compared with other countries.
In relation to the loan-to-value ratio (LTV ratio)50, the typical ratio for new
housing loans was about eighty per cent in the euro area in 2007 (ECB, 2009). In
Portugal, the typical LTV was slightly lower, around seventy per cent, which is
quite similar to Germany, Greece and Spain. This is an indication that in
Portugal there were not very aggressive practices in housing credit, on average.
Despite that, ECB (2009) notes that in 2000-08 were granted loans for housing
purposes with high LTV ratios (from 80% to 100%) in some countries, especially
in Ireland, Greece, Italy and Portugal. These loans usually require a large
maturity in order to keep then affordable for most households. This note
implies that in Portugal credit practices have become more aggressive in the
years before 2009.
In addition, the percentage of total dwellings that is occupied by its owner was
around 62.3% in the euro area in 2007 (Table 24). Portugal presented one of the
highest levels (74.5% in 2001) among the euro area countries, just below the
levels exhibited by Ireland, Greece and Spain. In order to be able to buy a house,
households have to have a mortgage. In Portugal the proportion of households
with a mortgage is reasonably high when compared with a group of 7 EA
countries, as shown in Table 25.
The high percentage of homes occupied by the owner in Portugal is the result of
a highly regulated and distorted rental market, the slowness of courts in the
resolution of rental contract’ disputes, and of several policy measures which
incentivized the purchase of homes. The high proportion of home owners in
50 The loan-to-value ratio is the ratio of the amount borrowed to the appraisal or market value of
the underlying collateral.
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Portugal makes it difficult for workers to move around the country. Especially
the unemployed have difficulty in accepting an employment far away from their
homes, because of the difficulty in selling their house. The result may be a
higher structural unemployment rate.
Table 24 – The percentage of total dwellings that is occupied by its owner
Note: Data refers to 2007, except for Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Cyprus
(2006), Spain, France, Malta, Slovenia (2005) and Portugal (2001). Source: ECB
(2009)
Table 25 – Households with a mortgage (% of total)
Source: ECB (2009)
Belgium 71,3%
Germany 43,0%
Ireland 74,7%
Greece 79,6%
Spain 86,3%
France 57,2%
Italy 69,1%
Cyprus 84,9%
Luxembourg 74,7%
Malta 75,2%
Netherlands 56,6%
Austria 58,0%
Portugal 74,5%
Slovenia 81,1%
Finland 65,1%
Euro Area 62,3%
Country Owner-Occupancy Rate
Germany 2003 26,5%
1995 36,1%
2000 35,0%
2005 35,9%
Greece 2007 16,6%
2002 20,9%
2005 25,3%
France 2004 29,7%
1995 13,0%
2000 9,0%
2006 11,9%
Netherlands 2007 38,5%
Portugal 2006 29,6%
Ireland
Spain
Italy
Country
Share of All Households
with Mortgage
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8.4. Equity withdrawals
Equity withdraws from a real estate loan occur when the value of the house is
larger than the value of the mortgage (the equity is positive) and the debtor can
obtain further financing giving the home equity as collateral. This financing can
be used for consumption spending, buying other assets or paying other debts.
The debtor has the advantage of contracting additional debt in this way instead
of using unsecured consumption credit because the interest rate is lower.
Equity withdrawals occur especially when house prices increase and they are
quite common in the US and the UK, and less common but growing in the euro
area (ECB, 2009).
Mortgage equity withdrawals have contributed to a larger housing wealth effect
on consumption in the UK and the US than in the euro area (IMF, 2008). This
effect may amplify the pro-cyclical effect of house prices.
The survey done by the ECB (2009) on banks shows that the proportion of new
mortgage loans that were used for purposes other than financing a home was
20% in 2007 in Portugal, much higher than the 5% average of the euro area and
one of the highest values in the sample. The report suggests that the high value
in Portugal may be related to the financing of the down payment or of
transaction costs.
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Table 26 – The percentage of new mortgage loans that are used for
purposes other than financing a home
Source: ECB (2009)
In terms of the volume of the outstanding loans to households with real estate
collateral that were used for other purposes than the acquisition of the main
residence, Portugal also had higher values than the euro area (
Belgium 1%
Germany 1%-2%
Ireland 13%
Greece 30%
Spain 5%
France 1%
Italy 1%
Cyprus n.a .
Luxembourg <1%
Malta 9%
Netherlands 3%
Austria 2%
Portugal 20%
Slovenia 11%
Finland 12%
Euro Area 5%
Country
Mortgages for Purposes other than Financing
a New Home (% of New Housing Loans)
190
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
Table 27).
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Table 27 – Outstanding loans to households with real estate collateral that
were used for other purposes than the acquisition of a principal residence
Note: * This category covers, for example, consumption , financial investment
and redemption of debts, as well as the situation in which a parent borrows a
mortgage for the purpose of transferring the funds to a son or daughter for the
purchase of house.
Source: Bank Lending Survey Bank of Portugal, October 2006. Bank Lending
Survey ECB, July 2006
8.5. Foreclosure of mortgages with negative equity
In the US, a borrower with a negative equity on his or her mortgage has a strong
incentive to walk away from the house, since by delivering the house he or she
puts an end to the debt contract with no further obligations.
In the euro area, personal insolvency rules state that a borrower with a negative
equity cannot simple delivery the house to end the debt contract. The debtor
continues to be responsible for the difference between the debt and the value of
the dwelling, and banks can still claim other assets and/or income flows from
the client. This implies that borrowers do not have an incentive to walk away
from the mortgage in such circumstances. Comparatively to the US, this has
contributed to a smaller decline of house prices in the euro area, because
borrowers are less prone to abandon their houses in the euro area than in the
US. This implies that there are fewer houses for sale and therefore house
prices decrease less in the euro area.
Minor (0% to 10%) 100% 80% 49% 64%
Significant (10% to 20%) 0% 20% 27% 8%
Considerable (more than 20%) 0% 0% 12% 5%
Not Applicable 0% 0% 13% 23%
Portugal Euro Area
% of All Mortgage Loans
Purchase of Second
Homes or Homes for
Investment Purposes
("Buy to Let")
Other
Purposes*
Purchase of Second
Homes or Homes for
Investment Purposes
("Buy to Let")
Other
Purposes*
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However, in Portugal a new law was passed in 2012 characterizing the
situations in which a household can deliver the house to cease the debt. The
new law only applies to low income families and does not allow them to walk
away from a home with negative equity, but facilitates the process of delivering
a house to the bank. This new proposal enables that the delivery of a house can
extinguish the debt (i) whenever the sum of the current value and the amortized
capital equals the amount of capital initially borrowed or (ii) if the current value
of the property is equal or larger than the outstanding capital.
If one of these two requirements is met, banks are required to accept the
respective house. If the home’s value is insufficient to settle the debt, the
capital portion in debt remains, but the debt associated with future interest
extinguished.
Nonetheless, this proposal continues to have many restrictions, namely the
requirement that at least one element of the household is unemployed or had
suffered a reduction in wages of of least 35%. In addition, the gross monthly
income of the household (two elements) cannot exceed twice the minimum
wage, in order to benefit from this new regime (this value can be increased by
50% of the minimum wage by each minor child). Finally, the value of the
dwelling is also limited to 90, 105 and 120 thousands euros, depending on the
location of the house.
8.6. Early repayment of the mortgage
As in other euro area countries, the partial or total early repayment of the
mortgage is allowed, but in general subject to a fee. The early repayment is
often associated with the client changing to another bank that offers better
interest rate conditions. Therefore the fees charged may be an important
deterrent to bank competition in the mortgage market. In Portugal, usually
these fees are paid by the new lender (ECB, 2009). By law, the maximum fee for
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variable interest rate contracts is 0.5% of the paid capital and for fixed interest
rate contracts is 2%. Other credit contracts also covered by the house mortgage
are subject to the same fees. Insurance contracts associated with the mortgage
remain valid as long as risk conditions do not change. Notice that in several
euro area countries early repayment is free of charge for variable interest rate
contracts (ECB, 2009).
8.7. Wealth effect in Portugal
The wealth effect refers to the increase in consumer spending that
accompanies an increase in wealth. Most of empirical studies confirm the
existence of such relationship. In the Portuguese case, the main references are
Castro (2008) and Farinha (2009).
Castro (2008) estimated the wealth effect on non-durable consumption of
households, using aggregated time series data between 1980 and 2005,
concluding that in Portugal the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth
was about 0.03. This means that an increase of one euro in wealth implies an
increase in consumption of 3 cents. The marginal propensity to consume out of
disposable income was 0.48. At the same time, she observes that this result is
similar both for financial and housing wealth. Besides, Castro (2008) notes that
after the financial liberalization the wealth effect on consumption increased,
because liquidity constraints faced by Portuguese households decreased.
On the other hand, Farinha (2009) studies the wealth effect using micro data
from the Inquérito ao Património e Endividamento das Famílias, realized by INE
and Bank of Portugal. He concludes that in Portugal the marginal propensity to
consume out of wealth was between 0.04 and 0.05, which is quite similar to
other European countries and the US. Farinha (2009) observes also that the
wealth effect is stronger for housing wealth than for financial wealth. This is
194
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
consistent with the fact that households use their houses as collateral to obtain
more credit to consume (Section 8.7).
8.8. Concluding remarks
In terms of prices there was not a boom-bust cycle in real estate in Portugal.
Despite this, the weight of real estate loans in total loans has increased
substantially since 1980, especially the credit for households to buy houses. In
2011 total real estate loans represented around 60% of the loans portfolio. This
weight seems to be larger than in some EA countries, making Portuguese
banks particularly vulnerable to house price fluctuations. The risk is mitigated
because credit practices in housing loans do not seem to have been very
aggressive, as shown by the fact that the average LTV ratio is lower in Portugal
than in the EA. Moreover, the non-performing loans on real estate are not a
problem at the level of households. But non-performing loans of construction
firms increased much more than the average of all industries (See Section 3.9).
In terms of interest rate risk, a large part of the risk is on the household’s side,
since almost all housing loans are at adjustable rates.
The large importance and growth of credit for households to buy houses led to a
large percentage of dwellings occupied by their owners. This is related to the
malfunctioning of the rental market, but also with policy measures that
favoured the buying of houses. The large proportion of workers that are
homeowners difficults the mobility of workers and may increase structural
unemployment rate.
The growth in credit was only possible due to high capital inflows and an
increase in foreign debt. But the debt was obtained in euros, and there was no
currency mismatch that could make banks and borrowers vulnerable to
exchange rate changes.
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A part of the credit to buy houses was indeed directed to consumption and other
purposes. Equity withdrawal from mortgages seems to have been a more
significant phenomenon in Portugal than in the EA.
One element that has prevented larger declines in house prices is the fact that
in Portugal a client with a negative equity on his or her mortgage cannot simply
walk away from the house.
The growth in credit for housing allowed the investment in dwellings to rose
faster in Portugal than in the EA between 1997 and 2000, but after 2000 the
investment in Portugal started a downward tendency much stronger than in the
EA.
Since 1995, construction and real estate industries have lost importance in
terms of value added and investment at a faster rate than in the EA. In 2011,
those industries were less important in terms of production than in the EA, but
in terms of employment they were still very important.
The wealth effect in Portugal has a size similar to the US and other European
countries. Financial liberalization has increased that effect because it reduced
liquidity constraints faced by households. Housing wealth has a larger effect
than financial wealth on consumption, which indicates that households use
mortgage loans to finance consume.
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9. Source of funds for business investment51
In this point we detail the source of funds of the business sector. Section 9.1
studies the financing structure of firms in terms of equity and types of debt. In
Section 9.2 we look at the interest rate charged in Portugal, comparing small
and large firms, and looking at the rates practiced in the EA. Finally, Sections
9.3, 9.4 and 9.5 analyse how banks and firms see the financing of firms and the
evolution of the degree of restrictiveness of bank credit.
An important point in this section is to analyse the extent to which banks have
restricted credit to firms after the 2008 crisis. Situations of credit rationing or
in more extreme cases of credit crunch are usual in severe crises as the Great
Recession. During periods of economic slowdown, demand and supply factors
lead to a slower growth of banking credit. On the one hand, the fall in aggregate
demand leads to a decline in credit demand. On the other hand, banks adopt a
higher level of credit tightening during these periods, mainly due to the
deterioration of expectations regarding the future evolution of economic
activity.
Nevertheless, there are some situations marked by a quite aggressive cut of
credit to the non-financial sector, which is called a “credit crunch”. In these
circumstances, credit tightening extends to all segments, even for those
economic agents with good collateral. Credit crunch is originated in the supply
side and it results from the unwillingness of banks to lend more money or the
lack of ability to do it.
This credit rationing could be produced by several factors. Firstly, it can be
originated by a more stringent interpretation of the rules by the regulatory
51 Point 10 in the terms of reference.
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authority, forcing banks to mobilize more capital to cover the increase of non-
performing loans and to have more caution regarding the risk of new loans.
Secondly, it can result from the introduction of new capital requirements, which
originate a decline in the relative level of banks’ capital. With less capital, banks
are forced to cut back credit. In many circumstances, banks are not willing to
get more capital, in order not to injure shareholders’ interests or due to
asymmetric information. This asymmetry becomes larger in periods of crisis as
bank management try to hide problems in loans portfolio. Therefore, the
market will assume that only banks with bad loans will be willing to dilute the
property in exchange for more capital. Thus, the issuer will have to issue capital
at a very low price. This problem of lack of capital is not easily solved by an
action of authorities, unless they are willing to inject capital into banks.
Thirdly, credit rationing may also derive from the lack of liquidity, the rise in
bankers’ risk aversion and the impact of poor quality loans in banks’ capital
levels. In particular, in periods of high uncertainty, where losses are potentially
high, banks prefer liquidity and they do not grant credit. As predicted by Keynes’
theory of liquidity-preference in moments of great pessimism and uncertainty,
agents prefer the safety and flexibility of liquid assets instead of the illiquidity
and uncertainty of other assets.
Finally, the phenomenon of credit crunch could be originated by a strong fall in
the prices of financial or real estate assets, after a speculative bubble or after
an expressive rise of prices. In this case, there is an increase in non-performing
loans, a fall in the value of collaterals and the rise of banks’ losses on their
investments. Notice that these factors will motivate a sudden decrease in
credit, which will deepen further the fall of asset prices.
The economic crisis in the UK and Scandinavian countries in the beginning of
the nineties was clearly associated with sudden reduction in house prices, in a
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context of an over-indebted of private sector and a deregulated financial
system.
After the 2008 crisis, in Portugal there were some factors that could have led to
a strong slowdown of credit supply, namely the lack of liquidity of banks, the
increase in uncertainty, the rise in capital requirements and the lack of capital
in some banks, and the increase in non-performing loans.
9.1. Firms’ financing structure
In this point we study how Portuguese firms finance their activities. Between
1995 and 2011, the assets of NFC as a percentage of GDP increased 96.9 p.p.,
with two-thirds of this increase (62.2 p.p.) being financed by loans, and the
remaining third being financed in almost equal parts by debt securities (17.5
p.p.) and equity (15.8 p.p.) – Figure 114.
Figure 114 – Sources of financing for non-financial corporations (% of GDP)
Note: Based on consolidated data
Source: Eurostat
In 2011, a year of crisis, debt securities increased their importance as a source
of financing (+2.1 p.p.), while loans as a proportion of GDP decreased 1.3 p.p.
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During this year banks had difficulty in obtaining financing in the markets,
which probably led them to limit finance to firms.
In 2011, the financing of Portuguese firms was essentially through loans (43.5%
of assets) and shares and other equity (42.8%), with debt securities having a
minor importance (10.0%). In accordance with the evolution described above,
the importance of banks’ loans in financing firms’ assets has increased
substantially between 1995 and 2011, from 29.8% to 43.5% of total assets
(Figure 115). Securities other than shares also increased from 4.7% in 1995 to
10.0% in 2011, but they remained with a residual importance, as firms prefer to
use banks instead of financial markets to raise debt. In general, only a small
number of corporations is financed through capital markets, either by shares or
by bonds emissions, reflecting the predominance of micro, small and medium
corporation sized (SMEs in short) in the Portuguese productive system. SMEs
account for around 99% of the number of non-financial corporations and more
than 80% of total employment. The importance of SMEs in the Portuguese
economy is larger than in French or German economies, and slightly less than
in Italy or Spain (
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Table 28).
SMEs depend more than large firms on banks for financing, since in general
they do not have access to the markets for debt and equity financing, due to
their size, low visibility and small transparency. Consequently, a reduction in
bank credit affects more SMEs. As a result, the reduction in credit by banks will
have a bigger effect in Portugal than on other European countries. Therefore,
the shortage of credit may be one factor explaining the large upward trend of
the Portuguese unemployment rate in 2010-12. Naturally other factors explain
the increase in unemployment, namely the reduction of fiscal balance.
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Table 28 – SME in Portugal and other European countries
Portugal German France Spain Italy
Number of
Firms
Micro 95.7 83.3 93.2 93.1 94.4
Small 3.7 13.8 5.7 6.0 5.0
Medium 0.5 2.4 0.8 0.7 0.5
Large 0.1 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.1
Employment
Micro 41.6 19.2 24.3 38.9 47.3
Small 22.9 21.8 20.4 23.3 21.8
Medium 16.4 20.0 15.6 14.0 12.3
Large 19.1 39.9 39.7 23.7 18.6
Investment
Micro 24.0 18.9 42.1 27.0 68.4
Small 20.7 15.8 10.2 30.4 13.5
Medium 22.3 18.6 12.5 20.2 8.4
Large 33.0 46.6 35.2 22.4 9.7
Added Value
Micro 23.8 16.3 22.4 27.7 32.2
Small 22.4 17.1 18.9 22.6 23.6
Medium 20.8 20.2 14.7 17.4 15.4
Large 33.0 46.3 44.0 32.2 28.8
Source: Eurostat
Portuguese firms have been more dependent on banks’ loans than the average
of EA16 firms (Figure 116 and Figure 115) and they have less equity.
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Figure 115 – Financing structure of Portuguese firms (% of assets)
Note: Based on consolidated data
Source: Eurostat
Figure 116 – Financing structure of EA16 firms (%)
Source: Eurostat
Since Portuguese firms have been relying more on debt, the ratio of debt-to-
equity has more than doubled between 1995 and 2010, from 0.66 to 1.26 (Figure
117). Notice that this ratio depends also on the fluctuations of shares prices.
This explains why the ratio increased substantially in 2001 and 2008, which
were years of large falls in the equity markets.
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Figure 117 – Debt to equity ratio of several European countries
Note: Debt includes Loans, Securities other than Shares and Trade Credit
Source: Eurostat
The rise in firms’ debt can be explained by the same arguments that explain the
increase in households’ debt: reduction in the level and volatility of interest
rates, increase of GDP growth, greater competition between banks, and easier
access of banks to foreign financing. The adoption by banks of new methods to
assess credit risk also contributed to the increase in the availability of credit to
firms. The growth in credit was essentially due to credit concession to firms
that previously did not have access to credit (Antão et al, 2009: 526).
The growth in firms’ debt was related to the quick growth of investment
between 1995 and 2000 (Figure 14). The decision to invest may not be
independent of the financial situation of the firm. Several studies on firms’
liquidity restrictions conclude that investment and financial situation are
related, especially for small firms (Antão et al, 2009: 525). As a result, firms
with larger access to credit can invest more.
In 2010, the ratio of debt-to-equity of non-financial corporations in Portugal was
one of the highest of the Euro area, being larger only in Greece and Spain. In
Portugal, Spain and Greece the debt-to-equity ratio has increased substantially
after 2007 (Figure 117).
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When we look at the partition of loans by long term and short term, in 1995
Portugal had 48% of the loans concentrated in short term maturities (Figure
118). This value was clearly larger than the EA average (Figure 119), and
probably implied that Portuguese firms had difficulty in financing long-term
investments. However, between 1995 and 2010 the proportion of long term
loans increased substantially, and in 2010 82% of the loans to firms were long-
term loans, which was even larger than the EA. We conclude that there was a
large increase in banks’ willingness to lend money with long term maturities.
Figure 118 – Short and long term bank’ loans to non-financial corporations
in Portugal (% of total loans to firms)
Source: Eurostat
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Figure 119 – Long term loans to non-financial corporations in the euro area
(% of total loans to firms)
Source: Eurostat
Regarding debt securities issued by NFC, in 1995 the proportion of short term
debt and long term debt was 27% and 71%, respectively (Figure 121). The
proportion of long term debt was among the lowest in the EA, being similar to
Spain. During the period up to 2010, the importance of short term debt has
grown even more and in 2010 it represented 59% of total debt securities. This
value was clearly an exception in the Euro area, where short term debt only
represented 9% of total debt. As a proportion of GDP, long term debt securities
represented 8.9%, which is similar to the euro average of 8.5%. It is on the short
term debt that Portuguese firms depart from their EA partners. Indeed, this
debt represented 12.9% of GDP in Portugal and 0.8% in the Euro area. This
short term debt was mainly commercial paper mostly held by banks.
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Figure 120 – Short and long term debt securities of non-financial
corporations in Portugal (of % total)
Source: Eurostat
Figure 121 – Long term debt securities of non-financial corporations in the
euro area (% of total debt securities)
Source: Eurostat
9.2. Interest rates
The active or passive interest rates reflect the evolution of Euribor and banks’
spreads. In turn, Euribor is determined by the present and future evolution of
the ECB refinancing rate. The co-movement of both interest rates can be seen
in Figure 122.
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Figure 122 – ECB Main refinancing rate and Euribor 6 months
Source: Bank of Portugal
The Portuguese and the euro area active interest rates have increased between
2005 and 2008, due to the tightening of monetary policy by the ECB, in a context
of economic dynamism and inflation pressures (see Figure 123). At the end of
2008, this upward trend reverted, reflecting several cuts on the ECB key
interest rates in order to mitigate the shortage of liquidity and the downside
risks on the business cycle arising from the Subprime crisis. From the
beginnings of 2010 onwards, the level of interest rates has increased again. At
the end of 2011, active interest rates decreased in response to a decline in key
ECB interest rates, making an important contribution for the economic recovery
in the Portuguese economy.
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Figure 123 – The evolution of the Portuguese and the euro area interest
rates
Source: Bank of Portugal
From 2003 to 2012, interest rates for credit to corporations and to consumption
were higher in Portugal than in the euro area, probably due to higher risk
premiums (see Figure 124 and Figure 125). For credit to corporations, that
difference has increased since the beginning of 2009, while for credit to
consumption that difference only increased substantially in 2010. The fact that
interest rates are becoming increasingly higher in Portugal since 2009 reflects
difficulties in banks’ financing and increase of clients’ risk premiums.
Interestingly, the interest rate for credit to housing has been smaller in
Portugal than in the EA, a situation that reverted only in mid-2011. The low
interest rates to housing in Portugal can be explained partially by the fact that
this credit is done with flexible interest rates, which transfer all the risk to the
debtor, while in many EA’s countries fixed interest rates are used.
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Figure 124 – The evolution of interest rates for credit to non-financial
corporations
Source: Bank of Portugal
Figure 125 – The evolution of interest rates for credit to consumption
Source: Bank of Portugal
Interest rates charged to non-financial corporations vary substantially with the
size of the loan. Usually banks do not treat all firms in the same way, with size
being a key variable of differentiation. Normally, SME have worse credit
conditions because they are more risky and have less bargaining power towards
banks. Looking at the interest rates charged, firms with loans up to €1 million
paid 1 to 1.5 p.p. more than firms with loans larger than €1 million (see Figure
126). The difference of interest rates according to the size of the loan has been
larger in Portugal than in the EA.
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Since 2009, the evolution of credit also shows an asymmetry across firms. From
2009 to 2011, the credit to SME has registered a much larger reduction than the
credit to large firms, -5.3% and -0.5% respectively.52 In the same period,
exporting firms have benefited from a 3.1% increase in credit, which can be
explained by the good performance of exports since 2009 (and also by the
favourable treatment granted to exporting firms in public support mechanisms
to enterprise investment).
Figure 126 – The evolution of interest rates for credit to non-financial
corporations by size of loan
Source: Bank of Portugal
In addition, contrary to what happens in the euro area, in Portugal the interest
rates for loans to households for housing purposes was smaller than the
interest rate for non-financial corporations up to one million euros. This may be
an indication that Portuguese financial institutions gave some priority to the
funding of housing at the expense of funding of investment.
Turning now to deposits, banks in Portugal and in the EA have paid almost the
same interest rates on deposits from firms and from households between 2003
and 2008 (Figure 127). From 2009, this situation reversed with banks paying, on
52 Data from Bank of Portugal.
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average, more to households than to firms, in an attempt to capture
households’ savings.
Figure 127 – The evolution of interest rates for deposits
Source: Bank of Portugal
From 2003 to mid-2010, Portuguese banks have paid larger interest rates in
deposits from firms than EA’s banks, while paying lower interest rates to
households. Yet, these differences were relatively low. After mid-2010, deposit
interest rates both for households and firms have become larger in Portugal
than in the EA.
From mid-2010 to mid-2011 there was a much larger increase in deposit
interest rates in Portugal than in the EA. This was the result of the strategy of
attracting deposits adopted by most Portuguese financial institutions, in the
wave of deleveraging process imposed by Troika and the difficulties in obtaining
financing in the international markets.
Spreads:
As it stands out from the previous analysis, the differentials between active
interest rates and the interbank interest rate are larger in Portugal than in the
EA, with the exception of credit to housing.
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In Portugal and in the EA, a remarkable event was the substantial increase in
active spreads at the end of 2008 (see Figure 128 and Figure 129). Afterwards
and up to the beginning of 2010, there was a stabilization or even a decline of
spreads. From the beginning of 2010, spreads started to increase substantially
in Portugal, while they remaining relatively stable in the EA. Only from the mid-
2011 spreads started to increase also in the EA. A clear indication of the new
regime was that, in 2011, the spread for credit to housing has become larger in
Portugal than in the EA, when between 2003 and 2010 had always been smaller.
Figure 128 – The evolution of spreads for the credit to non-financial
corporations.
Source: Bank of Portugal
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Figure 129 – The evolution of spreads for the credit to consumption.
a) Credit to Housing b) Credit to Consumption
Source: Bank of Portugal
From June 2008 to June 2012, the spread has increased 4.5 p.p. for loans to
consumption, 7 p.p. for loans to housing and 3.2 p.p. for loans to corporations.
Small firms had an increase in spread of 3.6 p.p., while large firms had only an
increase of 3 p.p.
Concerning deposits interest rates to households, in the end of 2008 they
started to be larger than the Euribor 6 months, due to competition for funds
among banks in a context of very acute financing difficulties in both the
interbank and securities market (see Figure 130a). Afterwards, the increase in
passive rates continued, with the increase being more pronounced in Portugal
than in the EA.
From the end 2008, there was also a tendency for an increase in the deposits
interest rate for corporations. However, in the euro area that interest rate never
was, in a sustained way, larger than the Euribor 6 Months (see Figure 130b).
But in Portugal the deposits interest rate to corporations have increased to
values much larger than Euribor 6 Months.
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Figure 130 – The evolution of spreads on deposits.
a) Deposits from non-financial
corporations b) Deposits from households
Source: Bank of Portugal
9.3. Credit conditions from the banks’ perspective
The bank lending survey questions large banks on the conditions they impose in
credit concession53. From July 2007, the Portuguese banks have tightened
credit conditions for all credit segments, as illustrated by the respective
diffusion index54 (see Figure 131). Credit conditions tightened considerably for
both households and corporations mainly due to pessimist expectations
regarding the evolution of economic activity, creditworthiness of consumers and
housing market prospects; difficulty in banks getting market financing; and
balance sheet constraints (see Table 29).
53 The bank lending survey is an inquiry made by the central banks integrating the Eurosystem.
Bank of Portugal reports the results of a sample composed by the five largest banking groups,
whilst the European Central Bank aggregates a sample of the one hundred thirty-one largest
banks in the euro area.
54 The diffusion index is defined as the net percentage weighted according to the intensity of the
response, using a scale from -100% to 100% to aggregate individual replies, where 0%
corresponds to “remained basically unchanged”. Values of less than 0% mean a loosening of
the credit standards criteria and, in turn, values exceeding 0% point to an increase in the level
of restrictiveness. The survey results report to the conditions existing in the previous three
months.
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Figure 131 – The Portuguese diffusion index for credit to households and
corporations
Source: Bank of Portugal
Table 29 – Factors behind the tightening of credit conditions
Source: Bank of Portugal and Bank of Portugal
Credit conditions for households and corporations have also became tighter in
the euro area after July 2007, but they returned to a more neutral position after
July 2009 (see Figure 132). Furthermore, since July 2007 the level of
restrictiveness of credit conditions as measured by the diffusion index has been
higher in Portugal than in euro area banks, due to demand conditions, as the
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Expectations Regarding General Economic Activity 80 47 0 6 30 28 80 45 40 15 70 3 40 11
Industry or Firm Specific Outlook 60 50 10 7 30 30 70 44 50 21 40 3 40 13
Liquidity Position 10 8 0 0 10 9 20 13 0 -5 60 4 0 1
Ability to Access Market Financing 30 11 -10 -1 60 13 60 22 20 -2 80 5 20 3
Market Financing Competition 0 11 -10 -1 10 13 0 22 0 -2 -10 5 0 3
Non-Bank Competition 0 -2 -10 -1 0 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Risk on the Collateral Demanded 30 30 -10 2 20 11 30 24 40 10 20 2 30 5
Households (Housing)
Bank Competition 10 -7 -20 -7 0 -4 0 3 0 0 0 -1 0 0
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evolution of economic activity, risk of collaterals and housing market prospects,
as well as supply conditions, like the access to market financing and funds,
solvability levels, and balance sheet constraints.
Looking at the period before July 2007, from October 2004 to July 2007, credit
conditions in the EA and in Portugal remained basically unchanged. But from
January 2003 to July 2004 the restrictiveness of credit standards increased both
in the EA and Portugal, with the increase being larger in the latter country.
Figure 132 – The euro area diffusion index for credit to households and
corporations
Source: European Central Bank
After July 2007, Portuguese and the European banks have applied more
stringent contractual terms and conditions for all type of loans, which has been
visible in the widening of margins (spread and commissions), especially for
riskier loans, in the decrease of loans’ maturity, namely for corporations, the
strengthening of collateral requirements, and the decrease of loan to value
ratio (see Table 30).
Additionally, the bank lending survey from the Bank of Portugal highlights that
the tightening of credit conditions has been more aggressive in the case of
long-term loans (see Figure 133a). At the same time, the level of tightness of
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credit conditions has been similar for large and small and medium corporations
(see Figure 133b).
Table 30 – Terms and Conditions for type of loan
Source: Bank of Portugal and European Central Bank
Figure 133 – The Portuguese diffusion index for credit to corporations
a) By size b) By maturity
Source: Bank of Portugal
PT EA PT EA PT EA PT EA PT EA PT EA PT EA
Corporations
Collateral Requirements 60 31 -10 0 20 18 20 23 20 10 30 1 40 5
Loan Covenants 30 22 0 3 20 14 20 17 10 7 10 0 40 4
Margin on Average Loans 40 36 -20 -1 40 29 70 35 50 7 60 -1 20 13
Margin on Riskier Loans 70 60 30 9 40 41 80 49 70 21 80 11 40 17
Maturity 40 23 -10 0 30 13 60 20 30 5 50 2 40 6
Non Interest Rate Charges 40 16 -10 1 10 9 20 13 10 4 40 0 20 4
Size of Loans 20 27 -10 1 20 16 40 23 0 7 30 0 30 4
Households (Housing)
Collateral Requirements 0 9 0 1 20 10 30 17 0 3 20 1 10 1
Impact of Loan to Value Ratio 40 8 0 -2 50 16 40 21 20 7 70 5 20 3
Margin on Average Loans 20 11 -10 -10 40 11 70 24 30 4 50 6 10 7
Margin on Riskier Loans 30 27 10 1 70 17 90 30 60 13 80 11 50 12
Maturity -30 1 -20 -4 20 5 0 10 0 1 30 3 0 2
Non Interest Rate Charges 10 3 10 -2 10 1 0 6 10 0 40 1 10 0
Households (Consumption)
Collateral Requirements 50 10 0 -1 20 7 10 11 20 6 40 1 30 1
Margin on Average Loans 10 9 -10 -8 40 11 50 16 50 9 50 3 20 6
Margin on Riskier Loans 30 21 30 3 60 19 60 19 60 14 60 6 40 8
Maturity 30 1 -10 0 40 4 20 11 10 5 20 1 0 1
Non Interest Rate Charges 10 4 0 -1 30 4 30 6 10 2 10 1 10 0
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In the euro area, the overall tightening of credit conditions was stronger for
large corporations than for small and medium size corporations (see Figure
134a). Similarly, credit conditions have been more aggressive in the case of
long-term loans (see Figure 134b), even though the difference was less
significant than in Portugal.
Figure 134 – The euro area diffusion index for credit to corporations
a) By size b) By maturity
Source: European Central Bank
The Bank Lending Survey allows us to assess also the evolution of credit
demand from the perspective of banks. This demand in Portugal has fallen
since July 2007, both for households and firms (see Figure 135a), reflecting the
current weakness of the Portuguese economic activity. For households, that
reduction was boosted by the deterioration of consumer confidence, increase of
unemployment, retraction in consumption of durable goods and pessimistic
outlook for the housing market. On the other hand, the demand for loans by
corporations has declined less due to the effect of opposing factors. On the one
hand, the fall in demand has been boosted by falls in investment and in the
movement of mergers and acquisitions. On the other hand, an increase in
demand has been motivated by the rise of short-term funding needs and debt
restructuring procedures faced by some corporations.
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The demand of credit has also declined in the euro area from January 2008,
recovering slightly afterwards (see Figure 135). It can be easily observed that
the drop in the demand for loans in the last quarters has been much smaller in
the euro area than in Portugal.
Figure 135 – The demand for loans in Portugal and in the euro area.
a) Portugal b) Euro Area
Source: European Central Bank
9.4. Investment survey: firms’ perspectives
The Portuguese National Statistical Institute, INE, realizes a qualitative survey
of the investment environment in order to periodically assess investment
activity of large and SMEs.
In accordance with the survey, Portuguese corporations have recognized a
considerable increase in the limiting factors of investment from 2008 (see Table
31). 55 Effectively, in 2011 the proportion of firms facing constraints to
investment reached the unprecedented level of 58%, even surpassing the level
of 52% achieved during the 2002 downturn.
Between 1998 and 2011, the sectors facing on average more limitations to
investment were extractive industry, manufacturing and construction (see Table
55 We use the April’s surveys, which cover all the previous year.
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31). On the other hand, corporations from financial and insurance sectors, real
estate sector and accommodation and food service activities were the ones with
less investment obstacles.
Table 31 – The percentage of corporations who recognize the existence of
limiting factors of investment
Source: INE (Inquérito Qualitativo de Conjuntura ao Investimento)
The factors limiting investment were diverse (Table 32), but the deterioration of
the outlook for sales, return on equity and the capacity of auto-financing are the
limiting factors most referenced by corporations on average. On the other hand,
the difficulty of hiring qualified employees and capital markets represent the
factors that affected investment activity the least. The fact that an important
limiting factor of investment was the capacity of auto-financing is an indicator
that firms relied heavily on this form of financing.
Since 2007, it is also relevant to notice that the difficulty in obtaining credit
increased faster than overall limitations to investment (see Figure 136). In 1998
only 15% of firms said reported difficulty in obtaining credit, while in 2011 that
number increased to 30% (see Table 33). In 1998, the difficulty in obtaining
credit was the seventh most important limiting factor of investment, whilst in
2011 that factor had climbed to the third position, but still much less important
than the deterioration of the outlook of sales. In 2011, the sectors facing more
CAE (3rd Revision) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Mean
98-11
Extractive Industry 36 37 39 36 47 62 57 41 31 72 52 66 58 36 48
Manufacturing 45 51 50 51 57 53 51 48 51 53 58 57 57 36 51
Electricity, Gas andWater 29 30 24 27 38 52 58 47 46 45 48 41 31 41 40
Captation, Remediation and Distribution ofWater n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 65 66 65
Construction 42 36 37 45 55 50 50 52 48 46 55 55 57 69 50
Wholesale/Retail Trade, Repair ofVehicles 42 30 38 36 50 40 45 40 38 32 43 44 42 51 41
Transportation and Storage 26 35 34 36 45 44 52 42 39 41 60 37 46 52 42
Accommodation and Food Service Activities 31 28 32 31 39 35 31 19 15 24 24 40 51 81 34
Information and Communication n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 62 60 61
Financial and Insurance Activities 20 18 14 11 20 17 14 35 10 14 10 8 20 22 17
Real Estate Activities 27 28 27 37 36 38 40 25 33 32 37 46 42 49 35
Consultancy, Scientific and Technological Activities n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 41 49 45
Administrative/Support Services n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 45 56 51
Total 38 40 42 43 52 45 46 42 42 40 48 49 50 58 45
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difficulty were the industrial sectors, with the industries of electricity and
construction as the more penalized. Between 1998 and 2011 the sectors facing
more difficulty in obtaining credit were manufacturing, construction (especially
since 2004) and transportation and storage, on average (see Table 33).
Broadly the same conclusions are reached if we use the main factors limiting
investment instead of the factors liming investment (see Table 4, in Annex)
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Table 32 – The factors limiting investment
Source: INE (Inquérito Qualitativo de Conjuntura ao Investimento)
Insufficient
Production
Capacity
Deterioration
of the
Outlook for
Sale
Difficulty of
Hiring
Qualified
Employees
Level of
Interest Rates
Return on
Equity
Capacity of
Auto-Funding
Difficulty in
Obtaining
Credit
Capital
Markets
1998 26 31 26 15 35 39 17 1
2003 31 58 1 11 46 4 1 0
2011 3 96 0 59 31 64 36 2
1998 24 48 20 17 33 36 20 1
2003 19 73 12 12 42 33 22 1
2011 16 68 6 31 43 31 34 1
1998 0 17 6 3 20 34 0 0
2003 1 9 0 11 4 55 35 0
2011 14 17 0 20 17 37 48 0
1998 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2003 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2011 13 36 0 15 27 27 27 2
1998 19 37 34 27 44 39 13 0
2003 11 71 15 20 44 24 12 4
2011 10 79 0 29 50 33 39 8
1998 7 53 13 10 36 29 9 2
2003 12 69 7 17 47 33 17 0
2011 6 79 4 24 44 26 26 0
1998 12 42 17 20 36 38 29 3
2003 7 77 12 6 42 19 38 0
2011 1 50 0 40 50 23 20 0
1998 12 49 31 18 30 45 4 0
2003 21 34 1 3 73 5 0 0
2011 11 83 1 11 53 28 28 0
1998 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2003 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2011 10 52 11 15 36 37 24 1
1998 0 15 2 5 21 23 0 2
2003 3 51 1 18 16 29 0 22
2011 0 30 0 32 30 4 28 0
1998 6 40 12 8 17 32 10 0
2003 19 54 13 6 53 40 6 9
2011 12 62 0 25 37 48 12 23
1998 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2003 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2011 12 69 2 16 29 26 22 8
1998 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2003 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2011 14 73 6 19 40 18 31 3
1998 16 47 19 15 34 34 15 1
2003 14 68 10 14 46 30 17 2
2011 10 73 3 26 44 29 30 2
Financial and
Insurance
Activities
Real Estate
Activities
Consultancy,
Scientific and
Technological
Administrative/
Support Services
Total
Construction
Wholesale/Retail
Trade, Repair of
Vehicles
Transportation
and Storage
Accommodation
and Food Service
Activities
Information and
Communication
Extractive
Industry
CAE (3rd Revision)
Manufacturing
Electricity, Gas,
Water, Sewerage,
Remediation
Captation,
Remediation and
Distribution of
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Figure 136 –Limiting factors of investment.
Source: INE (Inquérito Qualitativo de Conjuntura ao Investimento)
Table 33 – Difficulty in obtaining credit by sectors
Source: INE (Inquérito Qualitativo de Conjuntura ao Investimento)
9.5. Survey on the Access to Finance
Since 2009, the European Central Bank conducts a biannual survey on the
access to finance of small and medium-sized enterprises in the euro area. Each
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CAE (3rd Revision) 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Mean
98-11
Extractive Industry 17 13 16 21 16 1 2 6 6 11 43 21 6 36 15
Manufacturing 20 16 15 12 15 22 26 17 15 14 13 19 27 34 19
Electricity, Gas andWater 0 10 0 0 0 35 19 14 6 7 7 12 24 48 13
Captation, Remediation and Distribution ofWater n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 19 27 23
Construction 13 8 21 15 8 12 25 18 12 14 22 19 23 39 18
Wholesale/Retail Trade, Repair ofVehicles 9 5 6 7 14 17 13 7 6 14 18 18 19 26 13
Transportation and Storage 29 22 12 22 20 38 23 15 14 20 18 54 61 20 26
Accommodation and Food Service Activities 4 9 17 15 10 0 14 0 0 0 7 1 18 28 9
Information and Communication n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 15 25 20
Financial and Insurance Activities 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 20 0 3 2 3 8 28 5
Real Estate Activities 10 9 7 13 11 6 11 7 11 16 22 16 12 12 12
Consultancy, Scientific and Technological Activities n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 25 22 24
Administrative/Support Services n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 23 31 27
Total 15 11 12 11 14 17 19 12 10 14 17 19 23 30 16
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survey refers to the financial conditions that firms faced in the six months
preceding it. 56
According with that survey, the proportion of firms considering access to
finance as the most pressing problem has increased very little since the first
half of 2010 in the EA, while the increase has been very strong in Spain, Greece,
Ireland, Italy and Portugal (Figure 137). These four countries were facing the
consequences of the Euro Sovereign Debt Crisis. In the second half of 2011 the
percentage of Portuguese SMEs saying that finance was their biggest problem
was 21%, which was the fourth largest number in the EA. But it should be
noticed that only from the first half of 2011 did the proportion of SMEs saying
that finance was their most pressing problem become larger in Portugal than in
the EA.
Figure 137 – The access to finance as a pressing problem faced by SMEs (%
of respondents)
Source: European Central Bank (Survey on the Access to Finance of SMEs in the
Euro Area)
One reason why Portuguese firms are considering finance as a growing
problem relates to the decrease in the availability of bank credit (loans and
56 However, the reference period of the survey has changed: H1 2009 (first half of 2009), H2 2009
(second half of 2009), H1 2010 (from March to September 2010), H2 2010 (from September
2010 to March 2011), H1 2011 (from April 2011 to September 2011) and H2 2011 (from October
2011 to March 2012).
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overdrafts) since the first half of 2010 (see Figure 138 and Figure A 5 in Annex).
This decrease was stronger in Portugal than in the EA. In contrast, since the
second half of 2011 and against the tendency of the EA, the net proportion of
firms reporting a decline in the availability of credit decreased in Germany and
Finland.
Moreover, the majority of euro area’s SMEs recognized that the main factors
affecting banking credit and overdraft availability was the deterioration of the
outlook to the general economic activity and the worsening of the outlook to
their sales and profitability.
The extreme case of weak credit availability is the rejection of credit. Since the
first half of 2009 that the percentage of firms that applied for a loan but were
rejected has been larger in Portugal than in the EA, especially from 2011
onwards (see Figure 139). In 2011, the increase in the rejection rate in Portugal
was larger than in the EA, while in Germany, Ireland and Netherlands there was
even a decline in that rate. We can also observe rates of rejection larger than
average in Italy, Spain and Ireland.
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Figure 138 – Change in the availability of bank loans as perceived by SMES
(net percentages57)
Source: European Central Bank (Survey on the Access to Finance of SMEs in the
Euro Area)
Figure 139 – Rejection rate of bank loans by SMEs (percentage of firms that
had applied for bank loans)
Source: European Central Bank (Survey on the Access to Finance of SMEs in the
Euro Area)
Since the second half of 2010, the Portuguese SMEs not only saw the rejection
rate of their credit applications increase, but also observed a strong increase in
the interest rate charged, and this increase was once more larger than in the
EA (see Figure 140). The increase of other credit costs was very strong
especially in the first half of 2010 (see Figure 141). Since then the increase in
other credit costs in Portugal has been among the largest in the EA.
57 The net percentage refers to the difference between the percentage of firms reporting an
increase for a given factor and those reporting a decrease.
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Figure 140 – Change in the level of interest rates of banks loans to SMEs
(net percentages)
Source: European Central Bank (Survey on the Access to Finance of SMEs in the
Euro Area)
Figure 141 – Change in the level of other costs of financing of banks loans
to SMEs (net percentages)
Source: European Central Bank (Survey on the Access to Finance of SMEs in the
Euro Area)
The short sample available on the survey indicates that in 2009, before the start
of the Euro Debt crisis, the access of SMEs to finance was not worse in Portugal
than in the EA. But from 2010 the crisis implied a larger deterioration of the
access to credit by SMEs in Portugal than in the EA. The worsening of the credit
costs started in the first half of 2010, while in terms of credit availability the
tightening started in the second half of 2010, with a strong increase in 2011.
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9.6. Concluding remarks
In recent years, Portuguese firms increased the use of debt as source of
financing, and in 2011 they were among the most indebted of the EA. NFC used
increasingly long term bank loans, which constitute a more stable way of
financing long term investment. To finance short-term responsibilities they
preferred short term debt securities, which they used in large quantity. These
securities are mostly owned by banks, which make use of this market
mechanism to increase their profits.
Since 2003 to mid-2011, active interest rates were high in Portugal than in the
EA, with the exception of the interest rates for credit to households to buy
houses. Higher interest rates may reflect a larger risk premium of Portuguese
firms and households or less competition on specific segments. In the segment
of credit for housing purposes the lower interest rates seem to indicate more
competition in Portugal than in the EA. Portuguese banks charge higher
interest rates to small firms than to larger firms, with the difference been quite
significant (larger than in the EA).
From the end of 2008 deposit rates increased above the Euribor 6 months due
to the financing difficulties of banks. From the perspective of banks, from July
2007, credit conditions in Portugal have become tighter, with the tightening
being worse in Portugal than in the EA. A similar situation occurred between
January 2003 and July 2004.
From the perspective of firms, from 2008, large and small and medium sized
Portuguese firms identified an increase in the limiting factors on investment. In
2011, 58% of the firms were facing restrictions on investment. Between 1998
and 2011, the sectors facing more restrictions were manufacturing and
construction. Finance and insurance, real estate had the smallest level of
restrictions. The most important factors of limitation were the deterioration of
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the outlook of sales, return on equity and the capacity of auto-financing. The
importance of auto-financing as a limiting factor indicates that some of them do
not have access to other sources of financing.
Since 2007 difficulties in obtaining credit increased faster than the overall
limitations to investment. In 2011, credit was the third most important limiting
factor, with 30% of the firms reporting credit limitations. Between 1998 and
2011, the sectors facing more difficulties in obtaining credit were
manufacturing and construction.
Using a European survey on SMEs, we conclude that in 2009 before the start of
the Euro Debt crisis, the access of SMEs to finance was not worse in Portugal
than the EA average. But from 2010 the crisis implied a larger deterioration in
access to credit by SMEs in Portugal than in the EA.
After the Subprime crisis and especially after the Sovereign debt crisis there
were factor in the Portuguese banking system that can explain the reduction in
credit supply: liquidity difficulties of banks, increase in uncertainty, rise of
capital requirements, and the increase in non-performing loans.
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10. Involvement of financial sector in restructuring NFCs 58
This point considers the involvement of the financial sector in restructuring
NFCs. In Section 10.1 M&A are assessed, with particular emphasis on the role
of banks and international investors. In Section 10.2 the dimension of
deindustrialization in Portugal is described, and some suggestions are made on
the role of the financial sector in that process.
10.1. M&A in the non-financial sector
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have an important role in the process of firms’
internationalization and reorganization. In the last years, this phenomenon has
increased substantially, despite the recent fall after the 2007 financial crisis.
Among the reasons that explain the increase in the movement of M&A at a local
and international level during the last years, we highlight the integration of
European Union’s economies, globalization of markets, technological
development, economies of scale, availability of capital and financial innovation,
and privatizations in Eastern European countries.
However, M&A have not affected all countries equally. Among the countries
where, in 2001, the share of M&A was larger than the share of GDP, the UK has
a prominent position (see Table 34). This probably is explained by the larger
importance of financial markets in that country. In Portugal, the share of GDP is
very similar to the share of M&A, like in Greece. But comparing with Italy and
Spain, the relative importance of M&A is larger in Portugal.
The ECB bank lending survey presents the perspective of banks on credit
demand from non-financial corporations for M&A. Since January 2003, on
average, the demand of bank credit for M&A has been smaller in Portugal than
58 Point 11 in the terms of reference.
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in the EA (see Figure 142). Another important feature is that the demand for
credit to undergo M&A has exhibited a downward trend since July 2007 both in
Portugal and in the EA, with the decline been larger in Portugal, particularly in
the period from October 2009.
Besides banks, other source of financing for M&A is venture capital. In Section
4.3, we observed that the VC Buyout activity in Portugal is less intense than in
other EA countries.
Table 34 – Share of European M&A and GDP (2001)
Source: European Commission (2001)
Share of Mergers and Acquisitions (%) Share of GDP (%) Difference
Belgium 2,8% 3,2% -0,4%
Denmark 2,6% 2,1% 0,5%
Germany 16,3% 28,2% -11,9%
Greece 1,1% 1,4% -0,3%
Spain 5,0% 7,0% -2,0%
France 13,5% 18,1% -4,6%
Ireland 1,7% 0,9% 0,8%
Italy 6,2% 12,6% -6,4%
Luxembourg 0,5% 0,2% 0,3%
Netherlands 6,5% 4,9% 1,6%
Austria 2,1% 2,7% -0,6%
Portugal 1,2% 1,3% -0,1%
Finland 3,9% 1,6% 2,3%
Sweden 5,3% 2,8% 2,5%
United Kingdom 31,4% 13,2% 18,2%
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Figure 142 – Banks perspective on the demand for loans to finance M&A by
non-financial corporations
Source: European Central Bank (Lending Survey)
Neves (1997) highlights that the small size of Portuguese firms in some sectors
imposes a process of M&A at the national level in order for firms to increase
their size. After reaching a certain maturity and dimension, companies are
better prepared for cross-border growth through M&A at an international level.
According to A. T. Kearney (2009), the volume of M&A between Portugal and the
Rest of the World has increased in the last years from an annual growth of 2%
in 2005 to 21% in 2008. The foreign firms buying Portuguese firms are mostly
from emerging markets. The Portuguese firms investing abroad also target
typically emerging markets.
A large part of the external buyers of Portuguese firms are energy companies
and sovereign wealth funds from oil-producing countries, which are looking to
diversify portfolios. Companies from emerging markets invest mainly in
minority stakes in large Portuguese companies of the PSI20, although they are
also reference shareholders in some companies of the PSI-20 index (mainly in
the banking and energy sectors). Investments are mainly aimed at listed
companies from PSI-20 index (about 92%), where Angola has been the main
investor in the Portuguese stock market (about 3% of the total of PSI-20),
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followed by Brazil (around 1% of the total of PSI-20). Against this backdrop,
Angola and Brazil have accounted for about 60% of all operations of M&A done
in Portugal.
Indeed, according to A. T. Kearney (2009), in September 2009, the weight of
capital from emerging markets in the PSI-20 index capitalization was 4,9%,
which is three to five times higher than what occurred in other European
indexes like IBEX-35 (0,7%), DAX-30 (1,3%), CAC-40 (1,7%).
On the other hand, Portuguese companies have privileged majority stakes in
Brazil, Turkey and Poland, based on a strategy of internationalization in
markets with a high growth potential.
The Portuguese financial sector has played an important role in this growing
process of M&A, namely as provider of consultancy services or even as lenders.
Major Portuguese banks, through their investment banking activity, provide
financial advisory services and solutions indispensable to the process of M&A,
namely: advisory services for operations involving corporate equity investment
trading (acquisitions, sales, mergers, demergers, management and leveraged
buy outs, management buy ins, partnerships, joint ventures and any other form
of corporate business combination), corporate economic-financial
assessments, analysis of synergies associated with business combinations
between companies, financial restructuring studies, reorganization of corporate
equity investments, support for economic and financial reorganizations
preparing companies for equity market operations, formation and coordination
of financial consortia, identification of business partners and opportunities.
CGD (through Caixa – Banco de Investimento) and BES (through Espírito Santo
Investment Banking) are the main providers of these types of services, although
some consultancy firms also provide financial advisory services related to the
process of M&A, like Deloitte, KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young,
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Capgemini, among others. Still, CGD and BES are clearly leaders of this type of
financial services in Portugal.
In the coming years, A. T. Kearney (2009) anticipates a strong growth of M&A
from emerging markets, supported not only by the great dynamism of these
economies, but also by the stabilization of capital markets, recovery of
commodity markets, necessity to invest in more stable and developed
economies for risk diversification, among other reasons.
10.2. Portuguese deindustrialization
Industry except construction
In Section 3.1 we saw that in Portugal the weight of industry in GDP has
declined especially since 1990. In 2011, the weight of industry except
construction in GDP was lower in Portugal than in the EA11: 17.1% and 19.7%
respectively (Figure 143). The “process of deindustrialization” between 2000
and 2011 was slightly larger in Portugal than in the EA, with industry losing 1.5
p.p. in terms of its importance on GDP in Portugal and 1.44 p.p. in the EA
(Figure 144 and Table 35). If analyse since 1995, the conclusion in similar. In
terms of industry employment, the fall between 1995 and 2011 was also larger
in Portugal than in the EA, but with the difference being larger than for the
value added: -6.2 p.p. and -4.8 p.p., respectively (Table 35).
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Figure 143 – The importance of industry (except construction) in several
countries of the EA (2011)
Source: Eurostat
Figure 144 – Evolution of the importance of industry (except construction)
in several countries of the EA (% of GDP)
Source: Eurostat
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Table 35 – The importance of industry (except construction) in several EA
countries (% of GDP and employment)
Note: The variation 1995-2011 for the euro area was obtained by the unweighted
average of 11 countries.
Source: Eurostat
Concerning the investment in industry (except construction) in proportion of
total investment in the period 1996-2004, Portugal occupies a bottom position in
the European context, with industry representing around 15% of total
investment (Figure 145). After 2004, the importance of industry in investment
increases considerably, reaching 24% in 2009, which was the highest value in
the nine EA countries analysed.
Figure 145 – The investment in industry (except construction) (% of total
investment)
Source: Eurostat
ϭϵϵϱ ϮϬϬϬ ϮϬϭϭ ѐϭϵϵϱͲϮϬϭϭ ѐϮϬϬϬͲϮϬϭϭ ϭϵϵϱ ϮϬϬϬ ϮϬϭϭ ѐϭϵϵϱͲϮϬϭϭ ѐϮϬϬϬͲϮϬϭϭ
Austria 22,2% 22,6% 23,9% 1,8 1,3 20,5% 18,8% 16,4% -4,1 -2,4
Belgium 19,7% 20,5% 18,1% -1,6 -2,3 18,6% 16,9% 13,0% -5,6 -4,0
Germany 25,0% 24,8% 25,5% 0,4 0,7 23,3% 21,3% 18,8% -4,5 -2,5
Spain n.a . 16,2% n.a . 16,2 n.a . 18,7% 12,9% n.a . -5,8
Finland 20,2% 23,5% 23,6% 3,4 0,1 20,8% 20,5% 16,4% -4,4 -4,1
France 15,1% 15,5% 13,8% -1,3 -1,7 16,9% 15,4% 12,0% -4,9 -3,4
Greece n.a . 13,7% 11,8% n.a . -1,9 n.a . 12,7% 11,1% n.a . -1,7
Ireland n.a . 24,2% 32,3% n.a . 8,1 n.a . 18,7% 13,0% n.a . -5,7
Italy 22,5% 21,5% 19,4% -3,2 -2,2 23,8% 22,5% 19,4% -4,4 -3,1
Netherlands 20,2% 18,8% 18,1% -2,1 -0,7 14,6% 13,0% 10,4% -4,2 -2,5
Portugal 17,9% 18,7% 17,2% -0,7 -1,5 22,7% 20,8% 16,5% -6,2 -4,3
UK n.a . 19,6% 14,3% n.a . -5,3 n.a . n.a . n.a. n.a . n.a .
Euro Area n.a . 21,2% 19,8% -0,4 -1,4 n.a . 19,2% 15,8% -4,8 -3,4
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Manufacturing
The sub-sector of industry more important is manufacturing and is also the
more exposed to international competition. Other industrial sectors as
electricity, gas and water supply are more focused in the domestic market. That
is why we are dedicating particular attention to manufacturing in this point of
the text.
In 2011, the weight of manufacturing in GDP was lower in Portugal than in the
EA11: 13.5% and 16.9% respectively (Figure 143). Between 2000 and 2011, the
weight of manufacturing in GDP decreased 1.8 p.p. in Portugal and 0.8 p.p. in
the EA (Figure 144 and Table 35). Broadly the same qualitative conclusion is
reached if the analysis is done since 1995. In terms employment the fall in the
importance of manufacturing was also larger in Portugal than in the EA: 4.3 p.p
and 3.3 p.p., respectively (Table 35).
From the previous data, we conclude that the process of deindustrialisation in
Portugal was more intense in manufacturing than in the overall industry (except
construction). This process was also relatively stronger than in the EA.
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Figure 146 – The importance of manufacturing in several countries of the
EA (2011)
Source: Eurostat
Figure 147 – Evolution of the importance of manufacturing in several
countries of the EA (% of GDP)
Source: Eurostat
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Table 36 – The importance of manufacturing in several EA countries (% of
GDP and employment)
Note: The variation 1995-2011 for the euro area was obtained by the unweighted
average of 11 countries.
Source: Eurostat
Concerning the investment in manufacturing as a proportion of total investment
in the period 1996-2011, Portugal occupies an intermediate position in the
European context, with manufacturing representing around 10% of total
investment (Figure 145). This number puts Portugal below Germany and Italy,
but above Austria and Netherlands. More interestingly, in Portugal we do not
observe a downward trend in the importance of manufacturing in investment,
as has occurred in the other European countries.
Figure 148 – The investment in manufacturing (% of total investment)
Source: Eurostat
ϭϵϵϱ ϮϬϬϬ ϮϬϭϭ ѐϭϵϵϱͲϮϬϭϭ ѐϮϬϬϬͲϮϬϭϭ ϭϵϵϱ ϮϬϬϬ ϮϬϭϭ ѐϭϵϵϱͲϮϬϭϭ ѐϮϬϬϬͲϮϬϭϭ
Austria 18,7% 19,2% 20,6% 1,9% 1,5% 18,7% 17,4% 15,0% -3,6% -2,3%
Belgium 17,0% 17,4% 14,8% -2,2% -2,6% 16,6% 15,2% 11,3% -5,3% -3,9%
Germany 21,3% 21,4% 22,4% 1,1% 1,0% 21,3% 19,7% 17,5% -3,8% -2,2%
Spain n.a . n.a . 13,2% n.a . n.a. n.a . 17,6% 11,6% n.a . -6,0%
Finland 17,2% 20,7% 20,8% 3,6% 0,1% 19,3% 19,2% 15,1% -4,1% -4,1%
France 12,6% 12,9% 11,5% -1,0% -1,4% 15,7% 14,3% 10,8% -4,9% -3,5%
Greece n.a . 10,7% 8,5% n.a . -2,2% n.a . 11,2% 9,4% n.a . -1,8%
Ireland n.a . 22,3% 31,8% n.a . 9,5% n.a . 17,4% 11,5% n.a . -5,9%
Italy 19,9% 19,0% 16,6% -3,3% -2,4% 22,5% 21,2% 18,1% -4,4% -3,0%
Netherlands 14,2% 13,7% 13,3% -0,9% -0,4% 13,6% 12,1% 9,6% -4,0% -2,5%
Portugal 14,9% 15,4% 13,5% -1,4% -1,9% 21,2% 19,4% 15,1% -6,1% -4,3%
UK n.a . 14,0% 10,9% n.a . -3,1% n.a . n.a . n.a. n.a . n.a .
Euro Area n.a . 17,7% 16,9% -0,3% -0,8% n.a . 17,9% 14,5% -4,5% -3,4%
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Tradable goods sectors
A common argument regarding the recent evolution of the Portuguese economy
is that it has been concentrating on non-tradable goods sectors. But this
argument ignores what has been happening in other industrialized countries. In
order to assess this argument we studied how the value added of agriculture,
forestry, fishing and industry (except construction, electricity and water supply)
in terms of GDP has evolved in the last years. 59 The first thing that we observe
is that in Portugal and the euro area non-tradable goods sectors lost
importance from 2001 to 2009, but in 2010 and 2011 they re-gained relevance
(Figure 149).
In 2011, the importance of non-tradable goods sectors in the Portuguese
economy was slightly smaller than in the EA: 19.8% and 21.6%, respectively.
In terms of evolution, results depend on the terms of comparison. Between
2000 and 2009, the importance of non-tradable goods sectors has declined less
in Portugal than in EA12 (-2.7 p.p. and -3.1 p.p., respectively), but has declined
more than in the EA860 (-1.9 p.p). If we start the analysis in 1995, the decline in
these sectors in Portugal in comparison with the EA8 is even more clear (-2 p.p.
and -0.4 p.p., respectively).
59 This analysis assumes that construction, electricity and water supply belong to the non-
tradable goods sector and ignores that some services are tradable, as for example tourism.
60 EA8 includes Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands and Portugal.
For these countries there is data since 1995.
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Figure 149 – Tradable goods sectors in % of GDP
Source: Eurostat
Table 37 – The importance of tradable goods sector in several EA countries
(% of GDP)
Note: The variation 1995-2011 for the euro area was obtained by the unweighted
average of 8 countries.
Source: Eurostat
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ϭϵϵϱ ϮϬϬϬ ϮϬϬϵ ϮϬϭϭ ѐϭϵϵϱͲϮϬϭϭ ѐϮϬϬϬͲϮϬϬϵ ѐϮϬϬϬͲϮϬϭϭ
Austria 20,7% 21,1% 20,8% 22,7% 2,0 -0,3 1,6
Belgium 18,2% 18,6% 15,3% 16,1% -2,1 -3,2 -2,5
Germany 22,5% 22,4% 20,1% 23,6% 1,1 -2,3 1,2
Spain n.a. n.a . 15,7% 19,6% n.a. n.a . n.a .
Finland 21,4% 24,1% 23,6% 24,3% 2,9 -0,6 0,2
France 15,0% 15,3% 13,6% 13,7% -1,4 -1,6 -1,6
Greece n.a. 17,3% 12,7% 13,0% n.a. -4,7 -4,3
Ireland n.a. n.a . n.a . n.a . n.a . n.a . n.a .
Italy 22,7% 21,9% 18,5% 21,5% -1,2 -3,4 -0,4
Netherlands 20,2% 18,8% 17,1% 17,8% -2,3 -1,7 -1,0
Portugal 21,8% 19,0% 16,2% 19,8% -2,0 -2,8 0,9
UK n.a. n.a . n.a . n.a . n.a . n.a . n.a .
Euro Area n.a. 20,7% 17,5% 21,7% -0,4 -3,2 1,0
Country
Gross Value Added
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Attending to the decline in the importance of manufacturing in terms of value
added, it is possible to raise the hypothesis that manufacturing has been less
favoured in terms of financing. We obtained some support for this hypothesis
with the analysis of the investment survey (Section 9.4), which shows that
between 1998 and 2011 the sectors facing on average more difficulty in
obtaining credit were manufacturing, construction (especially since 2004) and
transportation and storage.
Now we look at how credit to non-financial corporations has grown by sector of
activity. We have divided the analysis into three periods: before 2000 (1993-
1999), after Portugal has joined the Euro and before the Subprime crisis (1999-
2007), and after the Subprime crisis (2007-2011). The two first periods were the
ones with the largest credit growth. During these two periods the sectors that
had a growth of credit clearly above average were construction (only in 1993-
1999), information and communication activities (only in 1993-1999), hotels and
restaurants and real estate (Table 38). Manufacturing industry had clearly a
credit growth below average. After the crisis, the growth of credit to
construction and real estate decreased to levels below average, but hotels and
restaurants and information and communication activities continued to have a
flow of credit larger than other activities. In the period 2008-2011 primary
activities and utilities also benefited from a large increase in credit.
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Table 38 – Credit by sector (average annual growth rate)
Source: Bank of Portugal
In terms of the sectorial structure of credit to non-financial firms there existed
a dramatic change between 1993 and 2011 (Table 39). In 1993, the sector
receiving more credit was manufacturing, with 34.3% of the total credit; and the
second most important sector was trade with 21.3% of credit. In 2011, the most
important sectors in terms of credit were construction and real estate, with
20.3% and 13.5% of total credit, respectively.
Agriculture 1,7% 8,5% 9,0%
Mining 3,0% 2,0% 2,8%
Manufacturing 2,8% 3,5% 3,6%
Utilities 1,3% 7,9% 16,9%
Construction 29,5% 14,0% -1,1%
Trade 12,4% 4,5% 0,1%
Transport 6,0% 12,3% 5,4%
Hotels and Restaurants 69,3% 18,3% 11,9%
Information and Communication 52,6% 1,3% 10,0%
Holdings 7,5% 11,5% 4,8%
Real Estate 29,5% 16,7% 0,9%
Consultancy 14,7% 12,5% 1,2%
Education and Health - 0,3% 9,9%
All Activities 12,8% 9,4% 2,9%
Sector 1993-1999 1999-2007 2007-2011
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Table 39 – Sectorial distribution of the credit to non-financial corporations
Source: Bank of Portugal
On a preliminary base, these numbers suggest that the banking system
between 1993 and 2007 has favoured credit to construction, real estate and
other non-tradable activities to detriment of credit to manufacturing. This
attitude may simple be related with a smaller growth of manufacturing or with
the fact that banks assess manufacturing as a high risk sector, exposed to the
high competitive pressures from abroad. In addition, some banking groups had
interests in non-tradable activities, such as real estate and health. 61 The high
volume of credit to real estate and construction activities can also be related to
the perceived high security that banks attribute to the collateral constituted by
real estate assets. As in many countries, in Portugal the price of houses had
been growing at a stable rate for a long time, offering a sense of security to
banks.
Looking at the issuing of securities (shares and debt) by sector, it stands out
that the sector issuing the largest amount is by far financial activities and
insurance with 60.2% of the total amount of securities of the private sector
61 Banks are interest in the health sector namely because of the connection of this sector with
the insurance sector.
Agriculture 2,8% 1,5% 1,4% 1,8%
Mining 1,2% 0,7% 0,4% 0,4%
Manufacturing 34,3% 19,6% 12,6% 12,9%
Utilities 5,5% 2,9% 2,6% 4,3%
Construction 7,5% 17,1% 23,8% 20,3%
Trade 21,4% 20,9% 14,5% 12,9%
Transport 7,4% 5,1% 6,3% 6,9%
Hotels and Restaurants 0,2% 2,0% 3,7% 5,1%
Information and Communication 0,3% 1,7% 0,9% 1,2%
Holdings 10,3% 7,7% 9,0% 9,6%
Real Estate 3,8% 8,8% 14,7% 13,6%
Consultancy 5,2% 5,7% 7,1% 6,7%
Education and Health 0,1% 6,2% 3,1% 4,0%
Others 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,1%
Dec-2011Sector Dec-1993 Dec-1999 Dec-2007
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(Table 40). Utilities, transport and manufacturing are the next sectors in terms
of importance, even though they have a very small proportion of total securities:
the three sectors together represent less than 13%. Construction and Real
state, which were sectors very important in terms of credit, have a very small
representation in terms of securities (3% both). Finally, holding companies
represent 18.9% of the amount of securities. It is worth mentioning that the
importance of manufacturing industry in the total amount of securities
outstanding has fallen from 17.0% in 1993 to 3.5% in 201162.
Table 40 – Securities (shares and debt) outstanding by sector (excluding
the public sector)
Source: Bank of Portugal
10.3. Concluding remarks
In this section we started by assessing the role of banks in the reconstruction of
the economy, which was not an easy task due to the lack of data. The volume of
M&A in Portugal is similar to the European average, but is larger than in
62 Notice that holding companies may in reality include firms operating in other sectors.
Agriculture 0.5% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
Mining 0.5% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1%
Manufacturing 17.1% 6.3% 3.9% 3.5%
Utilities 4.1% 8.5% 7.8% 5.0%
Water Captation and Distribution 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
Construction 3.9% 1.8% 2.0% 1.9%
Trade 3.4% 1.5% 2.1% 1.9%
Transport 5.3% 2.7% 4.0% 2.3%
Hotels and Restaurants 1.4% 0.6% 0.4% 0.4%
Information and Communication 2.0% 9.5% 1.6% 1.7%
Financial 41.1% 46.8% 50.6% 60.3%
Real Estate 3.3% 1.2% 1.3% 1.1%
Consultancy 0.7% 0.9% 1.2% 1.9%
Education 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Health 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Non-Financial Holdings 13.8% 18.7% 24.0% 18.9%
Others 2.7% 0.9% 0.6% 0.5%
Sector Dec-1993 Dec-1999 Dec-2007 Dec-2011
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countries like Spain and Italy. This may relate to the small dimension of the
economy which facilitates foreign acquisitions. However, since 2003 the
demand for bank credit to finance M&A was smaller in Portugal than in the EA.
Yet, banks have played a key role in the advising operations. On the other hand,
VC buyout activity is less intense in Portugal than in other countries of the EA.
In the recent past, M&A activity between Portugal and the Rest of the World,
especially emerging markets has increased considerably. Firms based in
emerging markets, especially Angola and Brazil, and more recently China, have
made investments in listed companies.
Some large Portuguese firms have also invested in foreign countries, especially
Brazil, Turkey and Poland, to take advantage of fast growth markets. Many of
the large companies following internationalization strategies belong to non-
tradable sectors, as for example Banks, Utilities (ex: EDP), Petrol companies
(ex: Galp), Infrastructure companies (Ex: Brisa) and Trade companies (ex:
Jeronimo Martins). As a result a large share of profits of many quoted firms
comes from abroad.
Since 1995, manufacturing has lost importance in terms of value added, with
the fall being larger in Portugal than in the EA. In 2011, manufacturing was less
important in Portugal than in the EA. In terms of the weight of investment in
manufacturing the situation was better, with investment being at an
intermediate position in European terms in 2008-9, even though before 2008 the
level was smaller than the average. Also, Portugal was able to maintain the
investment in manufacturing, while in other countries there was a decline.
In 2011, tradable goods sectors were slightly less important in Portugal than in
the EA. Since 1995 the decline on the weight of those sectors on the economy
was stronger in Portugal than in the EA8, showing the concentration of the
economy on non-tradable activities.
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Between 1993 and 2007 the banking sector favoured credit to construction, real
estate and other non-tradable activities, while the credit to manufacturing grew
at much slower rates. The issue of securities, which is an alternative to bank
credit, was completely dominated by the financial sector (with a weight of 60.3%
in 2011), which has increased its importance since 1993.
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11. The process of privatization 63
Like many other countries, Portugal went through a comprehensive process of
privatization which started in the middle 1980s and is still unfinished. Even
though privatizations were a common trend in many countries during this
period, the extent of this process in Portugal was outstanding. The reason for
this goes back to the Portuguese revolution of 1974. In the course of the
revolutionary process, vast domains of the economic activity were nationalized,
both as a result of the ideological orientation of the provisory government and
the perception of the risk of economic sabotage by part of prevailing business
and financial interests (which were largely at odds with the regime change).
Banking and insurance were the first sectors of activity to be massively
nationalized in the post-revolutionary period. In early 1975 all credit
institutions, savings banks and mutual agricultural credit banks, with the
exception of institutions with foreign capital participation, became State-owned.
In the same vein, all insurance companies were nationalized, with the exception
of those that were to some extent foreign owned and mutual insurance entities.
In the following months, nationalizations were extended to several other
activities, including electricity, gas, water infrastructure, transports and
transport infrastructure (rail, sea, air, and road), basic industries (petrol,
chemicals, basic metallurgy, cement, pulp, mining, ship building, tobacco, etc.),
among others. The Portuguese Constitution which was approved in 1976
declared the recent nationalizations as irreversible – a situation which would
only be inverted in 1989.
Although some partial privatizations had already taken place since the middle
1980, the 1989 changes in the Constitution marked the beginning of the
privatization process in full blown. The extent and rapid pace of this process is
63 Point 12 of the Terms of Reference.
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easily grasped in figures: in 1988, state-owned firms represented
approximately 1/5 of the GDP and 1/15 of total employment; in 1995 such
figures had dropped to 1/10 and 1/30 in 1995, respectively, and in 2000 to 1/20
and 1/50.
The post-1989 privatization process in Portugal can be broadly divided in three
periods: 1989-1993; 1994-1999; and after 2000. These periods differ with
respect to the volume, main drivers and implications of privatizations, as well
as the main sectors being privatized.
Figure 150 – Privatizations by year (in M€ and in percentage of GDP,
current prices)
Sources: Ministry of Finance and AMECO
Portugal had since 1985 a conservative government (holding a single-party
majority in Parliament since 1987), which was largely inspired by the Thatcher
government in the UK. According to the ruling party’s program, reducing the
role of the State, together with the development of the capital markets, were
crucial ingredients for promoting the modernization and competitiveness of the
Portuguese economy.
Notwithstanding its liberalizing stand, the Government was concerned with
keeping the control of the privatized firms in national hands. However, large
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national business or financial groups were virtually absent, and until the early
1990s the stock market played a residual role in the Portuguese financial
system and in the investment decisions of both households and firms.
Therefore, the success of the privatization program, according to the
Government’s goals, implied advancing by steps, starting with fostering the
development of national, private-owned financial groups, as well as increasing
the attraction of national investors (both firms and households) to the stock
market.64
Thus, the first phase of the privatization process in Portugal was dominated by
changes in ownership of financial firms. Before the end of 1993, almost all
State-owned banks and insurance companies (representing nearly 80% of the
financial sector) were privatized, with the exception of the CGD group (one of
the main financial groups, which remained in public hands until the present
day) and a few banks which would be privatized in the following years.
Concurrently, the financial sector was liberalized in accordance with EEC’s
single market program, even though limits were imposed to the participation of
foreign investors in the privatized firms (typically, to a maximum of 25% of the
capital).
The EMS crisis of 1992-3, the impacts of which were amplified in the
Portuguese economy by the rapid liberalization of the capital account (see
chapter 1), put the privatization program on hold. On one hand, the crisis
caused a strong decrease in the expected revenues of the program, leading the
postponement of several planned sales. On the other hand, the goal of boosting
the participation of households and non-financial firms in the stock market was
jeopardized by the volatility in stock prices. The 1987’s New York Stock Market
64 The appeal to ‘popular capitalism’ in the context of the privatization program served also the
purpose of increasing the popular support to what was by then a somewhat a politically
controversial option.
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crash was still fresh in the investors’ minds, and bank deposits were by then
considered a safer haven for both households’ and firms’ savings.
From 1994 onwards, several factors contributed to accelerate the privatization
program. First, the economic recovery implied brighter prospects for selling
State-owned firms at good market prices. Moreover, the increased
macroeconomic and monetary stability (which was a top policy priority in the
context of the EMU project – see chapter 1) translated into significant drops in
real interest rates, pulling savers away from bank deposits to riskier assets
(namely stocks). The newly privatized (or recently created) banks were then
willing to get actively involved in privatizations as part of their diversification
and growing strategies. Last but not least, the need to comply with the so-
called Maastricht criteria in order to participate in the EMU created additional
incentives for the Government to raise revenues through the selling of State-
owned firms (which were then largely channeled into public debt redemption).
Thus, the second half of the 1990s witnessed the zenith of the privatization
program in Portugal. During this period, the control of many of the most
important Portuguese firms was transferred to private hands, including: EDP
(electricity), Petrogal (oil refining), Brisa (highways), PT (telecommunications),
Cimpor and Secil (cement), Siderurgia Nacional (steel), Quimigal (chemicals),
CNP (petrochemicals), and Tabaqueira (Tobacco).
In many cases, while maintaining only a minor position in the capital, the
Portuguese State retained its capacity to influence the decision of the privatized
firms by holding special voting rights (‘golden shares’) in the election of the
Board of Directors and in other strategic decisions. Such ‘golden shares’ were
always a focus of tension with the EC authorities, since they conflicted with the
principle of free capital movements in the EU, but while they prevailed (i.e., until
recently) they were effective in helping to maintain the control of such firms in
national hands. In particular, by reducing the interest of foreign investors, the
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‘golden shares’ held by the Portuguese State were instrumental for
strengthening the position of Portuguese financial groups in the recently
privatized firms.
As mentioned before, the goal of maintaining the control of privatized firms in
national hands was also pursued through a strong appeal for the participation
of small investors in the privatization program. In order to overcome the risk
aversion of such investors, the privatization program provided more favorable
conditions for small investors to buy shares in privatized companies. Together
with the substantial drop in real interest rates, this led to a huge increase in the
involvement of households and non-financial firms in stock market
transactions, gradually increasing the propensity for financial risk-taking
among those segments of the financial system. As Lopes (1996) put it, small
investors were anxious to make capital gains from short-term transaction, but
few have established themselves as long-term investors.
By 2000 the State-owned enterprise sector in Portuguese had been
substantially reduced. However, some relevant assets were still (in whole or in
part) in State hands, including: CGD (bank and insurance), EDP (electricity),
GALP (oil distribution), TAP (air transport), ANA (airports), CP (railways), RDP
(radio), RTP (television) and CTT (post), among others.
In the first years of the new millennium, the pace of privatization was reduced,
not only because the greatest part of the program was by then completed, but
also due to the unfavorable economic context. As the performance of the
Portuguese economy improved after 2005, the privatization program has
regaining momentum, but it came to a halt with the advent of the international
crisis in 2008. A new wave of privatizations is presently planned in the context of
the adjustment program associated with the international loan obtained in 2011,
as part of the strategy to reduce the high levels of public debt.
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It is difficult to make an overall assessment of the privatization process in
Portugal. The immediate impact of the privatization program in the
development of the Portuguese stock market – one of the declared goals of the
program – is clear. In 1996, privatized companies accounted for over 40% of
market capitalization in shares and over 50% of the transaction turnover
(Corkill, 1999). One can, therefore, conclude that the Portuguese stock market
has benefited from the privatization program – even though this was not enough
to transform it into a significant source of finance in the Portuguese enterprise
sector. Arguably, the privatization program has contributed to the indebtedness
of Portuguese firms and households, many of which have recurred to credit to
acquire shares.
Privatizations were also relevant for reducing the Portuguese public debt ratio
in the year that preceded the inception of the euro, helping to comply with the
conditions for participating in the euro zone from the beginning.
The impact of privatization on the performance of privatized firms is less clear.
On one hand, while many of the privatized firms have thrived, other have shrunk
or even disappeared. On the other hand, the most important privatized firms
operate in highly regulated markets, making it hard to distinguish between the
effects of privatization and of regulatory practices on firms’ performance.
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12. Culture, inequality, and households finance 65
This section focuses on the cultural and social issues and their relation with the
country’s economic growth. In Section 12.1 we study the cultural characteristics
of the typical Portuguese and the institutions, looking how they may have a
negative effect on economic performance. In Section 12.2 we quantify the
contribution of non-for-profit organization for economic activity, in an attempt
to assess the erosion of the culture of solidarity. Next, Section 12.3 studies how
the financialisation of the health services has evolved. Finally, Section 12.4
looks at the emergence of a culture of consumption based on credit by
reviewing the evidence on the growth of credit for consumption.
12.1. Cultural and institutional aspects
The economic performance of a country is also affected by its culture. Some
authors venture into attributing the perils of the Portuguese economy to
‘cultural idiosyncrasies’, such as (Bento, 2009): the individualistic stance and
unwillingness to cooperate, lack of confidence and persistence, disorganization,
resignation, and jealousy. These characteristics overshadow the adventurous
spirit that characterized the Portuguese during the Age of Discoveries in the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
Those cultural features are supposed to have contributed to a poor dynamism
of the Portuguese production system, as entrepreneurs fear to face new risks
and challenges and show lack of spirit of initiative. This would affect innovation
and productivity, with negative effects on economic growth.
This type of accounts suggest that relying on the State is one way found by the
Portuguese businessman to avoid risk taking, a feature some associate with the
65 Point 8 of the Terms of Reference.
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legacy of the period of dictatorship (1926-1974). Then, the State played an
important economic role in eliminating competition and innovation, erecting
protectionist barriers and introducing regulatory red tape. The strong State
protectionism before the 1974 Revolution may be seen as a cause for the
absence of entrepreneurial spirit still today, since cultural characteristics take
time to change.
Madureira (2002) highlights that the period of dictatorship between 1933 and
1974, supported by a corporativism system, delayed the development of many
industries, namely through the Condicionamento Industrial imposed by the
Decree-Law 19354/1931. This regulatory framework, even though respecting
the private initiative, impeded real competition between firms, representing a
strong protectionist framework, causing technological stagnation, creation of
monopolies and deterioration of the quality of goods and services manufactured
and sold.
More recently, according to Corkill (1999), in Portugal, like in other European
countries, State aid has been used to protect national industries from the
competitive pressure resulting from globalization and the European single
market. In some parts of the Portuguese economy, the State is still thought as
the main driver of economic activity, with the private sector depending on State
subsidies and European funds to survive and do investments.
After the 1974 Revolution, Portuguese public institutions faced an important
process of modernization, indispensable to the functioning of a market
economy and to the values of democracy. Later, the process of integration into
European markets accelerated the restructuring of public institutions, in order
to manage the several programs and projects financed by European Union
funds. Despite this evolution, excessive bureaucracy and inefficiency is still
present in the Portuguese State. Some governments have been accused of
manipulating European Union funds and State resources and of appointing a
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huge number of public administrators with high remunerations based on
political criteria. The inefficiency does not come from the lack of civil servants,
that some even think have reached large numbers (Corkill, 1999). The
malfunctioning of the State bureaucracy is probably related with
mismanagement associated with the lack of qualified staff, under allocation of
resources (ex.: technological resources), and the predominance of private over
public interests on some occasions.
One way used to increase the efficiency of public bureaucracy was to introduce
incentive and evaluation schemes similar to private firms. The real efficacy of
such reforms is still to be assessed, since they have been implemented
recently. Anyway, it should be taken into consideration that the introduction of
incentives may crowd-out morality. That is where reforms of public
administration should support socially valued outcomes and cultivate public
spirit motives (Gintis et al 2005:4).
Regarding the “culture” of public policy, we observe a tendency for the
affirmation of a neoliberal vision. Despite the 2008 financial crisis, the
inclination of policy makers has been to assume that the market is the most
efficient mechanism for affecting resources. The State should not intervene
directly on resource allocation; it should only correct market failures. As a
result the State should ensure the free functioning of the market, deregulating,
privatising and increasing labour market flexibility.
Regarding the all set of Portuguese institutional and legal framework, Garoupa
and Rossi (2005) conclude that it has been quite mediocre, not favouring the
process of economic growth and development. Portuguese institutions do not
favour economic competitiveness when compared with institutions in other
European advanced countries. They also point the existence of pressure groups
that act as a barrier to the progress and public interest.
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Those authors highlight four weaknesses of the Portuguese legal environment:
the quality of laws, the regulation related to the entry of new corporations, the
regulation of financial markets and the regulation of labour market. In any of
these four cases, they note a higher level of inefficiency of the Portuguese
institutional and legal framework in relation to other countries. Nonetheless,
they recognize a positive evolution of the legal framework in Portugal in the last
century, through the adoption of structural reforms, mainly after the integration
within the European single market.
12.2. Non-Profit Institutions
Traditionally the Social State has been weak in Portugal, leading to the
emergence of private non-for-profit social institutions. This explains why
between 1995 and 2011, the importance of non-profit institutions serving
households as a percentage of GDP has been higher in Portugal than in other
European countries, with the exception of Finland (Figure 151). Moreover, this
importance has been increasing in Portugal since the beginning of the 2000s,
accompanying the upward trend seen in most European countries. These data
indicate that civil society in Portugal has been able to organize non-profit
institutions to serve households to a larger extend than the EA average and
much more than other Southern countries.
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Figure 151 – Gross value added of non-profit institutions serving
households (% of total gross value added)
Source: OECD
12.3. The health sector and private interests
Many of the non-for-profit institutions act in the health sector. In Portugal,
there is a public health system financed mainly by general taxation and
organized as a National Health Service (NHS) with universal coverage both in
terms of population and range of medical care. The NHS is a fundamental
component of the welfare state.
The sustainability of NHS is compromised by the population ageing, which
causes an upward trend of the spending on health. Campos (2008) indicates that
the total expenditure on health (public and private) as a percentage of GDP has
grown substantially, from 6.2% of GDP in 1990 to 10.2% of GDP in 2003, a trend
that probably will continue in next years. Moreover, Barros (2008) adds that
health expenditure in Portugal, as measured either in per capita terms or as a
share of GDP, has grown faster than in OECD countries, mainly since 1995.
Besides the general increase in health care costs, the participation of the State
in the funding of the health care system has increased. Campos (2008) states
that public spending in healthcare percentage of total expenditures has
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increased from 65.5%, in 1990, to 73% in 2005. The increasing financial effort
made by the Government may not be sustainable especially in a context of
economic slowdown, falling public revenues and increasing pressures towards
fiscal consolidation.
In an effort to cut costs, the health sector has suffered a set of reforms in the
last years. Some of them include the promotion of generic drugs prescription,
the establishment of public-private partnerships for construction and clinical
operations of new hospitals, change in the statutes of state-owned hospitals,
the creation of an independent regulation authority for the health sector, the
imposition of user fees, and the reorganization of health subsystems.
The establishment of public-private partnerships (PPP) was introduced by the
Decree-Law 185/2002 dated August 20. In theory PPP can be divided in two
types of programmes. In the first wave PPP the partnership includes the
construction and maintenance of the infrastructure, as well as their
management. The second wave PPP covers only the construction and
maintenance of the infrastructure. The Portuguese government has always
chosen the first type of PPP, with the exception of Hospital Oriental de Lisboa
and Hospital Central do Algarve.
At the same time, the health sector has aroused the interest of private
enterprises, including financial groups, which provide medical services, like
private health insurances for their employees and customers and own clinics
and hospitals. Recently, new private medical units have appeared, as for
example Hospital das Descobertas, Hospital da Luz, Hospital dos Lusíadas,
Hospital da Boavista, Hospital do Algarve, Hospital de Cascais. These units
increased the offer of beds, operating and delivering rooms, among other
things.
In addition, the largest financial groups in Portugal offer health insurance for
their employees and customers: CGD Group offers Multicare, BCP Group offers
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Médis, BES Group offers AdvanceCare, etc. The owners of these health
insurances use the services of the private hospitals referred to above. Despite
the existence of a public health service, the demand of private health
insurances exist for reasons of easier access and (supposed) higher quality of
medical services.
This increasing role of private enterprises and PPP on the Portuguese health
sector has social and economic implications. First of all, this process has only
benefited the population of the coast, of the main urban centres (Porto, Lisbon
and Faro) and with medium and high incomes. Secondly, this has led to the
transfer of a large number of professionals from the public to the private
sector. Finally, it is important to note that the use of PPP alleviates the current
financial pressure on the public budget, notwithstanding transferring the cost
into future periods and generations.
In the typical PPP operation, there is a private firm responsible for the finance,
construction and management of the infrastructure. Banks finance the
operation and the leading firm of the partnership may also belong to a banking
group. The State pays over a set of years a rent to the private firm in exchange
for the construction and management of the hospital. In conclusion, PPP seem
to be a profitable business for banks.
Despite the presence of these significant private providers, most health care in
Portugal is still ensured directly by the NHS, whose survival needs to be
ensured in the future. Barros (2008) warns that financial pressures over the
NHS will not be alleviated in the coming years and additional tax effort will be
required to cover the increasing public health expenditure.
The increasing penetration of markets in the health sector and in other sectors
formerly in the sphere of the State may affect the values of individuals (Bowles,
1998). The prevalence of market institutions may change the behaviour of
261
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
individuals towards more market-oriented values, as a larger emphasis on
competition with other individuals and less tendency towards solidarity.
12.4. Growth of credit to consumption
In some countries there has been a tendency for debt-led consumption, where
the stagnation in wages pushes households to increase debt in order to sustain
consumption. Before the 2008 Subprime crisis, in the USA poor households
were gained access to credit to compensate for falling real wages.
In Portugal, the liberalization of the banking market and the euro membership
reduced liquidity constraints on consumers. They used the wave of credit more
to buy houses than for consumption, and consequently there was not a large
growth of credit for consumption. Since 1980, the credit for consumption has
increased at a slower rate than the credit for housing. Also, in 2011, around
80% of the credit to households was for buying houses. However, this figure
understates the true importance of credit for consumption, since a part of the
credit for housing was used for consumption (see Section 8.4).
Our reading of the Portuguese reality indicates that the credit for consumption
given by banks was mainly to the middle class, not to the poor. But poor
households may have had easier access to credit from non-banking institutions,
where the screening process was weaker and interest rates charged were
higher.
12.5. Concluding remarks
Portugal presents some cultural characteristics with negative effects on
economic growth, namely unwillingness to cooperate, disorganization and fear
to face risk. In addition to this, the history of the country before 1974, where the
State did not promote competition between firms, also contributed to the fact
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that businessman over rely on the State. In the present, public administration is
still too bureaucratic and inefficient, and political criteria prevail on the
management of civil servants, despite the affirmation of a pro-market culture in
policy making in the last decade. Also, in the private sector there is a lack of a
culture that values performance. In general, Portuguese institutions, legal
framework, regulation and pressure groups do not favour economic growth.
A positive point of the Portuguese society and economy is that not-for-profit
institutions are more important than in the EA, with a tendency to grow. Another
positive point is the existence of a NHS offering quality services to all
population. Public expense in health increased considerably due to population
ageing and increase in service’s quality. Mainly in result of the pressure to
reduce the fiscal deficit after the crisis, a rationalization effort has been made
on the NHS to reduce expenses.
Taking advantage of the NHS’s weak points, private interest have been growing
in the health sector, with the opening up new private hospitals and clinics, an
increase in health insurances and the creation of PPP. These partnerships for
the construction and management of hospitals benefit banking groups, because
they finance the operation and sometimes manage the hospital. For the State, it
is still to be proved if PPP in the health sector is a good choice in the medium
and long term.
The NHS is an important factor to avoid social exclusion. Another type of
exclusion is financial exclusion. In 2010 there were still 9% of adults without
access to a bank account. Also, credit was distributed asymmetrically among
families. The average banking client presents limited rationality in his
investment and credit decisions, being very affected by the advice of banks
when choosing banking products. Therefore, banks may bear some
responsibility for the increase of households’ indebtedness.
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A more general analysis of poverty and inequality indicators allows us to
conclude that in 2010 Portugal was one of the most unequal countries of the
EU15 and with one of the highest poverty rates, but the situation has improved
on both dimensions since 2000.
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13. Inequality, poverty and financialisation66
This section relates inequality and poverty with financialisation. The first sub-
section studies financial inclusion in terms of payment systems and credit,
looking also at the way persons are able to make sound financial decisions. The
second sub-section assesses the evolution of poverty and inequality in Portugal
in recent years.
13.1. Financial inclusion
The non-for-profit institutions and the NHS serve households, being particularly
important for poor and socially excluded people. Social exclusion may also
manifest itself in terms of financial exclusion, in the sense that a person does
not have access to basic financial services that facilitate and allow key daily
operations. Despite the strong increase in the indebtedness of households, a
representative survey shows that 11% of those interviewed over 15 years old do
not have a bank account. Among the individuals with a bank account, only 29%
has a mortgage loan and 32% a credit card (Bank of Portugal, 2011b). Moreover,
based on the database IPEF (Inquérito ao Património e Endividamento das
Famílias), Antão et al (2009:504) indicates that 40% of the Portuguese
households have debts and 30% have mortgages.
According to the ECB (2009) the share of all households with a mortgage was
29.6% in Portugal (in 2006) and 20% in the Euro area (in 2005). Among the
countries with available data, on this point Portugal was only exceeded by
Ireland and the Netherlands.
Using the Global Financial Inclusion Database for 2011 (Demirguc-Kunt and
Klapper, 2012), we can evaluate bank account penetration in an EA perspective
66 Point 13 of the Terms of Reference.
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(Table 41). The percentage of population with 15 or more years with an account
in a formal financial institution is small in Portugal (81%), only higher than in
Greece (78%) and Italy (71%). If the analysis is restricted to the poorest income
quintile, the picture is even worse, with only 64% of the individuals having a
banking account, which is the second lowest value in the EA only better than
Italy (61%).
Regarding credit, family and friends stand out as an important source of new
loans in Portugal, as expected by the tight family bounds that characterize
Southern societies. New loans from that source represent 88% of the loans
from formal financial institutions, representing a high value in European terms.
Finally, the penetration of credit cards is also low in Portugal, with only 30% of
the adults declaring to have a credit card. Only Greece with a penetration rate of
17%, has a lower value on that indicator. Across all indicators of financial
inclusion, Portugal, Greece and Italy stand out as a group with distinctive
characteristics of low penetration of financial services.
In Portugal, the evidence presented shows that the use of credit and financial
services is not as widespread as expected based on the aggregate figures of
household indebtedness and on the development of the banking sector. This
suggests also, as confirmed by Antão et al (2009: 498), that debts are distributed
asymmetrically among families, with a relatively small fraction of households
having a large proportion of the overall debt.
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Table 41 - Indicators of financial inclusion 2011
Source: Global Financial Inclusion Database for 2011
(Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 2012)
The survey on financial inclusion from the Bank of Portugal allows other
interesting conclusions. Around 54% of individuals say that what led them to
choose banking products (saving or credit) they own was the advice received at
the bank counter. From here we can infer that probably banks had some
responsibility in the increase of households’ indebtedness.
That responsibility becomes even clearer when there are signs of limited
rationality on banks’ clients. For example only 39% say they know the value of
their mortgage loan’s spread and 40% do not compare interest rates among
banks before doing a credit (Bank of Portugal, 2011b). These figures indicate a
low level of financial education, which we suggest is linked to the low levels of
general education of the Portuguese population.
All adults
Poorest income
quintile
From a formal
financial
institution (1)
From
family and
friends (2)
((2)/(1))*100
Belgium 96 92 11 5 45.5 54
Germany 98 97 13 9 69.2 36
Ireland 94 88 16 11 68.8 56
Greece 78 75 8 20 250.0 17
Spain 93 91 11 12 109.1 42
France 97 96 19 5 26.3 38
Italy 71 61 5 3 60.0 31
Netherlands 99 98 13 7 53.8 41
Austria 97 93 8 6 75.0 39
Portugal 81 64 8 7 87.5 30
Finland 100 99 24 15 62.5 64
Share with an account at a
formal financial institution
(%)
Adults with
a credit
card (%)
Country
Adults originating a new loan in the past
year (%)
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13.2. Poverty and inequality
One characteristic of financialisation processes is that they are associated with
increasing inequality. At a European level, a set of factors challenged the
European Social model (ESM) in the early 2000s, namely globalization, Europe’s
slow economic growth, and the ageing of population (Marques, Salavisa e
Lagoa, 2012).
The impact of globalization occurs at three levels. Firstly, tax competition
between countries to attract FDI has increased due to larger international
mobility of capital. This creates a pressure on the ESM as social policies are
financed by general taxation. Secondly, the weight of multinationals and in
general the larger mobility of firms has weakened union power. In addition,
trade and capital market liberalization have also reinforced the ideological
opposition to the welfare state.
Regarding economic growth, there were several signs of Europe’s decline, as it
has been lagging behind its main competitor, the US, and lately had not been
able to compete with the economic dynamism of emerging countries (mainly
India and China).
As for ageing, there were significant demographic shifts in Europe since the
1970s. People live longer, mortality rates are decreasing, and fecundity rates
have been falling. Indeed, the current fertility rate is low (1.5 children for EU-25)
and significantly below the replacement rate of 2.1 (Commission, 2006, p.3).
Given this general background, we now analyse social cohesion in Portugal by
looking at two main indicators: the at-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers
(referred to as ‘poverty rate’), and inequality of income distribution.
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Table 42 shows the evolution of poverty rate after social transfers67. In 2010,
Portugal was one of the countries with highest percentage of population at-
risk-of-poverty (17.9%), only supplanted by Greece, Spain and Italy. These data
reveal that the Southern countries have a model of capitalism that generates
more poverty than the rest of EU15 (Hall and Soskice, 2001). In terms of
evolution between 2000 and 2010, Portugal has made one of the strongest
efforts to reduce poverty in the EU15. In that period, poverty declined 3.1 p.p. in
Portugal and increased 1.3 p.p. in EU15.
Table 42 - At-Risk-of-Poverty Rate After Social Transfers, 2000-10 (%)
Country 2000 2005 2008 2010
Change
2000-
2010
EU-15 15 15.8 16.2 16.3 1.3
Belgium 13 14.8 14.7 14.6 1.6
Denmark 10 11.8 11.8 13.3 3.3
Germany 10 12.2 15.2 15.6 5.6
Ireland 20 19.7 15 16.1 –3.9
Greece 20 19.6 19.7 20.1 0.1
Spain 18 19.7 19.5 20.7 2.7
France 16 13 12.9 13.5 –2.5
Italy 18 18.9 18.4 18.2 0.2
Luxembourg 12 13.7 13.4 14.5 2,5
Netherlands 11 10.7 10.5 10.3 –0,7
Austria 12 12.3 12.4 12.1 0.1
Portugal 21 19.4 18.5 17.9 –3.1
67 The poverty rate is the proportion of persons with an equivalised disposable income below 60
per cent of the national median equivalised disposable income (after social transfers).
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Finland 11 11.7 13.6 13.1 2.1
Sweden 9 9.5 12.2 12.9 3.9
United
Kingdom
19 19 18.7 17.1 –1.9
Source: Eurostat, European Union Statistics on
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC)
Note: 2000 data refer to the year 2001 for Sweden and Denmark
By looking at the percentage of people at-risk-of-poverty before and after social
transfers, we conclude that the reason why Portugal is better than Italy and
Greece in terms of poverty after social transfers is related to the ability of the
social state to bring more people out poverty (Table 43). However, the capacity
of the State to take people out of poverty in Portugal is still below what occurs
in other European developed countries.
Table 43 - Comparing At-Risk-of-Poverty Rate After and Before Social
Transfers, 2000-10 (%)
Country
Before
social
transfers
After
social
transfers
After
social
transfers
minus
before
social
transfers
2000 2010 2000 2010 2000 2010
EU-15 23 26.1 15 16.2 -8 -9.9
Belgium 23 26.7 13 14.6 -10 -12.1
Denmark 29 29.1 10 13.3 -19 -15.8
Germany 20 24.2 10 15.6 -10 -8.6
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Ireland 31 40.4 20 16.1 -11 -24.3
Greece 22 23.8 20 20.1 -2 -3.7
Spain 22 28.1 18 20.7 -4 -7.4
France 24 25.2 16 13.3 -8 -11.9
Italy 21 23.3 18 18.2 -3 -5.1
Luxembourg 23 29.1 12 14.5 -11 -14.6
Netherlands 22 21.1 11 10.3 -11 -10.8
Austria 22 24.1 12 12.1 -10 -12
Portugal 27 26.4 21 17.9 -6 -8.5
Finland 19 27.0 11 13.1 -8 -13.9
Sweden 17 26.7 9 12.9 -8 -13.8
United
Kingdom
29 31.0 19 17.1
-10 -13.9
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC.
Note: 2000 data refer to the year 2001 for Sweden and Denmark
It can be argued that the poverty rate is unable to capture important aspects of
social cohesion. A more complete indicator created for Europe 2020 strategy is
the at-risk-of-poverty and social exclusion68, which combines three indicators:
people living in households with very low work intensity, people at-risk-of-
poverty after social transfers, and severely materially deprived people. In 2010,
the relative position of Portugal on that indicator remains almost the same as
for the simpler indicator of at-risk-of-poverty, with the difference that Italy is
slightly better than Portugal in this indicator.
68 Eurostat, EU-SILC.
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Table 44 – At-risk-of-poverty and social exclusion
Country
At-risk-of-poverty and
social exclusion
2005 2010
EU15 21.5 21.7
Belgium 22.6 20.8
Denmark 17.2 18.3
Germany 18.4 19.7
Ireland 25.0 29.9
Greece 29.4 27.7
Spain 23.4 25.5
France 18.9 19.2
Italy 25.0 24.5
Luxembourg 17.3 17.1
Netherlands 16.7 15.1
Austria 16.8 16.6
Portugal 26.1 25.3
Finland 17.2 16.9
Sweden 14.4 15.0
UK 24.8 23.1
Source: Eurostat
The observation of the inequality of income distribution69 reveals that Portugal
is the second most unequal country of the EU15, only bettered than Spain. In
2010, the indicator of inequality was 5.6 in Portugal and 5 in the EU15. Notice
that the inequality of income was larger in Portugal than in the liberal economy
of the UK. Nevertheless, the evolution between 2000 and 2010 was very positive
69 Inequality is measured as the ratio of total income received by the top quintile to that received
by the lowest quintile.
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in Portugal, since it was the country where the inequality indicator has
decreased most (-0.8 p.p.), while in the EU15 there was an increase of inequality
(+0.5 p.p.).
Table 45 - Inequality of Income Distribution (2000-10)
Country 2000 2005 2008 2010
Change
2000-
2010
EU-15 4.5 4.8 4.9 5.0 0.5
Belgium 4.3 4.0 4.1 3.9 – 0.4
Denmark 3 3.5 3.6 4.4 1.4
Germany 3.5 3.8 4.8 4.5 1
Ireland 4.7 5.0 4.4 5.3 0.6
Greece 5.8 5.8 5.9 5.6 – 0.2
Spain 5.4 5.5 5.4 6.9 1.5
France 4.2 4.0 4.4 4.5 0.3
Italy 4.8 5.6 5.1 5.2 0.4
Luxembourg 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.1 0.4
Netherlands 4.1 4.0 4.0 3.7 0.4
Austria 3.4 3.8 3.7 3.7 0.3
Portugal 6.4 7.0 6.1 5.6 – 0.8
Finland 3.3 3.6 3.8 3.6 0.3
Sweden 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.5 0.1
United
Kingdom 5.2 5.9 5.6 5.4 0.2
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC.
Note: 2000 data refer to the year 2001 for Sweden and Denmark
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In conclusion, the preceding analysis allows us to conclude that in 2010
Portugal was one of the most unequal countries of the EU15 and with one of the
highest poverty rate, but the situation has improved on both dimensions since
2000.
13.3. Concluding remarks
An important dimension of social exclusion is financial exclusion. In 2010 there
were still 9% of adults without access to a bank account. Also, credit was
distributed asymmetrically among families. The average banking client
presents limited rationality in his investment and credit decisions, being very
affected by the advice of banks when choosing banking products. Therefore,
banks may bear some responsibility for the increase of households’
indebtedness.
A more general analysis of poverty and inequality indicators allows us to
conclude that in 2010 Portugal was one of the most unequal countries of the
EU15 and with one of the highest poverty rates, but the situation has improved
on both dimensions since 2000.
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PART IV – International integration and the Portuguese financial system
14. Impact of financial globalization on the national financial system70
In this section we aim to study how financial globalization has affected the
Portuguese economy and more specifically the financial system. Firstly, in
Section 14.1 we assess how trade, FDI and capital movements have impacted
the Portuguese economy and especially how the latter have made it more
vulnerable to external shocks. In Section 14.2 we analyse the
internationalization of Portuguese banks.
14.1. Major impacts of globalization in the Portuguese economy
Globalization has three main economic dimensions: intensification of the trade
of goods and services, FDI and the movement of financial capitals. Each one of
these elements had considerable implications in Portugal.
The liberalization of commerce in the WTO that allowed Asian emerging
economies to access European markets had a substantial negative impact on
Portuguese traditional firms. By weakening Portuguese firms, trade
liberalization had also an indirect impact on banks, by increasing credit default
and reducing economic dynamism.
A positive effect of trade liberalization was that it allowed for the importation of
products at a lower cost, increasing consumer surplus and reducing inflation.
Regarding FDI, after joining the EU in 1986 and up to 1992 Portugal benefited
from a large inflow of FDI, with large spillovers effects on the industrial sector
70 Point 1b of the terms of reference.
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in particular. With the EU enlargement to the East much of the FDI, especially
from Germany, was diverted to the new member countries.
The FDI in the areas of finance, real estate and trade had less positive effects
on the economy. There is no doubt that competition increased in those sectors
and there was a faster modernization. However, the FDI directed to finance, real
estate and trade is looking to increase profits by enlarging their consumer basis
and by operating in markets of imperfect competition.
The banking sector also benefited from the entrance of foreign banks, with the
large entrance occurring in 2000 when Santander bought bank BTA and became
one of the five largest banks operating in the Portuguese market. Foreign banks
and institutional investors also have major stakes in the large banking groups:
100% in Santander, around 15% in BCP and BES, and 58.9% in BPI (see Annex
III).
The entrance of FDI and foreign financial investment was especially important
during the privatization process. Foreign capital also entered the stock market
in large quantities as the market became developed, especially in 1999, 2001
and 2002. More recently foreign capital from developing countries, namely
Angola and Brazil, has invested in large listed companies (Section 10.1).
Before the 2008 crisis, the World economy was characterized by large liquidity,
i.e. by a large volume of financial capital looking for assets were to invest at
high return rates. The East Asian and oil producing countries with large current
account surplus and savings inundated the world and especially the USA with
large quantities of capital. Asian countries were strategically increasing their
foreign reserves to maintain the parity of their currencies with the dollar, and
also trying to avoid a crisis similar to the Asian crisis of 1998. In that crisis those
countries realized the importance of owning large sums of dollars during crises
as protection against foreign capital flight. More recently, they have been
diversifying the portfolio of currencies and have invested also in euro assets. In
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2008, according with the journal The Economist 27% of the world exchange
reserves were already in euros
The Portuguese Government benefited from the large liquidity in the World
market, and before 2010 was able to sell its bonds at an interest rate almost
similar to the German rate. More than 70% of the bonds of the Portuguese
government were bought by foreigners. But the dependence on foreign capital
has proven dangerous in many countries. FDI and also surprisingly the
investment in stocks are relatively stable in periods of crisis. In contrast, credit
and investment in deposits and bonds is easily scared and exits quickly in a
period of crisis. That was exactly what occurred in Portugal during the Euro
debt crisis in 2010.
A new characteristic of globalization is the high interconnection among banks.
Financial products are traded globally. This facilitated the quick spread of the
2008 financial crisis, as investors did not know where toxic assets were located.
Notice that, according with the Bank of Portugal Portuguese banks did not have
toxic assets in considerable amounts.
The liberalization of capitals has facilitated the contagion of crisis, namely of
the Subprime and Sovereign debt crisis. The larger trade interconnection
between countries means that this channel of propagation is more active. Also,
the cross-market rebalancing of portfolios is more relevant. International
investors adjust portfolios to changes in countries’ risk after a shock (Boyer et
al, 2006). After a shock in one country, which also affects other countries,
investors reduce risk by adjusting portfolios not only in the focus country, but
also in other affected countries. Wealth constraints also play a role, since when
investors suffer losses in the focus country of the crisis they have to sell assets
in other countries (Kyle and Xiong, 2001). They need to sell assets due to margin
calls or large withdrawals from mutual funds.
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14.2. Internationalization of Portuguese Banks
The globalization process and the European single market allowed Portuguese
banks to internationalize their activities. They have followed a strategy of
internationalization mainly after the publication in 1992 of the Decree-Law
298/92 dated 31st December in accordance with the Directive 89/646/EEC dated
15th December (Second Banking Coordination Directive), which extended the
single market to financial services. The new legal framework allowed any
financial institution authorized to operate in the market of a member State to
establish new branches or subsidiaries and provide financial services across
borders throughout the European Union, obtaining the so-called “EU-passport”.
Hence, any bank based in the European Union obtained automatic access to a
much wider market, eliminating formal national borders and restrictions on the
range of financial activities permitted (with the exception of insurance activity
to which “EU-passport” was allowed only in 1996).
The internationalization of banks was integrated in a more general wave of
internationalization of the Portuguese economy from 1997 (Ribeiro, 2003). In
1998, the FDI of Portugal abroad was larger than the FDI in Portugal. The
groups of firms leading the process were banks, large retail operators,
construction firms, real estate and services to firms companies, and some
industries. The most important destination countries were Spain, Brazil,
Poland, Morocco and Angola.
The reasons for investing abroad were related with the rapid growth of the
destination countries, while internally competition was becoming fiercer and
market growth was slowing down. Additionally, emergent markets’ consumers
are less demanding than developed markets’ consumers. The growth of the
Portuguese economy in the second half of the 1990s also allowed the
generation of cash-flow to invest abroad. Moreover, the rapid growth of credit
facilitated the financing of some operations. Finally, the privatization process
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created some large companies with internationalization potential and that were
able to generate large revenues in a relatively protected domestic market.
From 2008, the FDI abroad slowed strongly, as firms faced financing and cash
flow difficulties.
In general terms, the process of internationalization of Portuguese banks has
taken different forms. The most important are the establishment of branches
and representative offices in other countries, strategic alliances with other
international financial institutions and the acquisition of foreign banks.
Portuguese banks have targeted two types of countries. On the one hand, they
chose countries with strong cultural and economic affinities, like Angola,
Mozambique, Cape Verde, Brazil, among others. Portuguese banks also decided
to extend their activities to markets with a strong Portuguese community, like
Switzerland, Luxembourg, France and Spain. On the other hand, they chose to
be present in less developed markets, but with strong growth potential, like
Poland.
The international activity of Portuguese banks has facilitated and promoted
exports and direct investment by Portuguese companies.
Due to the maturity of the Portuguese banking market and slow growth of
domestic demand, profits from international activity are becoming increasingly
important for banks. International operations accounted for around 8% of the
total consolidated net income of the Portuguese financial institutions in 2006,
20% in 2007, 40% in 2008, 15% in 2009 and 22% in 2010. 71 Profits from
international operations have been important to mitigate the decrease in the
profits of the domestic activity, in a context of a strongly recessionary
environment of the Portuguese economy, due to the fiscal consolidation
71 Data from Financial Stability Reports of the Bank of Portugal, from 2006 to 2010.
279
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
process imposed by the Troika. Here it stands out that the internationalization
of Portuguese banks has allowed them to take advantage of growing markets
and to diversify their business risk. Additionally, it has permitted them to serve
emigrants and firms in the several geographical locations where they are
present.
Looking at the total amount of external assets owned by Portuguese banks (not
only investments in subsidiaries, but also securities), we find that they
increased substantially in the last decade. The percentage of external assets in
total assets (including securities) increased from 21.7% in the beginning of the
2000s to 29.3% in 2009 (Figure 152). This trend reversed in 2010 and 2011, with
the importance of external assets in total assets declining to 25.3% in 2011. This
reflects the strong turbulence of international financial markets, in the wake of
the Subprime crisis and, more recently, the sovereign debt crisis in the euro
area. National banks sold international assets as part of the general strategy of
deleveraging. The off-shore activity has also diminished in recent years: it
represented 11.4% of total assets in 2005 and fell to 5.5% in 2010. In 2011,
there was an increase to 8.2%.
Figure 152 – External assets (% of total assets)
Source: Financial Stability Report from Bank of Portugal, several years
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Figure 153 – Off-shore activities (% of total assets) and external Earnings
before Interests and Taxes (EBIT) - % of total EBIT
Source: Financial Stability Report from Bank of Portugal, several years
The geographical dispersion of the international exposure has remained
broadly unchanged, prevailing a greater exposure to more developed countries
and, particularly, to euro area countries (Table 46).
Table 46 – Consolidated Foreign Claims of the Portuguese Banking
System (in % of total international exposition)
Source: Bank of Portugal’s Financial Stability Report, several years
Despite have increased, the international exposure of Portuguese banks
continues to be smaller than other European banks, reflecting a more
conservative stance by Portuguese banks (Financial Stability Report of the Bank
of Portugal, May 2011).
According to Financial Stability Report of the Bank of Portugal (May 2012), in the
next years, the optimistic outlook for the economic activity of some countries in
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EBIT)
Geographical Exposition 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Developed Countries 68,4% 70,7% 71,2% 69,9% 70,1% 71,6% 68,8% 66,1%
Offshore Centres 15,2% 11,4% 11,0% 7,4% 7,8% 6,3% 5,5% 8,2%
Developing Countries in Europe 8,0% 8,3% 8,0% 10,4% 10,9% 10,3% 10,7% 11,3%
Others 8,5% 9,7% 9,7% 12,2% 11,3% 11,6% 15,0% 14,3%
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which Portuguese banking groups have important stakes should continue to
support the growth of international activity.
14.3. Concluding remarks
Economic globalization had several implications on the Portuguese economy
and financial system. The liberalization of commerce that allowed Asian
countries and other emerging economies to access the European market had a
negative impact on Portuguese firms, but allowed a reduction of prices of
imported goods.
From 1986 to 1992 Portugal benefited from a large inflow of FDI, but the EU
enlargement to East diverted much of the FDI directed to the Portuguese
economy. FDI has also been directed to the financial sector, where some
foreign banks compete and foreign investors have major stakes in the large
banking groups.
Foreign financial investment has also played an important role in the promotion
of the Portuguese stock market, especially in the period 1999-2002. More
recently foreign capital from developing countries has invested in large listed
companies.
In the public bond market, foreign investors became the major buyers and
financed the State at very low interest rates before the Subprime crisis. More
recently there was a flight of foreign investors from the Portuguese debt,
originating a debt crisis. The free movement of capitals has facilitated the
contagion of the debt crisis from Greece to Portugal.
The globalization process and the European single market on services allowed
Portuguese banks to internationalize their activities. This process was
integrated in a more general wave of internationalization of the Portuguese
economy from 1997 onwards. Portuguese banks invested in countries with
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strong cultural and economic affinities, and in less developed markets with less
proximity but with strong growth potential.
As a result, the total amount of external assets owned by Portuguese banks
increased substantially in the last decade, even though they are still below the
levels of other national banking systems. The exposure is essentially to
developed and “developing” countries in Europe. Profits from international
operations have been growing in importance and became significant to mitigate
the decrease in profits from domestic activity arising from the recession in
Portugal.
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15. Impact of European integration on the Portuguese financial system72
In this section we assess the impact of European integration on the Portuguese
financial system. Sections 15.1 and 15.2 describe the major macroeconomic
steps in the European integration and in the creation of a space for the free
movement of capital at the European level. Section 15.3 analyses the
convergence process of Portugal towards the euro, highlighting not only the
successes achieved but also the negative implications. In this line of reasoning,
Section 15.4 summarizes the major impacts of European integration on the
banking system and on the Portuguese economy more generally. Finally,
Section 15.5 studies how the single monetary policy may have differentiated
effects on the national banking interest rates.
15.1. Major macroeconomic steps in the European integration
EMS
The European Monetary System (EMS) was created in 1979 in response to the
collapse of the Bretton Woods System73, in order to control the fluctuations of
European currencies and, thereby, stimulate trade and FDI.
The EMS was essentially composed of the European Currency Unit (ECU) and
the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), functioning as a floating exchange rate
regime with regard to external currencies. The ECU was a currency basket
based on a weighted average of EMS currencies and it was used as the common
denominator in the exchange rate grid for Community currencies.
72 Point 15 of the terms of reference
73 The Bretton Woods System was established after the Second World War by most of the
industrialized economies, in order to ensure the currencies’ stability. It functioned as a system
of fixed (but adjustable) exchange rates, under which each country committed to maintain the
stability of its currency to the US dollar. Besides, there was the guarantee of conversion of US
dollars into gold, whose conversion rate was fixed at 35 US dollar per ounce of gold.
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According to this new system, all governments were committed to keep their
currency exchange rate towards other currencies of the system within bands.
Thus, no country’s exchange rate could fluctuate more than 2,25% from the
defined central exchange rates, with the exception of the Italian lira, the
Spanish peseta, the Portuguese escudo and the British pound, which were
allowed to fluctuate 6%. In August 1993, these bands were widened to 15%, due
to speculative pressures favoured by the process of capital liberalization.
Maastricht Treaty
December of 1991 saw the signing the Maastricht Treaty, laying the foundations
for the creation of a single currency in Europe. Each country wishing to
participate in the single currency had to fulfil the following five nominal
convergence criteria:
First Criteria: Inflation rate could not exceed more than 1.5 percentage
points of the average of the three best performing member states of the
EU on that indicator.
Second Criteria: the nominal long-term interest rate must not be more
than 2 percentage points higher than in the three lowest inflation
member states.
Third Criteria: Applicant countries should have joined the ERM during
two consecutive years and should not have devalued its currency during
that period.
Fourth Criteria: The ratio of the annual public deficit to GDP should not
exceed 3% at the end of 1998.
Fifth Criteria: The ratio of gross government debt to GDP must not
exceed 60% at the end of 1998.
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Stability and Growth Pact
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is an agreement among EU member states,
which imposes a legal obligation to avoid excessive public deficit, providing
sanctions in the case of non-compliance.
According to the SGP, the public deficit is considered excessive if it breaches
the maximum of 3% of GDP, except in the case of the occurrence of an
extraordinary event or in the case of a recession.
If the European Council decides that the deficit is excessive, it issues
recommendations to the Member State concerned to correct the excessive
deficit in a given time frame. The non-compliance with the recommendations
triggers further steps in the procedures, including for euro area Member States
the possibility of sanctions.
15.2. Free movement of capital at the European level
Until the Single European Act of 1986, European capital markets were not very
integrated, since capital could not flow freely across European countries. In
1986, the Single Act defined that capital was free to move in the EU. The
implementation of this principle was done through a set of directives, which
ended in the 1988 directive. Latterly, the Maastricht Treaty institutes in the
article 56 the principle of free movement of capital.
The free flow of capital allows agents to diversify internationally their portfolios
and brings more competition to national banking markets. In theory, clients can
borrow in any European country.
To facilitate the free movement of financial institutions, regulation is defined at
the EU level, guaranteeing that rules are uniform across national markets, and
not requiring the registration of institutions in each market. However, the
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supervision, i.e., the actual application and administration of the regulation is
done at the national level. This can be justified on the grounds of the subsidiary
principle and the better knowledge that national regulators have of their own
banking system. In 2012, in the sequence of the recent financial crisis, this
arrangement has been challenged by the European Commission, which
proposed the creation of a single European supervision authority that will be
able to better manage bail-outs of institutions affecting the stability of all the
monetary area and induce more confidence on the markets.
The free movement of banking institutions and the euro has not led to a large
movement of banks towards operations at a European scale, probably due to
different regulations, tax treatments, national protectionism, and economic
barriers associated to the business. M&A took place mainly at the national
level. Nevertheless, there are some banks that grew to a pan-European scale,
such as Santander and HSBC.
In Portugal, foreign banks participate in the Portuguese financial system and
Portuguese banks have invested FDI in other European economies.
Nevertheless, the analysis of the Portuguese financial sector highlights that the
national dimension is still important. This result emerges mainly from two
points. Firstly, foreign institutions still have a low market share. Secondly, the
specific macroeconomic evolution of the national economy is still important in
understanding the stability of the banking system.
The integration of national interbank markets was almost full. In the
government bond market the integration was quite substantial until the
Subprime crisis, with long term interest rates very similar in all EA countries.
For corporate bonds of large firms the degree of integration was smaller.
In the stock market, the creation of a single currency, by eliminating currency
risk, potentiates the international diversification of investments by economic
agents. A single currency also incentivizes the merger of stock exchanges,
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where scale economies are quite strong. The creation of Euronext in 2000 by
the exchanges of Paris, Brussels and Amsterdam was an example of this trend.
This exchange was able to become the fourth largest exchange in the world.
The Portuguese Stock Exchange joined Euronext in 2007.
15.3. The Portuguese strategy of convergence to the euro: achievements
and difficulties
Portugal had to fulfil the five Maastricht convergence criteria in order to
participate in the European single currency. The compliance of these five
criteria was assured by the Bank of Portugal (the first three criteria) and the
government (the other two criteria).
Let us focus on the first criteria related to the exchange rate, inflation and
interest rates. To ensure these criteria the Bank of Portugal adopted a
monetary policy strategy during the nineties consisting in maintaining the
stability of the escudo against the deutschmark. 74 Since the mark was the
anchor currency of the EMS, that strategy ensured the stability of the escudo
against the other currencies of the system. The main instruments of the
central bank were the key interest rates and interventions on foreign exchange
markets. This strategy was a success leading to the joining of the Escudo to the
EMS in April 1992. The Portuguese escudo started then to fluctuate around a
band of plus or minus 6% in relation to a central parity75.
Given that Germany was a low inflation country, by maintaining the exchange
rate stability with the mark, Portugal was able to reduce inflation rate of
tradable goods sector. Prices of the Portuguese imported goods (consumption,
intermediate and raw materials) from Germany began to grow moderately,
74 This monetary policy strategy is normally known as “exchange rate anchor policy”.
75 This central parity was fixed initially at a level that has reflected the substantial appreciation
of the escudo in the previous two years.
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curbing directly CPI inflation and production costs of firms. The reduction of
firms’ costs meant that they were able to reduce their prices, including the
prices of non-tradable goods. On the other hand, due to the higher competition
of imported goods, the Portuguese producers focused in the internal market
were forced to cut prices, in order not to lose market share. The same
reasoning applied here for Germany is also valid for other countries of the
system, also large commercial partners of Portugal, such as the UK and
France.
Consequently, expectations regarding the future inflation rate started to
decrease, feeding a reduction of nominal wages and profit margins, which
implied a further reduction of the inflation rate.
With free movement of capitals, the maintenance of credible exchange rate
stability also implied that the level of Portuguese interest rates approached the
level of German interest rates (by the uncovered parity). In sum, the central
bank was able to ensure the three goals of exchange rate stability and reduction
of both inflation and interest rates. This was a decisive step for Portugal to
participate in the single currency as a founder partner.
The reduction of interest rates achieved by the monetary policy also facilitated
the achievement of the two criteria related with public finances: reduction of
both public deficit and public debt. First of all the government started to pay
lower interest rates on its debt contributing to those two objectives. Secondly,
the reduction of interest rates to the private sector meant a boom in
consumption and investment, compensating some difficulties in the exporting
sector and supporting high economic growth and thus making a decisive
contribution to reduce the fiscal deficit.
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The balance of the participation in the EMS
Some months later after Portugal joined the EMS, the system was fustigated by
speculative pressures favoured by the process of capital movement
liberalization. The British pound and the Italian lira abandoned the system, and
the Spanish peseta devaluated strongly. The overall bands of fluctuations were
widened to +/-15%. Still, the Portuguese authorities maintained the parity of
escudo within the EMS, supported by high interest rates and large foreign
exchange reserves. Against this backdrop, the valuation of the real exchange
rate of escudo started to generate some controversy (Lopes, 1996).
On the one hand, that valuation helped to decrease inflation rate, as requested
by the process of nominal convergence under the Maastricht Treaty.
Additionally, it was argued that this real appreciation was a result of a strong
pressure of domestic demand and a policy-induced nominal devaluation could
not have had a strong effect on the real exchange rate. The enthusiasts of this
view emphasize in its support the dynamism of exports and the absence of
difficulties in the balance of payments between 1989 and 1994.
Nevertheless, the adoption of that monetary policy strategy created difficulties
in the sector of tradable goods. Real exchange rate appreciation caused loss of
price competitiveness, which favoured an increase of imports and a decrease of
exports. Additionally, while prices in the tradable goods sector felt quickly due
to price convergence with Europe, production costs linked to wages and other
non-tradable goods declined slowly. As a result, many corporations in the
tradable goods sector bankrupted and unemployment rate jumped. The export
sector faced difficulties and the level of production in manufacturing and
agriculture decreased expressively.
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Another factor favoring investment in the non-tradable goods sector was the
funding cost (Bento, 2010). Since prices in the non-tradable goods sector have
grown at a higher rate than prices in the tradable goods sector since the second
half of the eighties, the real interest rate was lower for the former than for the
latter sector. Since the non-tradable goods sector has a lower productivity
growth and does not contributes to the improvement of the current account, the
large growth and importance of that sector on the Portuguese economy has
become an important constraint to development (Bento, 2010).
The supporters of the pessimistic view on the effect of the EMS in Portugal
sustained that it prevented the adoption of a more accommodative monetary
policy and, therefore, it was the main cause of the Portuguese economic
recession between 1992 and 1994. Apart from that, exporting Portuguese firms
were used to frequent currency devaluations to compensate competitiveness
losses. The adaptation to a stronger currency was slow and implied a loss of
exporting market shares.
The adoption of an exchange rate peg in the context of the EMS or more
generally the adoption of the euro brings other costs for the Portuguese
economy. Firstly, Portugal can no longer use the interest rate or the exchange
rate to correct internal macroeconomic disequilibrium. Portugal’s key interest
rates are currently determined by ECB and during the EMS were determined by
the Bundesbank, the anchor country. As an example of the perverse effects of
this fact we have the recession in Portugal and Europe originated by the
German Reunification. In 1992, the German government followed an
expansionary policy to support the Reunification, resulting in high inflation. In
response the Bundesbank increased interest rates, which implied an increase
of interest rates in all countries of the EMS, including Portugal, which had a
recessionary effect on the economy.
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The adoption of an exchange rate peg or a single currency also implies a strong
discipline of public finances. In a flexible exchange rate regime, high budget
deficits, which produce inflation, can be accommodated with a depreciation of
the currency. But in a fixed exchange rate system there is not such possibility,
and high budget deficits imply a reduction of foreign reserves or an increase in
foreign indebtedness.
15.4. Major impacts of European integration in the Portuguese economy
The joining of Portugal to the EU had a profound impact on the economy. The
opening up of the financial system to the private sector in 1983 (with the change
in the constitution) was accelerated by the joining of Portugal to the EU. After
Portugal joined the EU in 1986, the integration of the economy into the common
market required a gradual dismantling of the constraints on the financial
system, particularly the State property of banks. Other major changes were the
free entrance of European banks in Portugal and the harmonization of banking
regulation, including capital regulation.
The participation in the euro in 1999 brought major benefits to Portugal, namely
the reduction of interest rates and the easier access of banks to international
financing. Portugal and other countries have also benefited from a low inflation
environment ensured by the ECB.
At a microeconomic level, the reduction in exchange rate uncertainty brought
many benefits to Portugal, namely the improvement in the quality of investment
decisions involving exchange rate risk, increase in trade with countries from the
monetary area and reduction of transaction costs. Households and institutional
investors also had better conditions to diversify their investments with less risk.
However, it seems that the euro did not stimulate much economic growth: since
1999 Portugal has diverged with Europe in terms of GDP per capita.
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The euro offered a considerable protection for Portugal during the turbulence
of the Subprime crisis. Other small countries with own currency, like Hungry,
were badly affected by the crisis.
The major cost of the euro is that Portugal had to transfer the monetary policy
to the ECB. This is would not be particularly costly if supply and demand shocks
are symmetric in the euro area and in Portugal. In terms of major events, the
Portuguese economy has been more affected than other European countries by
the increasing competition from Asian countries and the EU Eastern
enlargement. This occurs because the Portuguese industrial structure is more
traditional and more based on cost factors than other more advanced euro area
economies.
If macroeconomic shocks are asymmetric, they are not very negative for
Portugal if adjustment mechanisms function well. However, in the Euro area
and Portugal the adjustment mechanisms are not particularly strong, as the
labour market is relatively rigid, workers mobility across countries is limited,
and the European budget is very small to realize counter-cyclical transfers to
countries affected by negative shocks.
As an example of how the euro has brought some difficulties in macroeconomic
management, we have the fact that for Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Greece the
Euro fail to adjust when unit labour costs (ULC) grew faster than the average
after 1999. Between 1999 and 2007 the ULC grew 14% in the EA and around 27%
in Portugal (See Figure 163 below).
It was argued above that a major benefit of the single currency was the
reduction of interest rates and the easier access to external financing for
private and public sectors. Yet, this environment of economic boom hid the
necessity of reforms. At the same time the euro allowed the financing of large
external deficits for a longer period than if the financing was done in domestic
own currency.
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The convergence process to join the euro was accompanied by a large decline
of real interest rates in Portugal. This implied a faster growth of credit and
aggregate demand, with obvious inflationary consequences. This one-off
expansionary shock disappeared over time, namely because higher inflation
originated a real appreciation of the currency.
The participation in the euro also implied the respect of the Growth and Stability
Pact, which obliged in some years the country to follow a pro-cyclical tightening
of fiscal policy during periods of slow economic growth or even recession. In
addition, in the UE there is not a harmonization of taxes on corporations, which
together with the free movement of capitals implies that countries are in tax
competition. Some large firms have transferred their headquarters to countries
with lower corporate taxes, reducing the collection of taxes in Portugal. In
addition, firms, namely financial institutions, and also private individuals use
off-shores accounts to avoid taxation. All this makes the fiscal consolidation at
a national level even more difficult.
The European integration had other important impacts on the Portuguese
economy. The structural funds were important in the modernization of public
and private infrastructures. The FDI was also extremely relevant in the
modernization of the industry, even though its flow declined considerably in
recent years. Banks also used the opportunity to invest in other European
countries.
On the negative side, the EU’s agriculture and fisheries policies, which were not
properly implemented by the national actors, or due to some wrong design of
such policies, favoured the destruction of productive capacity and disinvestment
in these sectors.
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15.5. How the monetary policy of the ECB affects banks’ interest rates
Since 1999 Portugal belongs to the EA, with its monetary policy defined by the
ECB. The transmission of changes in the key interest rates to lending and
deposit interest rates depends on the decisions of banks and the structure of
the financial system.
In Portugal, there are flexible interest rates on credit to households and firms
(See Section 9.3). As a result, the ECB key interest rates influence banks’
interest rates of both new and existing loans, transferring the interest rate risk
to households and firms.
Antão (2009) studies the degree of transmission of interbank interest rates
using micro data for the period January 1990 to December 2002. She founds
that changes in the interbank interest rate are fully transmitted to loan interest
rates but the same does not occurs for deposit interest rates. Since the closer
the pass-through is to one the larger is competition, it can be inferred with
caution that competition is larger in credit than in deposit markets. Inside the
credit market, results show that the pass-through and consequently
competition is larger in the corporations segment than in the households
segment.
The study also concludes that the velocity of adjustment is larger for deposits
interest rates than for loans interest rates. It is also found that loans markets
with larger concentration have a larger velocity of interest rates adjustment,
but the adjustment is more incomplete. This indicates that the increase in
concentration in the 2000s may have made the interest rate pass-through more
incomplete.
Sørensen and Werner (2006) study a set of euro area countries and their results
for Portugal confirm Antão (2009). The pass-through is more incomplete in
deposits’ than in credit’s interest rates. The pass-through is also more partial
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in households segments (mortgage and consumer) than in the firms segment. It
is still confirmed that the velocity of adjustment is larger in deposits than in
mortgage loans. However, the adjustment is the quickest in consumer loans
and short term loans to firms (the paper does not include long term loans to
firms in Portugal).
For the period 1992-1999, Banco of Portugal (2000) obtains similar results
regarding the ordering of the size of the pass-through across market segments,
even though the quantitative results point to a larger degree of pass-through.
That paper finds that the long-term impact of interbank rate is 0.86 for deposits
(181 days to 1 year), 1.07 for mortgages and 1.19 for short term loans to firms
(181 days to 1 year). One point where Banco of Portugal (2000) differs from
Sørensen and Werner (2006) is that it obtains the largest degree of pass-
through for loans to consumption (1.39, 181 days to 1 year).
Comparing with the EA10 (unweighted average), Portugal has a long term
deposits rate elasticity to interbank interest rate much lower than the average:
0.47 and 0.73, respectively (Table 2). The difference is not so large for mortgage
loans, but still Portugal has a lower elasticity (0.87 versus 1.00). For consumer
loans the degree of pass-through in Portugal is quite similar to the EA average
of around 0.77. Finally, the pass-through in short term interest rates to firms is
larger than the average: 0.93 and 0.77, respectively.
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Table 47 – Interest rate pass-through across market segments
Note: Euro area is the unweighted average of 10 countries. Source: Sørensen
and Werner (2006)
The velocity of adjustment is quite similar to the average for mortgage loans
and time deposits, is smaller for short term loans to firms and larger for
consumer loans (Table 40, in Annex).
Other studies seem to confirm the above results. Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994)
and Kleimeier and Sander (2000) indicate that for short-term loans to firms, the
long-term pass-through is larger in Portugal than in the Euro area. It is worth
mentioning that Donnay and Degryse (2001) obtain the opposite result for loans
to firms, but for mortgages they confirm a more incomplete pass-through in
Portugal.
In conclusion, these results indicate that the effect of the ECB interest rate
policy will be larger for Portuguese firms than euro area firms, but the effect on
households will be milder in Portugal than in the Euro area.
15.6. Concluding remarks
The major macroeconomic steps in the European integration were the EMS, the
Maastricht treaty that defined the creation of a single currency, and the SGP.
The liberalization of capital movements at the European level was initiated with
the Single European Act. In 1989 the Second Banking Coordination Directive
Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper
Austria 0,698 0,416 0,981 0,887 0,747 1,027 0,755 0,633 0,877 0,512 0,437 0,588
Belgium 1,254 0,867 1,640 0,420 0,229 0,611 0,898 0,827 0,969 0,926 0,884 0,967
Germany 1,422 1,341 1,504 0,246 0,122 0,370 0,408 0,279 0,537 0,916 0,725 1,106
Spain 1,181 0,866 1,496 0,761 0,618 0,903 0,867 0,821 0,914 0,917 0,826 1,007
Finland 1,160 0,907 1,413 1,657 1,303 2,012 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0,350 -0,044 0,744
France 0,776 0,522 1,030 0,648 0,530 0,765 0,789 0,736 0,842 1,037 0,778 1,295
Ireland 0,770 0,288 1,253 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0,664 0,617 0,711 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Italy 0,549 0,146 0,952 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0,694 0,666 0,722 0,722 0,613 0,831
Netherlands 1,326 1,237 1,414 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0,987 0,959 1,015 0,709 0,550 0,868
Portugal 0,871 0,261 1,481 0,788 0,369 1,206 0,932 0,845 1,019 0,477 0,407 0,546
Euro Area 1,001 - - 0,772 - - 0,777 - - 0,730 - -
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Country
Mortgage Loans Consumer Loans Short Term Loans to Firms Time Deposits
Confidence Interval Confidence Interval Confidence Interval Confidence Interval
Coefficient
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extended the single market to financial services. To facilitate the free
movement of financial institutions, regulation is defined at the EU level. An
example of that is the EU Capital Adequacy Directive of 1993, which established
uniform capital requirements at the European level. However, the supervision
has been done at the national level. Recently the European Commission
proposed the creation of a single European supervision authority.
For several reasons the free movement of banking institutions and the euro has
not led banks to operate at a European scale, even though there are cross-
border linkages. The analysis of the Portuguese financial sector highlights that
the national dimension is still important.
Other areas were integration went further was in the interbank market and the
government bond market, despite the disintegration observed during the Great
Recession. In stock markets the tendency has been for a merger of national
exchanges.
The Portuguese strategy to achieve the nominal convergence required by the
Maastricht Treaty was to maintain the stability of the escudo against the
deutschmark. This strategy created difficulties in the sectors of tradable goods
because they were exposed to a strong international competition without a
reduction in internal costs.
The belonging to the EMS and to the euro brought other major cost to the
Portuguese economy: the loss of interest rate and exchange rate as policy
instrument. The new monetary regime also implies a strong discipline of public
finances, which was not a tradition in Portugal.
The joining to the EU had major impacts on the Portuguese financial system:
privatization of banks, entrance of foreign banks, and harmonization of banking
regulation with Europe.
298
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
The participation in the euro allowed banks to increase substantially credit to
the non-financial sector and brought other microeconomic benefits. However,
the euro did not boost economic growth of Portugal, even though it offered a
safe haven during the Subprime financial crisis. After 1999 the economy also
suffered considerable external shocks and had a large growth of labour costs,
and was not able to use interest and exchange rates to respond, whilst the
adjustment mechanisms to asymmetric shocks did not work very well in the
Euro area. The use of fiscal policy during economic downturns was also limited
by the SGP and the international tax competition.
An additional factor of heterogeneity is that the transmission of the ECB
monetary policy to national economies is not homogeneous. The effect of the
ECB interest rate policy will be larger in Portuguese firms than in euro area
firms, but the effect on households will be milder in Portugal than in the Euro
area.
Finally, FDI and European structural funds were very important in the
modernization of the country, despite some negative impact of the common
policy in agriculture and fishing sectors.
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16. The integration of the national financial system in the international
capital markets 76
In Portugal, external capital financed the current account deficit, stimulated
credit and real estate growth. Credit did not result in an increase of country’s
productivity, making the external deficit unsustainable. The existence of a
single currency difficult the adjustment, since high inflation resulting from
capital inflows originated a loose of external competitiveness and low or
negative real interest rates that further stimulated aggregate demand and real
estate growth.
When international investors started thinking the Portuguese situation as
unsustainable, capital inflows suddenly stopped. Without its own currency,
Portugal had a sudden stop of external financing, causing domestic credit
rationing and a deep recession, which reduced the current account from
negative values to zero.
This section is organized as follows. In Sections 16.1 and 16.2 the evolution of
the financial account and international investment positions are described.
Section 16.3 evaluates the size of foreign currency denominated loans and
liabilities. Sections 16.4, 16.5 and 16.6 analyze how inflation, real interest rate
and real exchange rate evolved in the recent past, and the interconnection
between them.
16.1. Financial account
Portugal has had a high current and capital account deficit since 2000. Between
2000 and 2008 that deficit was on average 8.4% of GDP (see Figure 154). In 1995,
the current and capital deficit was around 2% of GDP, and afterwards it
76 Point 18 of the Terms of Reference.
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increased substantially, reaching almost 10% in 2001. Despite some
fluctuations related with the business cycle, the external deficit remained high
up to 2008, when it reached the record of -11% of GDP. From 2009 to 2011 there
was a rapid correction of the deficit due to the economic crisis and credit
rationing of the economy.
Figure 154 – The Portuguese current and capital account
Source: Eurostat and Bank of Portugal
Even though Portugal has been a member of the EA, where the classical
problems of foreign currency shortage are not present, the deficit of the current
and capital account need to be financed. The financial account shows the
channels through which the external financing of the economy occurs, both in
terms of instruments and institutional sectors. 77 In Portugal, between 2000 and
2011, the two most important instruments to finance the current account were
portfolio investment and other investment (see Figure 155). These instruments
were mainly related to banks and the Government. When the government
issues bonds that are bought by non-resident investors they are registered in
portfolio investment, which explain the high relevance of this item.
77 A deficit of the current and capital account is compensated by a positive balance on the
financial account.
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Figure 155 – The finance of the Portuguese current and capital account
Source: Eurostat and Bank of Portugal
An important way through which banks obtained foreign financing was by
selling debt securities to foreign investors. The way of conducting this operation
and its registration in the financial account has changed over time. Up to 2006
banks obtained financing in the international market through their foreign
branches. The latter institutions sold long and medium term debt securities in
euros in foreign markets. After, the branches transferred to their parent firms
the issues’ proceedings by means of loans or deposits. These financial flows
were registered in the financial account as other investment.
From 2007 securities resulting from credit securitization have been sold
directly by the parent bank in the national market and bought mainly by foreign
investors. This change in the way of issuing debt is explained mainly by
modifications in the tax law of mortgage securities’ issues. These financial
flows were registered in the financial account as portfolio investment.
Between 2000 and 2011, the importance of other investment and portfolio
investment has changed considerably, reflecting the changes that have
occurred in the economy and the changes in banks financing. From 2000-05
other investment was the main way of financing externally the economy,
reflecting the increase of banks’ foreign debt. From 2006 up to 2009, while
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other investment decreased in importance, portfolio investment became more
important. This was caused by the fact that banks started making emission of
securities in the domestic market. In 2008 and 2009 the government also played
an important role in the increase of portfolio investment.
In 2010 and 2011 other investment became again the main way of financing the
economy. Since the government and banks did not have access to international
bond markets, the financing of the economy was done through ECB’s monetary
policy operations. This meant an increase of other investment liabilities of
monetary authorities. Moreover, the financing of the State was done by resident
economic agents (especially banks) and by secondary market operations of the
Eurosystem.
In 2011, other investment continued to be the most important instrument to
finance the economy, while portfolio investment continued to have a negative
contribution. Other investment increased because the Government received the
first disbursement of the loan under the international financial assistance
package. Finally, the financing of banks by the ECB was much more reduced in
2011 than in the previous year.
16.2. International Investment Positions
One can look at the International Investment Position (IIP) or net debt position
of the Portuguese economy, which gives us the difference between assets and
liabilities towards foreigners. This indicator reflects the financial transactions
registered in the financial account, changes in securities’ prices and exchange
rates, and other adjustments.
A deficit of the current account corresponds to a surplus of the financial
account. A surplus of the financial account results from an increase in foreign
debt or a sell of domestic assets to non-residents. As a result of the current
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account deficit in Portugal the negative IIP increased 71.1 p.p. from 2000 to
2009 (see Figure 156). The increase in portfolio investment explained 29 p.p. of
that increase, other investment explained 27.3 p.p. and FDI explained 8.7 p.p.
Portfolio investment was essentially related to foreign investors buying
Portuguese Government and banks bonds, whereas other investment was
related to banks getting financed abroad.
Figure 156 – The Portuguese International Investment Position
Source: Eurostat and Bank of Portugal
The main contributors to the increase in the IIP between 2000 and 2009 were
the Government and banks. From 2000 to 2007 the negative IIP of banks has
increased substantially, reflecting the process through which banks obtain
financing in foreign markets to finance domestic firms and households – Figure
156. 78 From 2008 the negative position of banks against the exterior reduced
quickly, because banks started to have difficulties in obtaining credit in the
international markets.
78 Between 2003 and 2005 temporary operations between banks and the BP have affected the IIP
of banks and the BP, but did not have effect on the global balance of the financial account (RA
2004 e 2005). These operations difficult the analysis of the importance of banks in the financing
of the economy.
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Likewise, the net debt position of the Government also increased substantially
from -25.9% of GDP in 2000 to -48% in 2007. But in 2008 and 2009, when banks
were already reducing their debt position towards foreigners, the Government
was still increasing its debt, reaching -59.9% of GDP in 2009. Only in 2010 and
2011 the debt position of the government reduced considerably.
Before 2000 we do not have data on IIP, so we use data on the financial account
(Figure 157). Between 1997 and 1999, banks and the General Government were
also the institutional sectors with larger external debt.
Notice that the net debt of the private non-financial sector did not increase
much. Between 2000 and 2009, the net debt of firms increased only 4.8 p.p. and
families even reinforced by 7.6 p.p. their creditor position towards the rest of
the world. Even though families and firms were getting more indebted, they
were financed in the national banking system and not abroad.
Figure 157 – The Portuguese financial account by institutional sector (% of
GDP)
Source: Eurostat and Bank of Portugal’s Annual Reports
Yet, in 2009 and 2010 there was a considerable decrease of the IIP of NFC,
which is partially explained by the issue of commercial paper bought by non-
residents, the sale of shares by a large telecommunication company and the
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sale of shares by a company of one of the main banking groups (Bank of
Portugal, 2010 and 2011).
From 2000 to 2007 the non-monetary financial institutions had a considerable
positive net asset position towards non-residents. The joining of Portugal to the
euro and the positive cycle of financial markets during a considerable period
induced institutional investors to diversify their portfolios buying foreign assets.
But after 2007, with the increase of the risk, individuals disinvested from
investment funds, which forced these institutions to sell their foreign assets.
Latterly, bank deposits started to offer larger interest rates, making households
prefer them to investment products offered by institutional investors (especially
insurance companies and pension funds). As a result one can observe a steep
decline in the net asset position of non-monetary financial companies in 2008
and 2011 (Figure 156).
16.3. Banks foreign Currency denominated loans and liabilities
In Portugal, the level of foreign currency denominated loans and liabilities is
quite low when compared with other euro area countries, like Austria, France,
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands (see Table 48). On the financing side, this
clearly indicates that Portuguese banks obtain finance preferentially in euros.
The reduced exposure to foreign currency is probably explained by the more
conservative stance of Portuguese banks, which avoid taking great currency
risks.
Moreover, the importance of foreign currency denominated loans and liabilities
have decreased in Portugal from 2006 to 2008. On the liabilities side, probably
Portuguese financial institutions have used less foreign currency funding due to
the greater distrust of international investors in the creditworthiness of
Portuguese financial institutions and the reduction of liquidity in international
markets after 2007.
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Table 48 – Foreign currency denominated loans and liabilities (% of total)
Source: IMF - Financial Soundness Indicators
16.4. Evolution of the Portuguese Inflation Rate
In the 1980’s and the first half of the 1990’s, Portugal was a high inflation
country (Figure 158). Up to the Portuguese economy joining the European
Monetary System, the differential in inflation was compensated by devaluations
of the currency.
The Portuguese convergence effort to join the Euro meant that in the 1990s,
namely in the second half, there was a significant reduction of inflation, to
values close to the euro area average, as was imposed by Maastricht Criteria.
From 1999, with the creation of the euro, the single monetary policy implied
that national inflation rates should be close (Figure 159), otherwise high
inflation countries loose external competitiveness. In this context, Portugal has
had one of the highest average inflation rates of the EA in the period 1999-2007,
only supplanted by Greece and Ireland (Table 49). However, notice that the
effect of the financial crisis implied that in 2008-10 Portugal had an inflation
rate lower than the EA.
In a monetary union inflation differentials may be originated by price level
convergence, due to the convergence of both tradable and non-tradable goods
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2011
Loans (% ofTotal Gross Loans) n.a. 25% 23% 26% 22% n.a.
Liabilities (% ofTotal Liabilities) n.a. 20% 17% 19% 14% n.a.
Loans (% ofTotal Gross Loans) n.a. n.a. n.a. 16% 14% n.a.
Liabilities (% ofTotal Liabilities) n.a. n.a. n.a. 26% 24% n.a.
Loans (% ofTotal Gross Loans) 10% 11% 11% n.a. n.a. n.a.
Liabilities (% ofTotal Liabilities) 10% 10% 10% n.a. n.a. n.a.
Loans (% ofTotal Gross Loans) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Liabilities (% ofTotal Liabilities) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 31%
Loans (% ofTotal Gross Loans) n.a. n.a. n.a. 20% n.a. n.a.
Liabilities (% ofTotal Liabilities) n.a. n.a. n.a. 22% n.a. n.a.
Loans (% ofTotal Gross Loans) 6% 6% 5% 4,4% n.a. n.a.
Liabilities (% ofTotal Liabilities) 7% 8% 8% 5,8% n.a. n.a.
Country
Austria
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
France
307
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
prices (Hofmann and Remsperger, 2005). On the one hand, tradable goods’
prices convergence is caused by goods markets’ integration that is boosted by
the single currency. On the other hand, the introduction of a single currency
may originate real income convergence leading to a convergence of non-
tradable goods’ prices, as predicted by the Balassa-Samuelson effect. During a
catching up process, productivity growth occurs more in the tradable goods
sector, which is exposed to higher external competition and is more capital-
intensive. Consequently, in that sector wages increase without originating
inflationary pressures. Since there is labour mobility among tradable and non-
tradable goods sectors and competitions in goods market, wages also increase
in the non-tradable goods sector. But in the latter sector productivity growth is
slower, meaning that the increase in wages has to be compensated by an
increase in prices. In sum, catching-up countries, where the productivity
differential between the tradable and non-tradable goods sectors is high, will
have larger non-tradable goods’ inflation.
Figure 158 – Inflation rate (average annual rate of change) in the period
1980-1998
Source: OECD
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Figure 159 – Inflation rate (average annual rate of change) in the period
1999-2011
Source: Eurostat
Table 49 – Inflation rate: periods’ averages
Note: The inflation rate is measured using the Consumer Price Index for the
period 1980-1998 and Harmonized Consumer Index Prices for the period 1999-
2011
Source: OECD (1980-1998) and Eurostat (1999-2011)
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Austria 3.8% 2.6% 1.8% 2.2%
Belgium 4.9% 2.3% 2.0% 2.6%
Finland 7.2% 2.3% 1.6% 2.6%
France 7.4% 2.0% 1.8% 1.8%
Germany 2.9% 2.8% 1.6% 1.7%
Greece 19.5% 12.1% 3.2% 3.3%
Ireland 9.3% 2.4% 3.4% 0.3%
Italy 11.2% 4.4% 2.3% 2.2%
Netherlands 2.9% 2.5% 2.4% 1.7%
Portugal 17.6% 6.4% 2.9% 1.7%
Spain 10.2% 4.4% 3.1% 2.3%
United Kingdom 7.1% 3.5% 1.6% 3.4%
Euro Area n.a . n.a. 2.0% 2.0%
Country Mean 1980-1989 Mean 1990-1998 Mean 1999-2007 Mean 2008-2011
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16.5. Evolution of the Portuguese real interest rates
As described in the previous section Portugal was one of the euro area
countries with higher levels of inflation during the last three decades.
Consequently, the Portuguese real interest rates have been among the lowest
in the EA, constituting an important stimulus to investment. This trend has been
more visible in relation to the short-term real interest rates, in a context where
the evolution of long term real interest rates has been more similar between
different European countries, mainly in the last two decades (Figure 160 and
Figure 161).
Figure 160 – The evolution of short-term real interest rates
Note: Interest rates are deflated using GDP deflator
Source: AMECO
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Figure 161 – The evolution of long-term real interest rates
Note: Interest rates are deflated using GDP deflator
Source: AMECO
During the 1980s the short term Portuguese interest rate was on average
negative due to the high inflation. The effect of these abnormally low interest
rates could not be fully exploited by firms due to the weak supply of credit. In
the 1990s the convergence effort to the Euro implied a tight monetary policy,
imposing short term interest rates larger than the EA, which declined
substantially after 1996. After the introduction of the euro, the existence of a
single monetary policy implied that Portugal, which presented inflation rates
higher than the average, had short and long term real interest rate lower than
the EA average. During the last two years, this trend reverted and the
Portuguese real interest rates increased, especially the long term real interest
rates, due to the negative effects of the sovereign debt crisis.
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Table 50 – The evolution of real interest rates on average
a) Short-term b) Long-term
Note: real interest rates were calculated using the GDP deflator
Source: AMECO
16.6. Evolution of the Portuguese real exchange rate
The Portuguese real exchange rate has increased since 1994, particularly
between 1994 and 1996 and 2000 and 2003, which reflect a deterioration of the
competitiveness of the Portuguese economy (Figure 162). The high levels of
inflation and the non-existence of a nominal exchange rate to compensate
explains that upward trend.
Comparing with other European partners, Portugal was the country of the EA
that lost more competitiveness in the period 1994-1998. During this period the
Portuguese real exchange rate appreciated 11.2% while in the EA there was
average depreciation of the real exchange of 6.9% (Table 51). During the period
of the euro, the Portuguese real exchange rate also appreciated more than the
average of the EA16, but the difference was much smaller. The appreciation of
the currency was 10.7% in Portugal and 7.3% in the EA16, respectively. In
contrast, there was observed a gain of external competiveness in the United
Kingdom, Germany and Austria.
Austria 3,0% 3,9% 1,3%
Belgium 6,0% 4,1% 0,9%
Finland 4,8% 5,3% 1,3%
France 3,5% 5,2% 1,2%
Germany n.a. 3,0% 2,1%
Greece -1,9% 6,1% 0,6%
Ireland 4,2% 5,2% 0,9%
Italy 3,4% 4,8% 0,7%
Netherlands 5,0% 3,8% 0,7%
Portugal -1,0% 4,5% 0,4%
Spain 4,6% 4,8% -0,1%
United Kingdom 4,2% 4,4% 1,8%
Euro Area 12 n.a. 4,0% 1,1%
Country Mean 1980-1989 Mean 1990-1998 Mean 1999-2011
Austria 4,2% 4,8% 2,7%
Belgium 6,1% 5,2% 2,4%
Finland 4,3% 6,5% 2,6%
France 4,3% 5,5% 2,4%
Germany n.a . 4,1% 3,1%
Greece -2,5% 6,2% 2,9%
Ireland 4,2% 5,0% 3,0%
Italy 2,8% 5,5% 2,4%
Netherlands 6,2% 4,7% 1,9%
Portugal 2,7% 3,8% 2,5%
Spain 4,0% 4,9% 1,5%
United Kingdom 3,6% 4,5% 2,2%
Euro Area 12 n.a . 4,8% 2,5%
Mean 1980-1989 Mean 1990-1998 Mean 1999-2011Country
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Figure 162 – The evolution of real exchange rates (1999=100)
Note: This index aim to assess a country's (or currency area's) price or
cost competitiveness relative to its principal competitors in international
markets. Changes in cost and price competitiveness depend not only on
exchange rate movements but also on cost and price trends. It is deflated by
nominal unit labour costs (total economy) against a panel of 36 countries (EU27
plus 9 other industrial countries: Australia, Canada, United States, Japan,
Norway, New Zealand, Mexico, Switzerland, and Turkey). A rise in the index
means a loss of competitiveness
Source: Eurostat
Table 51 – Changes in the real exchange rate
Country 1994-1998 1999-2011
Austria -7.1% -4.1%
Germany -6.9% -11.1%
Spain -0.5% 11.4%
Finland -0.9% 6.1%
France -2.8% 8.1%
Greece 10.3% 6.6%
Ireland -6.0% 16.0%
Italy 0.7% 15.2%
Netherlands -2.0% 10.9%
Portugal 11.2% 10.8%
United Kingdom 20.5% -11.1%
Euro Area 16 -6.9% 7.3%
Note: See Figure 162
Source: Eurostat
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A common argument in the literature is that the loss of competitiveness after
the creation of the euro in Portugal and also in Greece, Spain, Italy and Ireland
was related to the rapid growth in labour costs (Figure 163). Indeed, the unit
labour costs between 1999 and 2009 have grown 12.3% faster in Portugal than
in the EU12. The difference to Germany was even larger (+29%). The data for
Ireland, Greece and Spain indicate even larger differences to the average.
However, from 2009 the ULC have suffered strong declines in the four Southern
countries and Ireland, leading to an approximation with the EA12 average.
Notice that the evolution of labour costs in the tradable goods sector in
Portugal was less expressive than for the average of the economy (data not
presented).
Figure 163 – Evolution of unit labour costs
Source: Ameco
16.7. Concluding remarks
The Portuguese economy had a high CA deficit since 2000, but from 2009 to
2012 there was a strong correction due to international credit rationing. During
the years of high deficit, the financing was done by banks and the Government.
Banks were the major intermediaries between the exterior and the non-
financial sector. Consequently, the net debt position of the Portuguese economy
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is dominated primarily by banks and the Government. The third position is
occupied by non-financial corporations, due to FDI, sell of shares to foreigners,
and the issue of short term debt.
Nevertheless Portuguese banks have low levels of foreign currency
denominated loans and liabilities, meaning that they have a low vulnerability to
exchange rate risk.
The current account deficit was partially explained by the growth of aggregate
demand and the loss of external competitiveness associated with high inflation.
In the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, Portugal was a high inflation
country. Until the Portuguese economy joined the European Monetary System,
the differential in inflation was compensated by devaluations of the currency.
The Portuguese convergence effort to join the Euro meant that in the 1990s,
namely in the second half, there was a significant reduction in inflation, to
values close to the euro area average. But since the creation of the euro,
Portugal has had one of the highest average inflation rates of the EA, which
implied a reduction in competitiveness.
High Inflation rates can be produced by low real interest rates that stimulate
consumption and investment. In the 1980s the short run real interest rates
were negative in Portugal, but firms and households did not increase much
credit because there was a shortage of credit supply. In the first half of the
1990s the convergence effort to the Euro implied a tight monetary policy, with
high real interest rates. But after 1996 the real interest rates declined
substantially, to levels below the EA. After the introduction of the euro and up to
2009, real interest rates were below the euro area average due to a higher
inflation in Portugal.
High inflation not compensated by a weak currency implies a loss of
competitiveness. Portugal was the country of the EA that lost more
competitiveness in the period 1994-1998, mainly due to the effort of
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convergence to the euro. During the period of the euro, the Portuguese real
exchange rate also appreciated more than the average of the EA16, but less
than in the period 1994-98. The loss in external competitiveness of the economy
was related with the rapid growth of ULC. The real appreciation of the currency
and the rapid growth of ULC contribute to explain the high current account
deficit since 2000.
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Part V – The financial crisis in Portugal
17. The nature and impact of the (2007-?) financial crisis in Portugal79
In this section we make an outline of the effects of the financial crisis in
Portugal. In Sections 17.1 to 17.5 the effect of the Subprime crisis is assessed,
the road to the debt crisis is explained and the impact on key variables is
analysed. In Section 17.5 a brief description of the 2011 financial rescue plan is
performed.
17.1. The effect of the Subprime and Sovereign Debt Crisis in Portugal
The 2008 crisis was named subprime crisis because its origin was in the
subprime credit segment in the US. In fact, during the first years of the 2000s
and after the turbulence associated with the Dot.com crisis, the economic
robustness and the accommodative monetary policy, among other things,
favoured the increase of loans to high-risk households in the US, the so-called
NINJA loans (loans to a type of borrower with “no income, no job and no
assets”). These loans were fundamentally short-term and could be
renegotiated more than once depending on the valuation of the property. For
banking institutions the subprime credit segment was quite profitable due to its
high interest rates.
In addition, the US banking institutions transformed these loans into securities
(through securitization operations) and sold them to banks and other financial
institutions all around the world, in a strategy of risk immunization and
79 Point 16 of the Terms of Reference.
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diversification. Later on, this caused the crisis to be global, affecting all
economies in the world although with different intensities.
Between 2005 and 2006 over eighty per cent of new subprime loans were
securitized, a strategy that potentiated the development of this segment. In fact,
the subprime market in the US gathered some momentum during the first
years of the 2000s, in a context where mortgage credit in this segment tripled
between 2005 and 2006. In 2006, this segment accounted for around fourteen
per cent of the total value of the market and twenty-one per cent of all new
mortgages in the US (Bank of Portugal, 2008).
Nevertheless, in the beginning of 2007, the rate of default of this type of loans
started to increase considerably due to the reversal in the upward trend in US
house prices, with negative effects on US banking institutions. Besides, Leão
(2009) points out two other serious consequences of the increase of the default
rate of subprime loans. Firstly, banking institutions began selling the houses
that were used as collateral. As such, the decline of US house prices intensified,
which had negative repercussions in terms of in the fall of private consumption
and investment. Secondly, the value of the CDOs, purchased by most of
international financial institutions, fell expressively, and started to be called
“toxic financial products”.
This generated distrust between banks, because these “toxic financial
products” were spread across the global financial system, without their exact
location being known in terms of country or in terms of financial institution.
In addition, important financial institutions faced insolvency problems, being
rescued by their respective governments (Bear Sterns, Freddie Mac and Fannie
Mae in the US and Northern Rock in the UK are some examples). The failure of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008 generated a climate of panic, leading to
substantial instability in international financial markets, visible in the rise of
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volatility and in the sharp drop in prices of the main cyclical assets such as
shares and commodity prices.
As a result, some segments of interbank money markets have dried, mainly in
longer maturities, which led to a liquidity shortage with direct effects in terms
of the rise of loans’ interest rates (for firms and households).
The financial crisis quickly became an economic crisis. Indeed, according to the
European Commission (2009), the European Union economy entered the
steepest downturn on record since the Great Depression. The transmission of
the financial turbulence to the real economy evolved rapidly with credit
restraint and sagging confidence hitting business investment and household
demand for consumer durable goods (cars and appliances for example) and
housing. The strong trade connections between countries have also facilitated
the rapid cross-country propagation of the economic crisis. The same report
highlights that potential output may also be affected by the crisis, due to the
high risk aversion that leads to weak investment in physical capital and R&D.
17.2. The subprime market in Portugal and the exposure of banks to the
Subprime Crisis
In Europe and particularly in Portugal there was not a subprime market like in
the US, despite a similar evolution of interest rates and the upward trend of
house prices in some European countries (Bank of Portugal, 2008b). Instead, in
Portugal, there occurred a strong increase of credit to households and
corporations during the first years of the 2000s, which increased the level of
private debt to high values. One consequence of the rapid growth of banking
credit was the decrease of the Portuguese banks’ solvability to low levels in
comparison to other European countries (See Figure 103 above).
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Furthermore and according to the Bank of Portugal (2008), there are other
marked differences between the mortgage market in the US and Portugal. First
of all, the percentage of households with mortgage credit is substantially lower
in Portugal (thirty per cent) than in the US (forty-five per cent). That percentage
is also lower than in the Netherlands (thirty-eight per cent) or in the UK (forty
per cent). On the other hand, Portugal has one of the lowest ratios of credit
instalments to income (around fourteen per cent) among the euro area
countries. 80 Finally, Portugal also exhibited a low loan-to-value ratio.
On the other hand, in Portugal house prices had a modest increase when
compared with other countries, like the US, the UK, Ireland or Spain (Bank of
Portugal, 2008). Notice that nominal Portuguese house prices increased much
less than the euro area average between 2000 and 2011 (Figure 164).
Additionally, the real and nominal Portuguese house prices did not increase or
decrease more than 10%/annually between December 1998 and December
2011, a value which normally is taken as a threshold for the creation or burst of
a bubble in the real estate market. Lagoa et al (2004) review other papers and
data indicating that the growth of Portuguese house prices is explained by
fundamental factors, as the increase in households’ income, decrease in
nominal and real interest rates and the small dimension of rental market for
housing purposes. From the second half of the 1990s, the increase in the supply
of new houses avoided a surge in house prices.
80 This ratio indicates what is the financial effort of the household with its debt.
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Figure 164 – Evolution of nominal house prices (2000=100)
Source: ECB
According to the Bank of Portugal (2010), Portuguese house prices have evolved
in line with fundamental factors, contrary to what happened in other countries.
This report quotes a study from the International Monetary Fund stating that in
2007 deviations of house prices in relation to fundamentals were around thirty
per cent in the UK, twenty per cent in Ireland, between ten and twenty per cent
in France, Spain, Italy and Netherlands; and about seven per cent in the US. In
Portugal, the deviation was close to zero per cent.
At the same time, the Portuguese banks did not held in their portfolios “toxic
financial products”, having avoided the losses associated with these products.
The main difficulty faced by Portuguese banks in consequence of the subprime
crisis was the difficulty in obtaining funding in the international financial
markets. Notice that the interbank interest rates (EURIBOR) have surged to
record levels and the risk premium between them and the nominal rate fixed by
the ECB jumped substantially, reflecting the high degree of mistrust between
banks.
Still, this funding difficulty was overcome by the Portuguese government’s
scheme of state guarantees to the issue of securitized debt by Portuguese
banks, as well as by the large liquidity offered by the ECB. Notice that ECB has
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also reduced its key interest rate from 4,25% in October 2008 to 1,00% in May
2009, also putting in place some extraordinary full-allotment refinancing
operations. In the beginning of 2012, the ECB reduced again its key interest rate
to 0,75%, a new record low since the creation of the euro area.
In any case, the interest rate reduction by the ECB was slower than the Federal
Reserve or the Bank of England, which have adopted programs of asset
purchases (“quantitative easing”), in order to mitigate the downside risks of the
crisis in the financial sphere and the real economy. However, this more
conservative stance of the ECB is due to the fact that its mandate requires
primarily the maintenance of price stability. Remember that commodity prices
increased significantly in the first months of 2008, which may explain the more
conservative stance of the ECB.
Additionally, in a context of high risk aversion and the intensification of flight-
to-quality, the increase in the demand for deposits by households helped to
mitigate the funding difficulties of Portuguese banks. Synek (2009) asserts that
after the outbreak of the Subprime crisis, Portuguese households increased
their investments in cash, deposits and public debt in detriment of shares,
investment funds, among others. Notice that Portuguese banks adopted, during
this period, more aggressive strategies for attracting deposits, offering high
interest rates compared with other financial instruments, like certificados de
aforro or títulos do tesouro.
Nonetheless, the profitability of Portuguese banks felt strongly in 2008,
reflecting the drop of commissions, increase of funding costs and losses in
investment portfolios. The international activity of banking groups mitigated
these negative results, namely through the increase of the financial margin.
Yet, the increase of perceived credit risk lead the Portuguese banks to increase
interest rate spreads in credit, which implied a considerable deceleration of
private consumption and gross fixed capital formation. Thus and according to
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the Bank of Portugal (2010), Portuguese households also decreased their
investment in housing due to the higher level of interest rates (See Section 9.2).
This caused a deceleration in the growth of house prices between 2007 and
2009. In other European countries there was even a decline in house prices,
especially in Ireland (thirty-two per cent), Spain (eleven per cent), Greece (ten
per cent) and France (seven per cent).
According to Synek (2009), the indebtedness of Portuguese households began to
diminish after the beginning of 2008, due to the deterioration of consumer
confidence as well as the reduction of employment. So, the saving rate has
reversed the downward trend observed since the beginnings of the 2000s.
17.3. From the Subprime Crisis to the Sovereign Debt Crisis
The fundamentals of the Portuguese crisis
Before entering in the actual description of the details of the debt crisis in
Portugal, we start with a digression on the fundamental reasons behind the
crisis. The roots of the crisis in Portugal are related with current account
imbalances that originated high foreign indebtedness (Higgins and Klitgaard,
2011). Since current account equals internal savings less investment, current
account deficits accrue from a lack of savings to support investment.
During the convergence process of Portugal to the euro, interest rates declined
significantly, and up to 2007 the Portuguese Government bond yields were
almost similar to the German yields. The reduction in interest rates led to an
increase in consumption above disposable income, originating a reduction of
savings. With investment reducing slightly but continuing at high levels,
domestic saving was not enough to finance domestic investment, leading to an
increase in foreign indebtedness.
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An additional problem was that the increase in aggregate demand increased the
cost of labour, reducing external competitiveness and originating the loss of
exports market share. Other structural factors also explain the lack of external
competitiveness, as the appreciation of the euro, the entrance of new
competitors in the international markets and the lack of preparation of Portugal
for the knowledge-based economy. Investment was directed to non-tradable
goods sectors, with a slow growth of productivity and which do not contributed
to the improvement of the current account.
The unfolding of the crisis
Against this backdrop, the Portuguese economy began to decelerate in the first
quarter of 2008 and slipped into an unprecedented recession in the post-war
period in the third quarter of 2008, as the majority of international economies.
Initially, the Portuguese economy was not very affected by the Subprime crisis,
with a decrease of GDP smaller than the euro area in 2009. That happened due
to the strong anti-cyclical response of the Portuguese government during 2009,
following the European guidelines and the Keynesian recipe.
At the European level, the European Economic Recovery Plan was a launched in
December 2008, a discretionary fiscal stimulus of around 2% of GDP, combining
short-term measures to stimulate aggregate demand and maintain jobs, and
longer-term measures to invest in strategic sectors, including research and
innovation (European Commission, 2009). The aim was to promote economic
growth and ensure sustainable prosperity, mitigating the downside risks arising
from the subprime crisis.
Against this background, the deficit of the Portuguese Government grew
expressively during 2009, surpassing the growth in other euro area countries
(Figure 165).
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Figure 165 – Public deficit (% of GDP)
Source: Eurostat
However, this occurred in a country that struggled to maintain the public deficit
below 3% between 2001 and 2008. So, in 2010, Portugal was one of the euro
area countries with worse fiscal deficit. As a consequence, the public debt
increased to levels considerably above the euro area average in 2010 and 2011,
when it was close to that average in 2009 (Figure 166).
Figure 166 – Public debt (% of GDP)
Source: Eurostat
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The high levels of debt in the private and public sectors started to raise doubts
with international investors regarding the capacity of households, corporations
and the State to pay their debts in a scenario of low structural growth.
From 2007, the perception that the risk of Portuguese public debt had
increased, meant that the interest rates charged to the Portuguese government
and, consequently, to banks started to increase to very high levels, making the
financing of the State and banks more costly (Figure 167). Notice that the risk
premium between German and Portuguese long term interest rates increased
to the highest levels since the creation of the euro area. At the same time,
credit default swaps spreads of Portuguese banks, which measure their risk of
default, also increased accordingly. The contagion from the Greek situation was
also an important factor pushing Portuguese long-term interest rates up.
Figure 167 – Long term interest rates (%)
Source: Ameco
Credit default swaps were used to profit with the decline of the prices of banks’
bonds. The characteristics of those financial instruments bring more benefits to
speculators when they speculate on prices decrease than on prices increase.
Some argue that they amplified the crisis by facilitating the speculation against
corporate bonds (especially from banks), increasing directly the cost of debt
funding.
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Another way of speculating, but against banks’ shares, is using short-selling.
Recognizing the danger of such operations, the regulator of the securities
market, Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliário, imposed temporary
restrictions to short-selling using stocks of financial institutions and approved
new rules to increase the transparency of such operations. In some countries,
this type of operations was completely banned.
Given the continuous deterioration of the Portuguese situation, especially on
the bond market, the most important international rating agencies (Moody’s,
Standard & Poor’s and Fitch) adopted a set of downgrades to the Portuguese
sovereign debt during 2010, which was quickly reflected in the reduction of the
credit rating of most Portuguese companies, including the main financial
institutions. In a few months, the Portuguese private and public debt fell into a
junk status, worsening funding conditions in the international financial markets.
17.4. The impact of the crisis on key variables
Against this backdrop, the Portuguese government requested financial
assistance from the European Union, the International Monetary Fund and the
ECB on April 7, 2011. The Troika imposed a demanding program to be
implemented in a short period, as described in the next section, with strongly
recessionary effects. This program aims to ensure fiscal consolidation, financial
stability and the promotion of the potential growth of the economy, through
imposing a set of structural reforms.
While Portugal was not very affected by the Subprime Crisis, it was particularly
affected by the Euro Sovereign Debt Crisis, presenting one of the worst growth
performances among euro area countries in 2010 and 2011 (Figure 168). The
outcome was not worse, because Portugal has maintained a good performance
in terms of exports (Figure 169).
327
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
Figure 168 – GDP growth
Note: The values for 2012 and 2013 are forecasts
Source: Eurostat
Figure 169 – Exports growth
Note: The values for 2012 and 2013 are forecasts
Source: Eurostat
During 2011 and in the first months of 2012, the Portuguese domestic demand
maintained a declining trend. Private consumption has remained suppressed by
the fall in disposable income, as a result of fiscal tightening, reduction of
compensation to employees and cuts in social benefits. Households’
consumption registered the biggest fall among euro area countries.
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
Euro Area 12
Germany
Ireland
Greece
Spain
France
Italy
Portugal
-25%
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
Euro Area 12
Germany
Ireland
Greece
Spain
France
Italy
Portugal
328
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
Gross fixed capital formation followed the same trend, accompanying the
increasing number of corporate defaults. This was the most penalized
expenditure component, recording a fall above 10%, the worst performance of
the euro area with the exception of Greece.
Simultaneously, the Portuguese public consumption fell expressively during
2010 and 2011 due to the fiscal consolidation effort, a trend also visible in other
countries with fragile public finances, like Greece, Spain and Ireland.
The negative evolution of growth implied that the distance between the
unemployment rate in Portugal and in the euro area has increased considerably
during the last three years, a trend that may be exacerbated in the coming
years due to the current adjustment process of the Portuguese economy
imposed by the Troika (Figure 170).
Nowadays, Portugal has one of the highest unemployment rate in Europe, being
only lower than Spanish and Greek unemployment rates, which are above 20%.
The Portuguese unemployment rate has reached historically high values in the
last months, due to the upward trend of structural unemployment and the
increase of long-term unemployment. After the Subprime crisis, Guichard and
Rusticelli (2010) notes that the increase in long-term unemployment for most
European countries has been in line with projections, with a somewhat
stronger-than-expected increase recorded only in France and Portugal.
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Figure 170 – Unemployment rate
Source: Eurostat
According to a preliminary report from Ministério das Finanças, Ministério da
Economia and Ministério da Solidariedade e Segurança Social (2012), the rise of
the Portuguese unemployment rate has affected all social strata, but
particularly women, unemployed young people with university qualifications
who seek their first job and people from construction and manufacturing
sectors. At the same time, this report highlights that the rise of unemployment
has been greater in the non-tradable goods sector than in the tradable goods
sector and, particularly, in the following sectors: scientific and consultancy
activities; electricity, gas and water supply and sanitation; and construction. On
the other hand, sectors of textiles and cars manufacturing are the sectors
where unemployment has increased less.
Apart from the cyclical and structural components, the report indicates that
there are other factors that could explain the increase of the Portuguese
unemployment rate: the current process of deleveraging and the tightening of
credit conditions, expectations that the adjustment process of the Portuguese
economy will take more time than previous recessions, lack of employment
growth in dynamic sectors and the existence of rigidities in the Portuguese
labour market (generous unemployment benefits, high employment protection,
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high level of labour market segmentation, among others). Notwithstanding the
current adjustment process, it seems crucial that there is promotion of a more
dynamic labour market, especially for young workers, namely through the
promotion of investment and the supporting of corporations funding needs.
17.5. Financial rescue of Portugal
This section is about the financial rescue of Portugal. To understand the reason
for this rescue we have to go back to the year 2000, when the Portuguese
economic growth started to decelerate considerably, with a strong fall on the
potential output growth (Figure 171). The unemployment rate has grown
increasing rapidly, reaching the highest levels since the 1974 revolution.
Portugal was traditionally a low unemployment country, but in the end of the
years 2000s the unemployment rate increased to levels above the European
average.
Figure 171 – Growth of potential GDP
Source: Eurostat
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Since 1995, domestic savings have reduced substantially, which has been
accompanied by an increase in the indebtedness of most economic agents, and
a deterioration of Portuguese public finances.
In this context, there was a strong increase in the risk premium of the
Portuguese public debt since the second half of 2010, generating increasing
difficulties for the public and private sectors to obtain financing. This fragile
economic environment led the Portuguese government to request financial
assistance from the European Union, the International Monetary Fund and the
member countries of the euro area on April 7, 2011.
The financial assistance program was created to finance the State in the short
run, favor a sustainable growth of the economy and restore the confidence of
international financial markets on Portugal. The financial help covers the period
between 2011 and 2014 and contemplates a total funding of 78 billion euros. At
the end of the program, the Portuguese State should be able to obtain financing
again in the debt market at sustainable interest rates.
Thus, the program involves the implementation of a set of structural measures
and reforms, in order to increase the potential output growth, create more jobs,
improve competitiveness, ensure a process of deleverage of the financial
system and guarantee a trajectory of fiscal consolidation. The range and detail
of the program contrasts with previous interventions of the IMF in Portugal. In
past interventions, the main goal of IMF was to control public deficit and credit,
and promote exchange rate devaluation, without the concern of suggesting
detailed structural reforms.
The present program implies the reduction of the public deficit, from 9,8% of
GDP in 2010 to 5,9% in 2011, 4,5% in 2012 and 3,0% in 2013. This downward
trend will be guaranteed by the execution of policy measures that aim an
increase of public revenue and a decrease of public spending. On the revenue
side, these measures include a general increase of tax rates, as well as the
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reduction of some tax benefits and exemptions. On the expenditure side,
measures focus on the reduction of compensation to public servants, social
benefits, transfers to regional and local government, among others.
Furthermore, the possibility of renegotiating the Public Private Partnerships
(PPP) will be analysed, in order to diminish the financial obligations of the State.
Effectively and according to Direcção-Geral do Tesouro e Finanças (2011), the
amount contracted under PPP is very significant, particularly in the period
between 2015 and 2018, in which it is estimated that the costs of current PPP
could reach two thousand million euros per year. The costs with the current
PPP account for around 1,0% of GDP in 2011, 0,8% in 2012, 0,8% in 2013, 1,1%
in 2014 and 1,2% and 2015. Most of these contractual investments pertain to
road infrastructures, followed by healthcare infrastructures. In sum, PPP
represent a negative pressure on the effort of fiscal consolidation in the
medium and long-term.
At the same time, there is the goal of reducing the expenditure of the National
Health Service, namely through the adoption of measures regarding
prescriptions and co-financing of medicines, the network of the National Health
Service, and the management of hospitals with management autonomy.
Finally, the program also imposes a privatization plan, including firms in
transports, communications and insurance sectors.
Regarding structural reforms, the main reforms will occur on the labour
market, markets for goods and services, the housing market, the judicial
system and the financial system, as described below (Bank of Portugal, 2010b).
In the Labour Market the program includes a set of measures, aiming to
increase job creation, reduce market segmentation and allow an evolution of
wages compatible with prevailing market conditions at the firm level. The focus
is on the review of employment protection legislation, the revision of
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unemployment protection schemes, the reduction of the cost of overtime labour
and the promotion of collective negotiation at the firm level.
In the markets for goods and services, the program focus essentially on the
energy, transports and telecommunications sectors, trying to promote
competition, a reduction of State’s involvement and an independence of
regulators. In the energy sector, measures focus on the full liberalization and
integration of the Iberian market in the electricity and gas sectors, as well as in
the revision of support schemes for renewable energy and co-generation. In the
transports sector, the program aims at greater rationalization of transport
network. Finally and regarding the telecommunications sector, the reform’s
proposals are based on the reduction of entry barriers and the mobility of
customers between different operators.
In the housing Market the main structural changes aim to guarantee greater
efficiency in the rental market, in order to improve labour market mobility and
reduce the level of private sector indebtedness.
In the judicial system the proposed measures aim to improve the efficiency of
courts’ management, reducing the time to judge cases and decreasing the
number of cases awaiting trial. Moreover, these reforms also include the
creation of two new courts, which will act on issues related to competition and
intellectual rights and property.
Regarding the financial system, this program aims to ensure its stability,
provide the necessary conditions for the functioning of financial intermediation,
in a context of pronounced slowdown of the economy. In general terms, the
main priorities of the program are oriented to the process of deleveraging of
the banking system and increase of its solvency. Some important measures
have been taken, such as the strengthening of banks’ collaterals for borrowing
money at the ECB, state guarantees for debt issues, periodic target leverage
ratios, and a recapitalization plan (for greater detail see Section 2.4).
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According with its governor (Costa, 2012), the Banco of Portugal played a
central role in the current adjustment process, namely: (i) providing liquidity to
the financial system; (ii) ensuring the recapitalization of banks, in order to meet
their new risk profiles; (iii) encouraging the restructuration of banks to restore
their levels of profitability in accordance with the current business
environment; and (iv) preserving public confidence in the financial system.
17.6. Concluding remarks
In Portugal there was nothing similar to the phenomenon of subprime loans.
Besides, in general credit practices do not seem to have been too aggressive
and there was not a bubble in the real estate market. However, credit to the
non-financial private sector grew at a rapid pace, leading banks’ solvability to
low levels (because credit growth was not accompanied by a proportional
growth of capital). The lack of domestic saving to finance investment obliged the
economy to obtain financing abroad, becoming exposed to an external credit
rationing in case of a crisis.
Portuguese banks also did not have on their balance sheets the so called “toxic
financial products”. The main difficulty of banks was to find financing in the
international markets after they have dried up in September 2008. Banks were
forced to increase interest rate spreads, with negative consequences for the
economy.
In order to avoid a major slowdown after the Subprime crisis, the government
followed an expansionary fiscal policy, which weakened the country’s fiscal
position. The high levels of debt in the private and public sectors started to raise
doubts with the international investors regarding the capacity of households,
corporations and the State to pay their debts in a scenario of low structural
growth. Interest rates on Government long term bonds increased noticeably, to
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a point where financing in the markets was not anymore possible, leading the
country to ask for international financial help.
The plan of financial assistance of Troika had two major goals: finance the State
in the short run and restore the confidence of the markets in the Portuguese
economy. The plan looks to achieve the last goal through the reduction of the
fiscal deficit to 3% of GDP in 2013 and through a set of structural reforms
aiming to increase the potential output growth, create more jobs, improve
competitiveness, ensure a process of deleverage of the financial system and
guarantee a trajectory of fiscal consolidation. The proposed reforms are
essentially on the following areas: PPP, National Health Service, privatizations,
labour market, goods and services market, housing market, judicial system and
the financial system.
While the Portuguese economy was not very affected by the Subprime crisis, it
was particularly affected by the sovereign debt crisis. In 2010 and 2011, the
Portuguese growth performance was one of the worst of the EA. Unemployment
rate grew to unexpected high levels that may undermine social stability, in a
country where the social state is weak. Thigh credit conditions have contributed
to the growth of unemployment, as well as the austerity imposed by the
Government on the economy.
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Conclusion
Since 1980, the Portuguese financial system has changed dramatically, both
following and conditioning the evolution of the overall economy. In the second
half of the 1970s and in the 1980s high inflation, monetary financing of the fiscal
deficit and strong regulation of the banking system were the main
characteristics of the macroeconomic environment. Governments after the
1974 Revolution adopted a strong interventionist approach to economic policy,
thereby postponing the liberalization of the banking system. In the second half
of the 1970s and in large part of the 1980s the Portuguese banking system was
mainly dominated by public banks and it was subject to a strong regulation, with
weak competition and innovation.
In the second half the 1980s and in the 1990s the liberalization of banking
activities took place and monetary policy converged to European standards,
with Portugal joining the EMS.
Liberalization of the banking sector
The liberalization of the banking sector started in 1984, when private banks
were allowed to operate, followed by the elimination of restrictions to banking
activity, privatizations of banks, the free entrance of EU banks, and the adoption
of capital requirements. Since 1987, domestic banks reduced dramatically the
financing of the Government, foreign banks entered the market, competition
increased, there was a wave of takeovers, and the supply of credit increased.
Since 1999 the deregulation of the banking market, the privatisation of banks,
and M&A increased considerably the concentration in the banking sector. This
increase was one of the largest of the euro area and in 2010, the degree of
concentration was above the EA, but it was not very different from other small
European countries.
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Despite the increase in concentration, competition has increased especially
after 2000, causing a reduction of lending interest rates and an increase in
credit supply to firms.
The financial integration and the increase in competition led to a modernization
of the payment systems and channels of contact with customers. In other areas
the progress was slower, as in the use of direct debits and credit transfers.
The growth of credit
In the first half of the 1990s the convergence effort to the Euro implied a tight
monetary policy, with high real interest rates. Portugal was the country of the
EA in which price-competitiveness has deteriorated the most in the period
1994-1998, as a result of the mixture of exchange rate stability and strong
credit growth, both factors resulting from the decision to participate in the euro
since its inception. This had strong negative impacts in the development of the
tradable goods sectors.
Notwithstanding, after 1996 the economy grew at a rapid pace, largely as a
result of the sharp decline in the real interest rates. The strong reduction in the
level and volatility of inflation and interest rates, as well as an easier access to
external financing by banks caused an increase in credit to the non-private
financial sector. The increase of domestic demand hid the problems in the
export sector.
Households saving rate decreased considerably since the beginnings of the
1980s. As a result the growth of deposits did not accompany the growth of
credit, leading banks to search for other sources of financing. In a more
competitive environment, borrowing from abroad and using credit
securitization, banks were able to finance the strong cycle of credit growth,
initiated in 1995 and ended in 2001/02, and induced by both demand and supply
conditions. The use of credit securitization is an example of how a bank-based
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system has used market mechanisms to strength its position. Apparently, credit
securitization did not create incentives for banks to take excessive risks in
credit granting.
The demand also increased considerably, not only due to the decrease in
interest rates and increase in actual and expected GDP growth, but also due to
specific characteristics of the Portuguese economy. On the households’ side,
the malfunctioning of the rental market, in a context marked by declining
interest rates and increasing real incomes, fostered the acquisition of houses
by households. The public policy of subsidized loans created an additional
incentive for households to buy houses. On the corporations’ side, there was a
large effort to modernize production technology.
Credit to households grew much faster than credit to firms, especially in 1994-
2002. The segment of credit to households that grew the most was credit for
housing, with 80% of the credit to households in 2011 being for this purpose.
The credit for firms with medium/long term maturities increased considerably,
allowing firms to do more long term investments.
The rapid growth in credit implied that in 2011 both Portuguese households and
firms were among the most indebted of the EA, making them vulnerable to an
economic slowdown and increasing macroeconomic risk. Probably, credit to the
non-financial private sector grew in excess. Since 2008 non-performing loans
have increased considerably, especially for some sectors of activity and
households’ credit segments. Besides translating the deterioration of the
business cycle, this constitutes an indication of the difficulties brought by the
growth of indebtedness.
The growth of credit and aggregate demand, together with the loss of external
competitiveness associated with high inflation implied a high current account
deficit since 2000. Other factors weakening the exporting capacity were the
liberalization of international trade that allowed Asian countries and other
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emerging economies to access the European market, and the de-location of FDI
to EU’s new Eastern member states. The external financing of the current
account deficit was done by banks and the Government. Particularly, banks
were the major intermediaries between the rest of the world and the domestic
non-financial sector.
Growth of the financial sector
Since the growth of credit generated the growth of the financial sector, in 2011
the importance of that sector in terms of production in Portugal was one of the
highest in the EA, and between 1995 and 2011 the growth was one of the fastest.
The Gross Operational Surplus (GOS) of financial institutions has grown faster
than the GOS of non-financial corporations.
From 1995 to 2010, the financial sector has financed a high level of overall
investment in Portugal. Nevertheless, since 2001 there was a decline on the
level and efficiency of investment.
In Portugal, financial assets in proportion of GDP are high and they have grown
fast between 1995 and 2010, indicating an accumulation of financial rents
during the period. The domestic institutional sector with the fastest growth of
financial assets was financial corporations, translating probably a transfer of
wealth to the financial sector.
Also non-financial firms became more involved in financial operations, as
indicated by the fact that such operations are increasingly more important in
terms of revenues.
One financial area where Portugal is under developed is the stock market, and
the tendency since 1993 has been for a negative divergence with the EA in terms
of stock market capitalization. In contrast, Portuguese firms are among the
ones of the EA that most issue debt securities, which have grown fast since
1993.
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In the same vein, the role pension funds has been receding, with many private
pension funds being transferred to the public domain. This movement had a
short run positive effect on the fiscal deficit, but in the long run may have
negative effects. The importance of investment funds decreased substantially,
but the importance of real estate investment funds increased.
Taking advantage of the public NHS’s weaknesses and the financial constraints
on public investment, private interests have been growing in the Health sector,
with the opening of new private hospitals and clinics, an increase in health
insurances and the creation of PPP. These partnerships for the construction
and management of hospitals benefit banking groups, because they finance the
operation and sometimes manage the hospital. For the State, it is still to be
proved if it is a good business in the medium and long term.
PPP have even been even more often used in the construction of motorways,
bridges and other transport structures. Besides the supposedly superior
efficiency of private operators in the construction and management of such
structures, once more the main driver has been the possibility of quickly
construct structures without affecting the current budget deficit. But an overall
balance on the benefit for the State of such operations is still to be done.
Households have invested increasingly in retirement savings plans due to the
fear of the end of public pensions system, feeding the growth of insurance
companies.
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Banks’ behaviour
On the banking sector, there was the construction of banking groups through
M&A and internal growth, which brought many advantages to banks. Probably
on the context of those groups, banks have been devoting a large proportion of
their credit capacity to finance non-monetary financial institutions.
Even though universal banking is the rule in Portugal, banks’ decreased the
amount of resources devoted to securities and financial operations, and their
level of engagement in these operations is low. Portuguese banks also trade
much less than euro area banks in derivatives, but they have a much higher
level of off-balance sheet items.
The several transformations in the Portuguese banking system, namely the
increase in competition, lead to a reduction in the financial margin, which
however remained above the EA average. In compensation, banks have
increased income from services and commissions.
On the cost side, banks have made a rationalisation effort that was interrupted
by the financial crisis. Comparatively to Europe, Portuguese banks are relatively
efficient.
Combining an analysis of revenues and costs, from 1996 to 2006 the tendency
was for an increase in the ROE and ROA of the banking system. Naturally, the
financial crisis turned the upward trend in a steep decline. Before the decline,
the ROA of Portuguese banks was among the largest of the EA, but comparing
with large firms in Portugal banks do not seem to have excess profitability.
The globalization process and the European single market on services allowed
Portuguese banks to internationalize their activities. Profits from international
operations have been growing in importance and have become significant to
mitigate the decrease in profits from domestic activity due to the recession in
Portugal.
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From 1997 to 2010, the capital adequacy ratios of Portuguese banks have
decreased. Initially, the decline was explained by the rapid growth of credit, and
later on the period by losses originated by the crisis and difficulties in raising
capital. Consequently, in 2008 and 2010, Portuguese banks had one of the
lowest levels of regulatory capital of the euro area. Other area of fragility is the
high credit-to-deposit ratio, making banks very dependent on market financing.
Financing the real economy
Even though in Portugal, there was no boom-bust cycle in real estate’s prices.
Despite this, the weight of real estate loans in total loans increased
substantially since 1980, especially the credit for households to buy houses; and
in 2011 total real estate loans represented around 60% of the loans portfolio.
This weight seems to be larger than in some countries of the EA, making
Portuguese banks particularly vulnerable to house prices fluctuations. The risk
is mitigated because credit practices in housing loans do not seem to have been
very aggressive. Moreover, the non-performing loans on households’ real
estate are not a problem. But non-performing loans of construction firms
increased much more than the average of all industries.
Construction and real estate industries have lost importance both in terms of
value added and investment at a faster rate than in the EA. In 2011, those
industries were less important in Portugal than in the EA. But in terms of
employment they were still a very important sector.
Turning now to the financing of firms of all sectors, in recent years Portuguese
firms increased the use of debt as source of financing, and in 2011 they were
among the most indebted of the EA. NFC used increasingly long term bank
loans, which constitute a more stable way of financing long term investment. To
finance short-term responsibilities firms use abundantly short term debt
securities. These securities are mostly owned by banks, which make use of this
market instrument to increase their profits.
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Since 2003 to mid-2011, active interest rates were higher in Portugal than in the
EA, with the exception of credit to households to buy houses. Portuguese banks
charge larger interest rates to SME than to larger firms, with this difference
been quite significant (larger than in the EA). Finally, there are indications that
SME are less favoured by credit than large firms in periods of credit tightening.
Since 2007 difficulties in obtaining credit increased faster than the overall
limitations to investment. In 2011, credit was the third most important limiting
factor, with 30% of the firms saying to have credit limitations. Between 1998 and
2011, the sectors facing the largest difficulties in obtaining credit were
manufacturing and construction (since 2004 only).
Using a European survey on SME, we conclude that in 2009 before the start of
the Euro Debt crisis, the access of SME to finance was not worse in Portugal
than the EA average. But from 2010 the crisis implied a larger deterioration of
the access to credit by SME in Portugal than in the EA.
The perspective of banks regarding their own credit policy was more negative
than the one of firms. From July 2007, credit conditions in Portugal became
tighter, with the worsening been larger in Portugal than in the EA.
We observe that between 1993 and 2007 credit to construction, real estate and
other non-tradable activities has grown much faster than credit to
manufacturing. The alternative to bank credit, the issue of securities, was
completely dominated by the financial sector, which inclusive has increased its
importance since 1993.
The slow growth of credit to manufacturing may result from or cause the slow
growth of that sector’s output. Since 1995, manufacturing has lost importance
in terms of value added, with the fall being larger in Portugal than in the EA. In
2011, manufacturing was less important in Portugal than in the EA.
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The Bust
The growth of credit created the boom and the conditions for the bust. The high
growth of aggregate demand, fed by credit and helped by a pro-cyclical
expansionary fiscal policy in some years, originated that since the creation of
the euro Portugal has had one of the highest average inflation rates of the EA,
which implied a reduction in competitiveness. After the inception of the euro,
the Portuguese real exchange rate also appreciated more than the average of
the EA16.
Around 2002, high inflation, the inevitable slowdown of credit growth (given the
increasing levels of indebtedness), the liberalization of worldwide trade, and the
vulnerability of the Portuguese export structure to the appreciation of the euro
against the US dollar, among other factors, translated into a long period of slow
economic growth, resulting in increasing pressure on public finance. During the
2000s the Portuguese economy had one of the worst economic growth
performances of the EA, with a high current account deficit financed abroad by
banks and the Government.
Up to 2008 the State had helped the growing of finance and market
mechanisms, namely through the privatization of banks and other firms, the
liberalization of the banking market, fiscal incentives to households for buying
houses and shares on the privatizations, integration of pension funds on public
social security, and creation of PPP. Some of these decisions did not emerged
spontaneously from political parties’ programs, but aimed at solving public
finance problems. In 2008, the State and the CB took measures to ensure the
stability of the financial system, guaranteeing banks’ debt, recapitalizing banks,
re-enforcing the regulatory framework, and nationalizing of a small bank.
After 1990, the Government also worked for the improvement of the Welfare
State. Even though that meant an increase in public expenditure, it was
important for the reduction in income inequality and poverty. In spite of these
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efforts, in 2010 Portugal was one of the most unequal countries of the EU15 and
presented one of the highest poverty rates.
Therefore, when the Subprime crisis occurred, the Portuguese economy was
already in a dismal condition. During this crisis, banks had difficulties in
obtaining financing in the international markets. After the Sovereign debt crisis
begun in late 2009, this and other factors – namely, liquidity problems of banks,
increase in uncertainty, rise of regulatory capital requirements, and the
increase in non-performing loans – help to explain the sharp worsening of the
conditions faced by firms non-financial in obtaining credit.
As a result of the Subprime crises and its subsequent developments, the fiscal
position of the Portuguese government deteriorated fast, both as a result of the
‘ automatic stabilizers’ and, to a lesser extent, to the expansionary fiscal policy
followed by the government (according to the guidelines agreed at the EU level).
International investors (the main buyers of Portuguese public debt) started to
raise doubts regarding the capacity of households, corporations and the
government to pay their debts. Interest rates on government’s long term bonds
increased noticeably, forcing the country to resort to international financial
help. Since 2009 the current account deficit has decreased sharply, as a result
of both the international credit rationing, and the substantial drop in internal
consumption and investment (both public and private).
In sum, several indicators suggest that the Portuguese economy has gone
through a process of financialisation since the early 1990s, namely the large
growth of private debt, the growth of the financial sector, the deregulation of
financial markets, and the diffusion of market mechanisms to new areas. This
process has contributed to create the conditions for the emergence of the
Sovereign Debt crisis in Portugal from 2010 onwards.
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Annexes
Annex I
Table A.1 – (Re)privatizations in the Portuguese banking
Bank Date
Banco Totta & Açores
1st Phase
2nd Phase
3rd Phase
22-03-1989 and
10-07-1989
31-07-1990
19-11-1996
Banco Português do Atlântico
1st Phase
2nd Phase
3rd Phase
4th Phase
11-12-1990
25-05-1992
07-07-1993
24-03-1995
Sociedade Financeira Portuguesa 06-05-1991
Banco Espírito Santo & Comercial de
Lisboa
1st Phase
2nd Phase
09-07-1991
25-02-1992
Banco Fonsecas & Burnay
1st Phase
2nd Phase
27-08-1991
20-07-1992
Banco Internacional do Funchal 23-11-1992
Crédito Predial Português 02-12-1992
União de Bancos Portugueses
1st Phase
2nd Phase
03-02-1993
11-07-1995
Banco de Fomento e Exterior
1st Phase
2nd Phase
3rd Phase
27-12-1994
28-08-1996
07-02-1997
Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor
1st Phase
2nd Phase
16-11-1994
28-03-1995
Banco Comercial dos Açores
1st Phase
2nd Phase
02-07-1996
09-12-1996
Note: Sociedade Financeira Portuguesa – Banco de Investimento, S.A. changed
its name to Banco Mello, S.A. and to Banco Mello Investimentos, S.A. on 26
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June 1996. União de Bancos Portugueses changed its name to Banco Mello
Comercial, S.A. on 28 June 1996. Source: Mendes e Rebelo (2000)
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Annex II
Table A.2 – The velocity of adjustment of interest rates (adjustment
coefficient of the Error Correction Model)
Note: Euro area is the unweighted average of 10 countries. Source:
Sørensen and Werner (2006)
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Austria -0.192 0.001 -0.330 0.000 -0.027 0.640 -0.355 0.000
Belgium -0.103 0.011 -0.058 0.144 -0.166 0.157 -0.153 0.160
Germany -0.231 0.000 -0.180 0.003 -0.047 0.095 -0.246 0.000
Spain -0.069 0.000 -0.526 0.000 -0.925 0.000 -0.396 0.000
Finland -0.098 0.011 -0.211 0.000 n.a . n.a . -0.052 0.162
France -0.076 0.001 -0.133 0.001 -0.780 0.000 -0.233 0.000
Ireland -0.097 0.053 n.a . n.a . -0.315 0.002 n.a. n.a .
Italy -0.129 0.010 n.a . n.a . -0.330 0.000 -0.087 0.192
Netherlands -0.190 0.000 n.a . n.a . -0.849 0.000 -0.154 0.076
Portugal -0.124 0.023 -0.397 0.001 -0.287 0.000 -0.213 0.008
Euro Area 10
(average) -0.131 - -0.262 - -0.414 - -0.210 -
Country
Mortgage Loans Consumer Loans Short Tems Loans to Firms Time Deposits
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Table A 3 – Joiners and leavers of the Portuguese banking market
1998 227 n.a. n.a.
5 8
Credi fin CCAM Olhão
Bank Brussels Lambert Universo Banco Directo
BIG CCAMMesão Frio
Banco Rura l Europa CCAM Peniche
Rheinische Hypothekenbank AG CCAM Baião
CCAM Cinfães
CCAM Sernancelhe
CCAM Vila Nova de Paiva
8 14
Caja de Ahorros Y Monte de Piedad de Madrid CCAM Amarante
Ci tibank Internationa l PLC CCAM Valpaços
Banco Popular Español Ca ixa Económica da Guarda
Renaul t Crédi t Internationa l Ci tibank Portuga l
BMW Bank GMBH Argentaria Caja Posta l Y Banco Hipotecario
Caja de Ahorros de Gal icia ygma Banque
Banco Mais Banco Mel lo
Banque Privée Edmond de Rothschi ld Luxembourg Banco Português do Atlântico
CCAM Sabrosa
CCAM Vi la Real de Santo António
The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi
CCAM Barlavento Algarvio
CCAM Alcochete
Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor
5 11
Banco Português de Gestão Banco Mel lo Imobil iári
Dresdner Bank Luxembourg Banco Sabadel l
BANIF - Banco de Investimento CCAM Arronches
BEST - Banco Electrónico de Serviço Total CCAM Benavente
Eurohypo A. E. H. der Deutschen Bank CCAMMonforte
CCAM Samora Correia
CCAM Vi la Franca das Naves
CCAM Carrega l do Sal
CCAM Pinhel
Credi t Lyonnais Portuga l
Banco Nacional Ul tramarino
3 13
Banco Posta l CCAM Alcáçovas e Viana do Alentejo
Banco Espíri to Santo dos Açores CCAM Ílhavo
Eurohypo Aktiengesel l schaft CCAM Penalva do Castelo
CCAM Alte
CCAM Vi la do Bispo
CCAM Santa Marta de Penaguião
CCAM Amarante
CCAMMira
CCAM Sever do Vouga
Caixa Económica da Misericórdia de Ponta Delgada
Eurohypo A. E. H. der Deutschen Bank
RHEINHYP - Rheinische Hypothekenbank AG, Selectiba i l
Selectiba i l
4 6
Banco Cetelem CCAM Aguiar da Beira
Banque Centrale de Compensation - Clearnet CCAM Cabecei ras de Basto
BNP Paribas Private Bank CCAM Celorico da Bei ra
Genera l Electri c Capi ta l Bank CCAM Aljezur
Banco de Negocios Argentaria
Banco Cetelem
4 7
Santander Consumer Finance CCAM Porta legre
Banque Accord SA Portugal Banco Expresso Atlântico
ypo Real Estate Bank Internationa l Banco Postal
Monte de Piedad Y Caja Genera l de Ahorros de Badajoz Banco Santander Portugal
Central - Banco de Investimento
Crédibanco - Banco de Crédi to Pessoa l
Crédi to Predia l Português
Joiners LeaversDate
Credit
Institutions
2002 202
2001 212
1999 224
2000 218
2004 197
2003 200
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0 11
Banque Centra le de Compensation Clearnet
CCAM Lagoa
CCAMMortágua
Banco Sabadel l
CCAM Castro Dai re
CCAM Vi la Viçosa
CCAMMurtosa
CCAM Santa Maria da Fei ra
CCAM Ribatejo Centro
CCAM Avis
CCAM Vi la Nova Anços
1 9
Banco Primus Banco Internaciona l de Crédi to
CCAM Figuei ró dos Vinhos
Hypo Real Estate Bank Internationa l
CCAM Fafe
CCAM Figuei ra da Foz
CCAM Castelo Branco
CCAM S. Pedro do Sul
Bankboston Latino Americano
CCAMMontemor-o-Novo
6 9
Anglo Irish Bank Banco Popular Español
The Roya l Bank of Scotland Publ ic Limited Company CCAMMonta legre
CCAM Torres de Viriato Banque Accord SA Portuga l
Dexia Sabadel l Banco Loca l CCAM Nelas e Carrega l do Sa l
Banco Credibom CCAM Viseu-Tondela
CCAM Entre Tejo e Sado CCAM Sintra e Li tora l
CCAM Baixo Vouga
Genera l Electri c Capita l Bank
CCAM Entre Tejo e Sado
8 8
Banque Privée Espíri to Santo CCAM Favaios
BNP Paribas Securi ties Services CCAM Costa Verde
UBS Bank CCAM Ponte de Sôr
CCAM Nordeste Alentejano CCAM Porta legre e Al ter do Chã
Banco BIC Português Anglo Irish Bank
Caja de Ahorros de Valencia CCAM Guarda e Celorico da Bei ra
Hyposwiss Private Bank Genève CCAM Fornos de Algodres
Banco L.J. Carregosa CCAM Vi la Nova de Tazém
2 11
CCAM Alentejo Centra l Banco BANIF e Comercia l dos Açores
Banco Privado Atlântico CCAM Armamar e Moimenta da Bei ra
CCAM Alto Douro
CCAM Barcelos
CCAM Évora
CCAM Alto Guadiana
CCAM Guimarães
UBS Bank
Banco Mi l lennium BCP Investimento
CCAM Vale do Douro
CCAM Vi la Nova de Paiva
1 7
CCAM Alto Cávado e Basto Credi fin
Banco Privado Português
CCAM Tarouca
BSN - Banco Santander de Negócios Portuga l
CCAM Amares
CCAM Santo Ti rso
CCAMMinho
0 5
The Royal Bank of Scotland
Sanpaolo Imi Bank
Caixa de Aforros de Vigo
The Royal Bank of Scotland Publ ic Limited Company
Caja de Ahorros de Valencia
2011 155
2010 160
2009 166
2008 175
2007 175
2006 178
2005 186
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Note: “There are four events that could result in a financial institution joining
the MFI sector: the establishment of an MFI as a result of a merger, the
establishment of new legal entities as a result of the division of an existing MFI,
the establishment of a new MFI and a change in a status of a previous non-MFI
such that it becomes an MFI. There are five events that could result in a
financial institution leaving the MFI sector: the involvement of an MFI in an
merger, the purchase of an MFI by another MFI, the division of an MFI into
separate legal entities, a change in the status of MFI such that it becomes a
non-MFI and the liquidation of an MFI.”
Source: ECB (Total number of MFIs, several years)
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Table A 4 – The main factors limiting investment (% of the total).
Source: INE (Inquérito Qualitativo de Conjuntura ao Investimento)
Insufficient
Production
Capacity
Deterioration
of the
Outlook for
Sale
Difficulty of
Hiring
Qualified
Employees
Level of
Interest Rates
Return on
Equity
Capacity of
Auto-Funding
Difficulty in
Obtaining
Credit
Capital
Markets
1998 6 23 10 6 15 20 5 0
2003 25 48 0 0 7 4 0 0
2011 2 94 0 0 0 0 2 0
1998 5 35 5 6 15 14 8 0
2003 4 56 1 2 13 8 8 0
2011 4 53 2 4 16 5 15 0
1998 0 17 0 3 0 0 0 0
2003 0 4 0 4 2 30 6 0
2011 0 3 0 3 14 17 31 0
1998 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2003 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2011 13 18 0 7 8 20 13 0
1998 7 30 7 6 21 18 3 0
2003 5 51 5 1 15 8 6 2
2011 2 65 0 0 7 5 14 0
1998 1 41 7 4 14 15 1 0
2003 6 55 1 6 15 9 3 0
2011 1 62 0 2 18 4 8 0
1998 8 33 6 0 23 13 4 0
2003 0 50 0 1 8 6 30 0
2011 1 45 0 0 29 5 15 0
1998 5 46 8 5 7 22 1 0
2003 0 34 0 0 65 1 0 0
2011 5 77 0 0 11 0 7 0
1998 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2003 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2011 1 49 0 1 17 12 10 0
1998 0 13 0 3 19 10 0 2
2003 1 45 0 13 11 21 0 0
2011 0 28 0 3 2 1 28 0
1998 1 36 6 5 15 16 4 0
2003 9 28 11 1 20 22 2 1
2011 0 38 0 0 12 37 12 0
1998 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2003 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2011 5 53 0 1 11 11 9 5
1998 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2003 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2011 9 54 0 2 13 4 14 1
1998 4 36 6 5 15 16 4 0
2003 5 52 2 3 17 9 6 0
2011 3 59 1 2 15 5 12 0
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Figure A 5 – Change in the availability of bank overdrafts as perceived by
SMES (net percentages)
Source: European Central Bank (Survey on the Access to Finance of SMEs in the
Euro Area)
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
Austria Belgium Germany Spain Finland France Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Euro Area
H1 2010
H2 2010
H1 2011
H2 2011
366
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
Annex III – Description of the main financial groups
CGD Group
Caixa Geral de Depósitos was founded in 1876 and was always owned
exclusively by State capital. Since 1993, it is a public limited company owned
exclusively by the State. It has the same rights and obligations of any
commercial banks, acting in free and just competition with them. CGD Group is
the largest financial group on the Portuguese economy and develops activities
in several business areas, through some business companies owned directly or
indirectly by the Group itself.
In aggregate terms, CGD Group has developed some business areas both at the
national and international level, like commercial banking, investment banking
and venture capital, asset management, specialized credit, insurance and
health care, among others.
In Portugal, Group CGD has activity in many areas, namely:
- Commercial Banking, through Caixa Geral de Depósitos (100%);
- Asset management, through Caixa Gestão de Activos (100%), CGD
Pensões (100%), among others;
- Specialised Credit, through Caixa Leasing and Factoring (51%), like
other companies;
- Investment banking and venture capital, through Caixa Banco de
Investimento (100%), among others;
- Insurance, owning some insurance companies, like Companhia de
Seguros Fidelidade Mundial (100%), Império Bonança Companhia de
Seguros (100%), Via Directa Companhia de Seguros (100%), like others;
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- Health care, through shareholding in some hospitals.
Moreover, CGD Group participates in the capital of other non-financial
corporations, like Zon Multimédia (10,9%), Tagus Park (10%), Cimpor (9,6%),
Águas de Portugal (9,7%), Portugal Telecom (6,2%), Galp Energia (1,7%), REN
(1,2%), EDP (0,2%), among others.
Internationally, CGD Group is present in some countries (Spain, Mozambique,
Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, among others), acting in the same business areas
as at the domestic level, through participation in some companies, namely:
- Commercial Banking, by Spanish Banco Caixa Geral (99,8%), Brazilian
Banco Caixa Geral (100%), Macaense BNU (100%), like other banks;
- Specialised Credit, through Mozambican BCI – ALD (46,1%) and Cape
Verdean Promoleasing (60,2%);
- Investment banking and venture capital, through Mozambican Banco
Nacional Investimento (50%), among others;
- Insurance, participating in some insurance companies, like Cape
Verdean Garantia (65,4%) and Angolan Universal Seguros (70,0%).
The largest subsidiaries of CGD Group are Caixa Seguros e Saúde (capital
owned: 1,229 Millions (M) € - 100%), Parcaixa (510 M€ - 100%), Banco Caixa
Geral (Brasil) (395.8 M€- 99.79%), Banco para a Promoção e Desenvolvimento
(182.2 M€ - 49.99%), among others.
BCP Group
Banco Comercial Português was founded in May 1986. In 1989, Banco
Comercial Português created Nova Rede, a retail network oriented for the mass
market customers.
368
This project is funded by the European Union under
the 7th Research Framework programme (theme SSH)
Grant Agreement nr 266800
Since then, Banco Comercial Português has been growing through acquisition
of other financial institutions. In this way, Banco Comercial Português acquired
Banco Português do Atlântico (in 1995), Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor (in 2000) and
Banco Mello (in 2000).
The brand Millennium BCP was created in October 2003, incorporation prior
acquisitions and unifying the several retail networks of the group. Actually, BCP
Group is the largest Portuguese private financial group.
After that and as Portuguese banking market reached some maturity, Banco
Comercial Português extended its know-how for other countries with high
growth potential and/or with the presence of the Portuguese community. In this
way, BCP Group is now established in Poland, Greece, Romania, Switzerland,
France, Luxembourg, Mozambique, Angola, China, among other countries.
BCP Group acts in several business areas, not only related with commercial
banking, but also with other complementary activities, as asset management,
investment banking and venture capital, insurance, among others. At the
national level, Group BCP has activity in many areas, namely:
- Commercial Banking, through Millennium bcp retail network (100%)
and Activo Bank (100%);
- Asset management, through Millennium bcp Gestão de Activos (100%),
Interfundos (100%) and Pensõesgere (49%);
- Investment banking and venture capital, through Millennium bcp
Investment Banking (100%) and BCP Capital – Sociedade de Capital de
Risco (100%);
- Insurance, owning participations in some insurance companies, like
Ocidental – Companhia Portuguesa de Seguros (49%) and Médis –
Companhia Portuguesa de Seguros de Saúde (49%);
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At the international level, BCP Group operates in some countries,
offering products and services from different financial areas, namely:
- Commercial Banking, by Banco Internacional Moçambicano (BIM)
(66,7%), Banco Millennium Angola (52,7%), Bank Millennium in Poland
(65,5%), Banque Privée BCP in Switzerland (100%), among others;
- Specialised Credit, through Millennium Leasing (100%) and BG Leasing,
both in Poland (100%);
- Asset management, through Millennium TFI (100%) in Poland,
Millennium Mutual Funds Management (100%) in Greece, among others;
The largest subsidiaries of BCP Group are Millennium Bank in Greece (199.6
M€ - 100%), Millennium BIM (130.3 M - 66,7%), Banca Millennium in Romania
(56 M€ - 100%), Banco ActivoBank (41 M€ - 100%), among others.
In the end of the first semester of 2012, the main shareholders of BCP Group
were individuals (42,26%), institutional investors (34,05%), corporations
(22,99%) and employees (0,70%). The respective capital is quite dispersed,
although the main shareholders were: Grupo Sonangol (11,03%), Grupo Teixeira
Duarte (5,36%), Grupo Sabadell (3,97%), Grupo Berardo (3,07%), Grupo EDP
(2,99%) and Grupo Caixa Geral de Depósitos (2,96%).
BES Group
The origin of BES Group is clearly associated with the creation of Caza de
Câmbio, in 1869, which was specialized on the national and international
transactions of financial instruments.
Nonetheless, the name of Banco Espírito Santo only appeared in 1920, following
a fusion with Banco Comercial de Lisboa, which originated Banco Espírito Santo
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Comercial de Lisboa. This was nationalized after the 1974 revolution, gaining
again a private status only in the second half of eighties.
BES Group is a universal financial services group, offering a set of services
oriented to all type of segments, namely individual, corporate and institutional.
BES Group also operates on different business areas, as commercial banking,
investment banking, asset management, as described below:
- Commercial Banking, through Banco Espírito Santo retail network
(100%);
- Asset management, through Espírito Santo Activos Financeiros (90%)
and Banco BEST (75%);
- Investment banking and venture capital, through Banco Espírito Santo
de Investimento (100%);
- Insurance, owning participations in some insurance companies, like
Companhia de Seguros Tranquilidade;
At the same time, BES Group has a strong international presence, especially in
some countries with cultural and economic affinities with Portugal, like Spain,
Brazil, Cape Verde, Venezuela, United States of America, China, Poland, France,
United Kingdom and Libya.
In Spain, BES Group operates through its 25 branches and 9 corporate centers.
BES Group is also present in Brazil, through BES Investimento do Brazil and
BESAF – BES Activos Financeiros. In Angola, BES Group has a strong presence
through BES Angola, benefiting from its 34 branches, 1 private banking center
and 1 corporate center. The activity of BES Group in Cape Verde is limited to the
existence of 2 branches. In Venezuela, BES inaugurated recently a one branch.
In Lybia, BES Group operates through a 40% stake in Aman Bank, owning 33
branches. In Poland, BES Group is present through Espírito Santo Investment
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Sp. In France, BES Group conducts its activity through Banque Espírito Santo et
de la Vénétie, in which it has a 42,69% stake. In China, BES Group is
represented by BES Oriente. In the USA, BES Group conducts its activity
essentially through Espírito Santo Bank, based in Miami. In the UK, BES owns
one branch.
In the end of 2011, the main shareholders of BES Group were BESPAR -
S.G.P.S., S.A. (35%), Crédit Agrícole, S.A. (8,63%), BRADPORT, S.G.P.S., S.A.
(4,83%), Silchester International Investors Limited (5,67%) and Portugal
Telecom, S.G.P.S., S.A. (2,09%). The remaining capital is spread by different
shareholders.
Santander Totta Group
The Group Santander gained importance in the Portuguese market in
December 2000, after the acquisition of Banco Totta & Açores. The latter bank
had been re-privatized only in the end of 1992.
Santander Totta Group is present in several business areas, like commercial
banking (individuals and small business, companies, promoters and brokers,
cards and POS, and transaction banking), global banking and markets (equity,
cash equities, fixed income sales, corporate finance and custody), asset
management (investment and pension funds), among others. The presence of
the group on those business areas is done sometimes through specialized
companies:
- Commercial Banking through Banco Santander Totta;
- Asset management through Santander Gestão de Activos, Santander
Asset Management and Santander Pensões;
- Insurance and Health Care using Santander Totta Seguros.
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Internationally, the Group Santander is present in Angola, Cayman Islands and
Porto Rico, through Banco Caixa Geral Totta de Angola, Serfim International
Bank & Trust, Totta & Açores Financing and Bst International Bank,
respectively.
In the end of the first semester of 2012, Santander Totta Group was owned
essentially by Santander Totta, S.G.P.S., S.A. (97,65%) and TaxaGest - S.G.P.S.,
S.A. (2,22%).
BPI Group
The origin of this group was Sociedade Portuguesa de Investimento, founded in
1981. In 1985, Sociedade Portuguesa de Investimento changed its name to
Banco Português de Investimento (BPI) and acquired the possibility to take
deposits, grant short-term credits, participate in the interbank market and
some foreign exchange transactions.
In 1991, BPI acquired Banco Fonsecas & Burnay, ensuring its entry into the
commercial banking activity. So, BPI began to ensure the provision of a wide
range of products and financial services to individuals and corporations.
In 1996, BPI also acquired Banco Fomento do Exterior and Banco Borges &
Irmão, resulting in the creation of BPI Group in 1998 as a fusion between these
three different banks.
Nowadays, BPI Group focus on five different business areas, like commercial
banking, investment banking, private equity, asset management and insurance,
as described below:
- Commercial banking, carried on by Banco BPI (100%) and the services
provided by the Madrid branch;
- Investment banking, through BPI (100%) and BPI Suisse (100%);
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- Private Equity, through BPI Private Equity (100%);
- Asset Management, through BPI Gestão de Activos (100%) and BPI Vida
e Pensões (100%);
- Insurance, owning participations in Allianz Portugal (35%) and in Cosec
(50%).
On an international level, BPI Group is represented essentially in Angola and
Mozambique, through Banco de Fomento Angola and Banco Comercial e de
Investimentos, owned in 50,1% and 30% by BPI Group, respectively.
The largest subsidiaries of BPI Group are Banco BPI (capital owned: 41.6 M€ -
100%), Banco Português de Investimento (62.1 M€ - 100%), Banco Fomento de
Angola (558.1 M€ - 50,08%), BPI Vida e Pensões (140.2 M€ - 100%), Companhia
de Seguros Allianz Portugal (182.7 M€ - 35%), BPI Gestão de Activos (24.2 M€ -
100%), among others.
In the end of the first semester of 2012, BPI Group was mostly owned by Grupo
La Caixa (39,5%), Santoro (19,4%), Grupo Allianz (8,8%) and HVF, S.G.P.S., S.A.
(3,0%). The remaining capital is spread by different shareholders.
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Financialisation, Economy, Society and Sustainable Development (FESSUD) is a
10 million euro project largely funded by a near 8 million euro grant from the
European Commission under Framework Programme 7 (contract number :
266800). The University of Leeds is the lead co-ordinator for the research
project with a budget of over 2 million euros.
THE ABSTRACT OF THE PROJECT IS:
The research programme will integrate diverse levels, methods and disciplinary
traditions with the aim of developing a comprehensive policy agenda for
changing the role of the financial system to help achieve a future which is
sustainable in environmental, social and economic terms. The programme
involves an integrated and balanced consortium involving partners from 14
countries that has unsurpassed experience of deploying diverse perspectives
both within economics and across disciplines inclusive of economics. The
programme is distinctively pluralistic, and aims to forge alliances across the
social sciences, so as to understand how finance can better serve economic,
social and environmental needs. The central issues addressed are the ways in
which the growth and performance of economies in the last 30 years have been
dependent on the characteristics of the processes of financialisation; how has
financialisation impacted on the achievement of specific economic, social, and
environmental objectives?; the nature of the relationship between
financialisation and the sustainability of the financial system, economic
development and the environment?; the lessons to be drawn from the crisis
about the nature and impacts of financialisation? ; what are the requisites of a
financial system able to support a process of sustainable development, broadly
conceived?’
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THE PARTNERS IN THE CONSORTIUM ARE:
ParticipantNumber Participant organisation name Country
1 (Coordinator) University of Leeds UK
2 University of Siena Italy
3 School of Oriental and African Studies UK
4 Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques France
5 Pour la Solidarite, Brussels Belgium
6 Poznan University of Economics Poland
7 Tallin University of Technology Estonia
8 Berlin School of Economics and Law Germany
9 Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra Portugal
10 University of Pannonia, Veszprem Hungary
11 National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Greece
12 Middle East Technical University, Ankara Turkey
13 Lund University Sweden
14 University of Witwatersrand South Africa
15 University of the Basque Country, Bilbao Spain
The views expressed during the execution of the FESSUD project, in whatever
form and or by whatever medium, are the sole responsibility of the authors. The
European Union is not liable for any use that may be made of the information
contained therein.
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